The sounds of terror-related violence have, for some time, been seemingly muffled, if not completely quiet in Jammu and Kashmir, which has borne the brunt of terrorism for nearly two decades. 

With the security forces neutralising several of the key “area commanders” of the Pakistan-backed Hizbul Mujahideen it is said  that militancy is on the wane and only about 900 terrorists are holed up in different locations in J&K. The focus of terrorism has apparently shifted from Kashmir to South of India.

Though the official claim may be taken with a pinch of salt given the international linkages of the terror history of J&K, the report card of the South on the terror front, is, increasingly causing disquiet with confirmation of well entrenched terror modules in Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala and Tamil Nadu.  

The pattern of terrorist violence in the country in the last two years showed that militancy was travelling towards the southern region as terrorists have repeatedly zeroed in on targets in Hyderabad and Bangalore. It is in fact a phase of “loss of innocence” for the southern states.

The gradual terror push towards the South is not only on account of pressure in the North but also a part of long-drawn and a well thought out policy of having an “all India terror presence”. The main motive of terrorist strikes in the South is to further expand “the corridor of communal tension” in the country. 

Externally funded, aided and controlled, terrorism seeks to strike at the key installations or institutions, particularly the religious ones, at any place in the country at a given time. Largely untouched during the ’80s and ’90s, the South is now gradually been drawn into the vortex of terrorism.

Unlike in the North where the contours of terror designs of the outfits -- Hizbul Mujahideen, Lashker-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammad and outlawed organisations like SIMI and others -- are well chronicled by the security forces, the southern states have not been seized of the growing infiltration by terrorist organisations in the metropolitan cities like Hyderabad and Bangalore.

“Whether it is a SIMI, Lashkar, Tabliq-e-Jamaat or Deendar - the same members keep shifting from one organisation to another and remain well-rooted in different southern states”, says former CBI Director Joginder Singh who had a long stint in Karnataka.  

Whirlpool of terror

There are mixed reasons –political as well as administrative -- for an unsuspecting South being suddenly caught into the whirlpool of terrorist storm.

Lulled into complacency, the forces in the South were not adapt at such routine exercises as surveillance of calls to terror-infested Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan or to any other “hot” destination. This apart, there has not been any aggressive and accurate intelligence gathering accompanied with a possible data base of terrorist organisations in the South Indian cities or hinterlands, especially in Karnataka. Although it is doubtful whether the Central government itself has a data bank on terrorist network on an all India scale!

Needless to say, counter-terrorism that involves waging an asymmetrical war, demands sophisticated technology and trained personnel, going hand in hand with precise intelligence.

Lacking in these counts, police and intelligence agencies in southern states have not been prepared for the sudden eruption of terrorist strikes in the major cities. Despite the emergence of broad contours of terror network, anti-terror cells have not been in place. The counter-terror mechanism remains ineffective on account of inadequately trained police.

The real time and the city specific intelligence has been a casualty in the anti-terrorist operations in southern states, resulting in the loss of precious time, giving terrorists an advantage in places like Bangalore, Hyderabad and Chennai. 

The inter-state intelligence coordination and that with Intelligence Bureau (IB) has not been smooth despite umpteen official meetings, be that of chief ministers’ security conference, DGP level interaction or the state specific coordination initiated by the Union Home Ministry. A piecemeal and reactive policy rather than a pro-active one has yielded ad hoc anti-terror measures, leaving wide gaps to let terror suspects or the organisations to escape the security dragnet.

Additionally, there is the problem of “ego.” As the law and order is a state subject, the Central government’s attempt to handle terror by forming a federal agency is being opposed by most of the states, fearing infringement in their powers.

The Multi Agency centre (MAC) and the Joint Task Force on Intelligence (JTFI)–the two wings created under Intelligence Bureau–have not been able to work to their full potential in feeding the terror specific information to states and to upgrade intelligence skills of state intelligence in counter-terrorism. The shortage of manpower in the two wings of the IB as also wrangling over funding of states training and upgrading programme on counter-terrorism has bedeviled the fresh anti-terrorism moves.

Absence of an anti-terror law like POTA has also been cited as oen of the reasons for failure to  checkmate terrorist strikes in southern states. POTA  allowed the detention of a suspect for up to 180 days without the filing of charges in court. Under regular Indian law, a person can deny such confessions in court. Barring India, most of the countries facing terrorism have a terror specific law.

The tale of terrorism in south of Vindhyas has just begun and may progress with grim consequences, given the “unexplored depth” of terror entrenchment in four otherwise “peaceful states.”