Time for change

The India China relations are typically framed in a cooperative-competitive-conflictual framework to describe the operational state of affairs. Each of these images describes India-China relations in some issue area or region. But there is also something of an overarching image and attitude that reflects how a state defines a relationship.
In this sense, there is still reticence and mistrust that shape how India approaches China. There is a premium for being risk averse and eschewing ambitious policy innovations. This applies on all fronts – the border dispute, economy, regional affairs, and, global politics.

The Modi government came with an initial impulse to implement the accumulated consensus that has been established in recent years – that despite the border dispute, ‘common interests’ in diverse areas should be tapped. These include the economy both at a bilateral trade and investment level and also co-developing or participating in new multilateral institutions of global finance emerging in the non-western world. The idea that India and China can establish a “developmental partnership” was the big narrative shift in Modi’s approach during the Xi Jinping visit last September.

Yet, the dominant image of mistrust remains unchanged. It is by no means evident that India China relations can be transformed by focusing only on the economy. Some kind of a wider geopolitical understanding – at its core is the border dispute – seems essential for the bilateral equation to yield positive outcomes in the areas where common interests are generally presumed to prevail. Now, the question can be asked is why change the framework at all?

The short answer is, despite the decades long glacial process of diplomatic normalisation and incremental expansion in the bilateral menu of engagement, the dominant image of discord remains resilient. Some argue that perceptions of mistrust have actually increased over the past year. The second factor is the economy. The Modi government has underpinned its domestic and foreign policy themes around industrial modernisation, and, China is perceived as an opportunity to redress structural weaknesses in India’s economy and overcome some of its capital needs to propel faster growth.

The third factor, which has made it imperative for India to re-evaluate its China policy framework, is China’s changing interests in the neighbourhood. This change in the context and regional setting has become too apparent to wish away. China is changing its South Asia policy and is going beyond just an India-centric and Tibet-centric security approach. We are still in the early stages but Beijing is transitioning towards a more active regional policy where its earlier arms length posture is being displaced by a more strategic and proactive attempt to shape the regional order and link it with China’s political economy.

The above three reasons are collectively making it more and more challenging for India to sustain a China policy that is built on tentatively dealing with the parts rather than addressing the whole. If we examine the two big rapprochements between China and other major powers – the 1970s Sino-American normalisation, and, the post-1986 and post-Cold War China-Russia normalisation – both were driven by a political level decision and choice to alter the conflict-dominant image. The economic and strategic interdependence of the last three decades between China and the advanced economies, and, China and Russia was a consequence, not the cause, of a grand political détente.
In the case of US and China, they reached an understanding on East Asian and global security and stability. Although it was originally built on an anti-Soviet platform, the basic accommodation survived for more than two decades after the end of bipolarity. It has only recently begun to fray with the changing balance of power. In the Russia China case, it was a mutual recognition that the Sino-Soviet conflict had gone too far and was undermining national interests of both sides. By 2008, China and Russia had solved all their territorial disputes paving the way for a genuine strategic partnership. Importantly, none of these political accommodations with China inhibited the pursuit of national interests.

Profound policy questions
This is something that policymakers need to recognise as we think about different kinds of China policies and strategic choices in the changing global context that we now face. The policy relevant questions for Modi are profound. At one level, should India probe for a deeper transformation and test the early cooperative rhetoric that Xi’s regime has been signalling since 2013? Are there domestic costs to a more ambitious China policy on Modi’s part? Are there international repercussions for a bolder policy?

At another level, and this is becoming necessary, is managing India China interactions in South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region. As China pursues a bigger regional policy and even competes with the US in the wider region, India has to define its interests clearly and sensibly to avoid getting caught in the geopolitical crossfire. India has to identify where its red lines lie and where it might have common interests or at least not diverging interests with China.

For example, pressures to alter the territorial status quo or destabilise South Asian regimes or promote anti-India sentiment in South Asia are obviously clear red lines. But what about China attempting to improve its energy security or expand its economic, financial and political footprint in Southern Asia?

The March 2015 official document on China’s ‘Belt and Road’ idea states, “It is a pluralistic and open process of cooperation which can be highly flexible, and does not seek conformity.” Should India seek to strategically plug into this emerging political economy network on terms that it finds acceptable?

Modi’s quest to emulate a Deng Xiaoping-style modernisation strategy requires a China policy that is both realistic and open to fundamentally altering the meta-image of the bilateral relationship by probing for a limited geopolitical understanding with China.

(The writer is a research scholar at King's College London)