Buffer zone or new LAC?

Danger of Misperception

The Indian Army and the Chinese PLA have begun to withdraw from the conflict site in Galwan Valley after mutually agreeing to create a 4-km buffer zone between them in Ladakh, a second such zone after both sides moved back by two kilometres at PP (Patrolling Point) 14, creating the first buffer zone. The friction point at Pangong Tso appears to be still tense, pending resolution.

The declaration and mutual acceptance of buffer zones and temporary suspension of patrols by the two armies is neither permanent nor should it be misconstrued as a new narrative on the Line of Actual Control (LAC). This interim arrangement, mainly to de-escalate the crisis, should be viewed as a necessity and situational compulsion. The signals to Beijing that its claims over Galwan Valley remain untenable should be loud and clear. However, there is no denying that India’s acceptance of the hitherto non-existent buffer zones will be seen as a drastic change in its perception of the LAC.

The Indian Army’s right to patrol till PP14 is temporarily suspended because of the acceptance of the buffer zone. How long this suspension will last is uncertain. In the absence of ground-level verification of the troop pull-out and clarity on the extent of Chinese intrusion into our side of the LAC as perceived by Delhi, the phased de-escalation process will take time to complete, restricting patrolling by both armies in the area. Whether China will stick to the bargain is inevitably a part of the current enigmatic discourse.

While both armies have withdrawn to a safe distance from a position of dangerous proximity to one another, the details of the actual extent of withdrawal are not available. Both armies are tight-lipped, so are the political establishments in Delhi and Beijing. The silence and opacity of the Chinese side is understandable as their top leader is not answerable to his people. The silence on the Indian side wears the cloak of military secrecy and hence information is not forthcoming, which is also understandable in the given circumstances.

It is not clear if the PLA has withdrawn by two km from PP15 (Hot Springs). A similar retreat was expected to be completed at PP17 (Gogra) by the Indian Army pulling back proportionately to help de-escalate tensions. PLA soldiers have been noticed in the Finger Area near Pangong Tso. Disengagement by China here is reportedly marginal. The Indian Army is keeping a close watch on the ongoing pullback by the PLA. It is critical to verify every stage of the disengagement process to avoid surprises.

The disengagement in Galwan Valley, Hot Springs and Gogra could set the stage for reducing tensions in the Finger Area and also turn the focus on the Depsang plains, where the PLA’s forward presence is hindering Indian Army’s patrolling patterns. The biggest challenge is to prepare for, and avoid the consequences of, strategic miscalculation by either side.

That will depend much on China’s intentions. Delhi has to be on constant alert as the possibility of the PLA reoccupying positions vacated by India cannot be ruled out at any point of time. India will have to insist and ensure that disengagement verification is done to its satisfaction, including by aerial and satellite means.

A great apprehension is that the buffer zones might become the new status quo along the LAC. That would be completely detrimental to India’s national security. The buffer zones are expected to be treated by China as a temporary measure to facilitate the military disengagement process to restore status quo ante. In time, the Indian Army would be able to exercise patrolling rights. Otherwise, the challenges would be far too many for India, arising out of this disproportionate arrangement, and would confirm the view that Delhi still doesn’t have a measure of China’s mind.

In battlefields and conflict zones, withdrawal is not necessarily defeat or retreat. It is part of tactics and strategy. There are innumerable instances of conflicting parties agreeing to a ceasefire or withdrawal, only to prepare for a renewed attack.

It is important to note that there is no verification of the actual withdrawal that has taken place at the ground level. Since the government is on record as saying that there is no intrusion, the question of withdrawal does not arise. Yet, if the two armies have taken a position on the border and stationed themselves at some given spots, these spots could be interpreted as the new LAC. Much of the missing information will trickle down only when the situation thaws and normalcy returns.

The 2017 Doklam crisis was followed by the Modi-Xi informal summit at Wuhan in 2018. The optics was encouraging but, according to some analysts, there was little substance in terms of outcomes. Subsequently, the two countries agreed to work closely on projects to improve economic relations and on regional issues. There were major differences of opinion and disagreements, especially on terrorism emanating from Pakistan. Despite the rough relationship, the second informal summit meeting between the two leaders took place in Mahabalipuram near Chennai, Tamil Nadu. No one would have thought then that the relationship between the two countries would plummet to a new low in just over a year.

Xi’s China, determined to emerge as the next superpower, is willing to use military and economic might in its attempt to subjugate the region and grab territories. Needless to say, Beijing did not relish Modi’s comment that the “age of expansionism has ended”.

Delhi must prepare a new strategy to deal with an expansionist China. A two-pronged strategy, one that relates bilaterally to China and another to the emerging global coalition against it, will have to be developed into action plans.

(Kumar is Professor of Geopolitics and International Relations at Manipal Academy of Higher Education, Manipal; Chari is a member of the BJP’s National Executive and a well-known strategic analyst and political commentator)