The apex court said that there has to be sufficient evidence that the partner was responsible along with the other colleagues in committing the offence.
"As regards the criminal liability of a partner in the firm, in the light of the provisions contained in Section 141 of the NI(Negotiable Instruments) Act, there has to be evidence that at the time the offence was committed, the partner was in-charge of and was responsible to the firm for the conduct of the business of the firm," the court said.
A bench of justices Aftab Alam and R M Lodha passed its ruling while allowing the appeal filed by a company's partner Sarojben Ashwinkumar Shah challenging the criminal prosecution against him under the NI Act in a cheque bounce case.
In this case, criminal complaint was initially filed by Gulamnabi Hebatkhan Sumara and others against Rashmi Builders, a partnership firm and two of its partners - Ashwinkumar Tribhovandas Shah and Chandravadan Gopaldas Thakkar - in the court of judicial magistrate after a cheque for Rs five lakh issued by the accused bounced at the bank.
The complainants subsequently sought inclusion of two other partners - Paresh Lakshmikant Vyas and Sarojben Ashwinkumar Shah (appellant) as co-accused by invoking the provision of Section 319 CrPC, upon which they were issued summons.
Sarojben Shah challenged the summons before the Gujarat High Court which dismissed his plea, following which he moved the Supreme Court. Upholding the appeal, the apex court said, "The basic requirements for invoking the above section is that it should appear to the court from the evidence collected during trial or in the inquiry that some other person, who is not arraigned as an accused in that case, has committed an offence for which that person could be tried together with the accused already arraigned.
"It is not enough that the court entertained some doubt, from the evidence, about the involvement of another person in the offence. In other words, the court must have reasonable satisfaction from the evidence already collected regarding two aspects."
Accordingly it reverted the matter to the high court for fresh appraisal, but clarified that its order would not have any bearing on the merits of the case which would be dealt appropriately by the trial court.