Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, a Kurd, told Ankara to limit its incursion in scope and time while Massoud Barzani, head of the Iraqi Kurdish regional government, warned Turkey it would face resistance from Iraqi Kurdish peshmerga forces if civilians are harmed. Last week, peshmerga risked a clash when they prevented Turkish troops from leaving a base established inside Iraq.
Iraqi government spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh stated, “We know the threats that Turkey is facing, but military operations will not solve the (Kurdish rebel) problem.” A worried US Defence Secretary Robert Gates said the operation should be of “short” duration and urged Turkey to come to terms with its 25 per cent Kurdish minority.
There is serious concern in Washington that major Turkish attacks could destabilise Iraqi Kurdistan, particularly if peshmerga defend their territory.
While Baghdad is trying to play down the offensive by claiming Turkey has deployed less than 1,000 troops in its ground operation, the Turkish military says 8,000-10,000 soldiers (two brigades) are involved. Ahead of the invasion, Turkish warplanes took out five bridges, depleting the rebuilt infrastructure of Iraq’s most stable and prosperous region.
Rare winter offensive
The Turkish military has several reasons for mounting this rare winter offensive. The generals seek to pre-empt a spring offensive by rebels of the Turkish Kurdish Workers Party (PKK). The generals want to warn the Iraqi Kurds not to press for the annexation to their region of the oil fields of the Kirkuk area or enhance their autonomy so their region becomes a virtually independent state. Turkey is not prepared to tolerate an Iraqi Kurdish state because it would encourage Turkey’s Kurds to continue their struggle for their own entity or for union with Iraqi Kurds.
The generals are also determined to force the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP), which has its roots in political Islam, to accept the military’s central role in policy-making.
By hyping the PKK menace, the army can pursue its long-standing policy of dealing forcibly with rebel Kurds rather than accept the government’s efforts to conciliate the Kurds and make them partners in the modern Turkish state.
Turkey’s secular politico-military elite is alarmed by the rise of the AKP which appeals to the country’s conservative and devout lower middle, working and rural classes whose men wear beards and women headscarves, seen by the elite as symbols of backwardness.
So far, the AKP has been compelled to go along with the ongoing military adventure but if, as expected, the PKK revives and attacks the army in coming months, the government may be able to resume its efforts to win over its troublesome minority rather than try to bludgeon it into submission. AKP success would seriously reduce the power of the generals and strengthen Turkish democracy.