Despite a written agreement to disengage, China is upping the ante

Exactly a year since the June 15 carnage at Galwan in which 20 Indian soldiers died fighting the Chinese, an eerie silence prevails on the borders between the two countries. China admitted, after eight months, to four casualties on its side.

Both countries have mobilised forces extensively across the western sector of the Line of Actual Control (LAC), but also with an eye on at least 20 spots in other sectors across the nearly 3,488-km unresolved border.

Despite the 11 rounds of corps commanders’ meetings in the border areas, and specifically even after the February 10 “written agreement” to disengage and de-escalate at “all friction points,” things are far from normal yet. Except in the Pangong Tso sector, troops are yet to disengage at several points along the LAC.

China has mobilised thousands of troops in Depsang Plains, Gogra Heights and at other places, blocking Indian patrols’ traditional patrolling duties that stretch from Karakoram in the northwest to Chumar in the southeast of the Ladakh sector. A buffer zone was agreed to in other areas, resorting to a previous confidence-building protocol — of the two sides not patrolling in an area simultaneously.

However, the military posturing in the past year has only intensified, and in the absence of any major diplomatic understanding and progress on disengagement on the ground, things could flare up at any time in the coming days and months.

China escalated the situation by sending in additional troops or re-inducting troops in the forward areas on the border. An estimated 50,000-60,000 troops from the PLA Western Theatre Command’s 76th and 77th Group Army are mobilised, with the 6th Highland Mechanised Infantry Division from Kashgar and the 4th Highland Mechanised Infantry Division from Aksu tasked with operations in Aksai Chin.

Second, China has deployed its latest, terrain-specific kinetic systems to wage mountain warfare with India. Thus, the lightweight 38-tonne Type 15 tanks were mobilised in large numbers, along with T-99, T-96B, WZ-551 armoured personnel carriers and the latest Dongfeng Mengshi vehicles since November last, in addition to converted 122-mm towed artillery guns, PCL-181 truck howitzers and PHL-03 multiple rocket launchers.

China’s air force is also in overdrive, with surface to air missile systems such as FN-6, HQ-16, HQ-17, PG 59 and HQ7A deployed to counter Indian air power. It has also inducted its latest fighter aircraft — the J-20, J-20A, J-20B, J-10B and J-11 (Su-27), besides its Z-9 and Z-20 helicopters. There are 12 airfields facing India, five of them dual-use in nature and with fortified, underground shelters. Expansion of the runways and the PLAAF’s efforts to overcome high-altitude aviation problems have been spotted. China is also building heliports opposite Indian advanced landing grounds. A large number of Chinese drones, such as Y-9 and Y-20, are deployed in the area.

China has also strengthened its non-kinetic responses through cyber, information and electronic warfare platforms. It has an advantage in ISR capabilities and a quantitative edge over Indian forces, but the PLA is saddled with professionalism issues among its ranks. As Chief of Defence Staff Gen Bipan Rawat stated at the Raisina Dialogue in April 2021, China is attempting to change the status quo on the borders with disruptive technologies.

The PLA has stepped up military exercises in the border areas. In July last, it conducted artillery exercises to test “long-range precision strikes and fire-assault capabilities in plateau environments.” Two months later, troops in Tibet conducted exercises to test “adaptability and strike capability in ultra-high-altitude areas.” An “emergency mission 2021” was conducted by the military and para-military forces in the Western Theatre Command. Twenty fighter aircraft — J-11 (Su-27) and others — conducted aerial exercises closer to the borders in the Ladakh sector earlier this month. This was followed by the 76th Brigade with helicopters and 77th “Tiger Brigade” with armoured exercises in Tibet. Army aviation units at Kunlun Mountains conducted exercises with Z-10 helicopters.

China is also enhancing its outreach to the border areas through dual-use infrastructure build-up. It has already built nearly 118,000-km of roads in Tibet, with Ngari Prefecture, opposite Ladakh, getting the lion’s share of connectivity. Roads linking Nyingqi Prefecture, opposite Arunachal Pradesh, have also been built. On May 16, China connected the last border county in Tibet at Medog by a highway. The new 14th Five Year Plan has further allocations for building military infrastructure. In the Ladakh sector, China’s aim is strategic domination from Highway 219 in Aksai Chin. It has also built over 20 tunnels on the border with Pakistan. In 2006, it had inaugurated Tibetan railway to Lhasa, which has been extended to Shigatse and is now set to be connected to border areas. The People’s Daily newspaper advertised the transport of missiles by these railways as deterrence posture against India.

To further militarise border areas, China is forcibly vacating Tibetan nomads from their traditional habitats and converting these into military bases and camps at Rutok, Gampa, Dingri, Shigatse, Ngamring, Nyalam and other counties, thus further engineering the demographic profile of the region. It has also implemented 628 “xiaogang” (well-off society) villages across the LAC, populating these with Han families. Since February, China is also raising a special Tibetan Army Unit from Ngari and Zamda areas.

Beijing is also waging psychological warfare against India. A barrage of articles in the Communist Party-led publications have been warning India of the growing asymmetry in power relations, showcasing military exercises and equipment, and advising India to play “second fiddle” to China, focus on epidemic control and desist from moving closer to the US.

As China was unable to clinch matters with India in the western sector, it has been invoking its “iron brother” Pakistan recently. Defence Minister Wei Fenghe visited Islamabad last December to “safeguard regional peace and security”. Prior to that, the all-powerful Central Military Commission Vice Chairman, Xu Qiliang, visited Pakistan in August and helped set up an artificial intelligence centre. These have led to speculation about a “two-front war” against India, both in the continental and maritime spheres.

Thus, the continuing armed stalemate in the border areas over the last year suggest that there will be no quick resolution as China refuses to follow the protocols agreed upon since the 1990s. China’s emerging “zone of actual control,” instead of the Line of Actual Control that came into being since the 1993 agreement, gives an indication of the attempt to change the status quo. India needs to strengthen its all-round deterrence capabilities.

(The writer is Professor in Chinese Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University)