The US intelligence report released last Monday delivered a  severe blow to Washington’s policy of trying to “contain” Iran and finished off Bush administration plans to conduct military strikes against Iran’s nuclear and military facilities. The National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), produced by all 16 US intelligence agencies, rejected administration claims that Iran is trying to develop nuclear weapons.

The NIE also revealed that “in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear programme”, this suspension lasted several years, and that Tehran “had not restarted its nuclear weapons programme as of mid-2007”. The estimate, based on new data and re-evaluation of old material, says Iran is unlikely to produce enough enriched fuel for a weapon before 2010-2015, if it chooses to do so.

US President George W Bush responded to the report by arguing that Iran remains “dangerous” because it is obtaining the know how to produce nuclear fuel, which could be used for bombs. He said that the US policy remains unchanged: therefore, the use of force is still an option. Britain and France backed up his call for strengthening sanctions but China, a permanent veto-wielding member of the UN Security Council, dismissed stronger sanctions, Russia is expected to follow suit, and influential US politicians and opinion-makers insist that Bush engage the clerical regime in dialogue, a long-standing Iranian demand.

Bush was briefed on the NIE in July but warned in October that Iran’s refusal to halt its nuclear programme could precipitate World War III. The White House challenged the evidence and attempted to discredit  sources. The NIE was originally completed in the autumn of 2006 but was redrafted three times under pressure from Vice President Dick Cheney, the administration’s chief hawk who wanted to alter the findings or, even, suppress the report.

Although the NIE holds that “international pressures” may have contributed to Iran’s decision to halt its weapons programme, analysts argue that Tehran probably took this step because the US had toppled the Baathist regime in Iraq, Iran’s main enemy.

Iran was also influenced by the 2002 exposure of its nuclear ambitions, the revelation that it had acquired nuclear technology from the Pakistani A Q Khan network and the readiness of Britain, France and Germany to negotiate an agreement on security if Iran would suspend uranium enrichment.  This agreement, concluded in October 2003 between Iran and the three European states, bound Tehran to sign the Additional Protocol of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and end enrichment and reprocessing activities in exchange for security co-operation and the declaration of the region as a zone free from weapons of mass destruction.

Iran also proposed a “grand bargain” with the US involving security guarantees, talks on all issues and normalisation of relations. But the Bush administration, prodded by Israel, which regards Iran as its chief antagonist, opposed both the European initiative and the Iranian proposal.

The NIE bolsters the position of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) which argues that Iran has provided answers to some queries about its past secret activities, but must be more informative and transparent about its ongoing programme.

The NIE restores the authority of the US intelligence agencies which earned condemnation for their failure to report correctly on Iraq’s lack of weapons of mass destruction, giving the administration a pretext to wage war and topple the Baghdad regime. But the NIE also seriously undermines the credibility of the administration which has,  once again, been caught misrepresenting intelligence with the aim of creating a pretext for military action or boosting sanctions.

Bush, seen as a man not to be trusted, is not only a lame duck during the next 13 months but his antics have weakened US leadership on the world scene. If Europe were to step into the vacuum, it might be able to reach an accord with Iran and assert its role as a determining power in West Asia and elsewhere.