Equip village defence force to face evolving threats

The ambush on an Indian Air Force (IAF) convoy on May 4 in Shahsitar area of Poonch district by Pakistani terrorists in which one airman was martyred and four others wounded points to the fact that the Pakistani army is shifting its activities towards Poonch – Rajouri axis close to the 220-km Line of Control for various strategic reasons.

The Pir Panjal ranges, which had been peaceful between 2003 and 2021, are resonating with gunfire, prompting the Indian security forces to have a relook at their strategy in containing terrorism in the region. This was the third such incident this year

Earlier, on April 22, terrorists killed a 40-year-old villager Mohammed Razaq of Kunda Top near Shahdra Sharief in Thanamandi area as he happened to be the brother of a Territorial Army personnel.

Six days later, in an operation launched on intelligence-based input to apprehend terrorists in Basantgarh area of Udhampur, a village defence guard Mohammed Sharief was killed in an encounter with terrorists in Tharua forest near Panara village in Basantgarh area.

That 19 security personnel were martyred last year in Poonch and Rajouri districts while 30 militants were neutralised in the operations conducted by security forces is indicative of the focus of the Pakistan Army having shifted to this region.

Investigations into the ambush on the IAF convoy reveal that the ambush was led by Pakistani army officer-turned-militant of Lashkar-e-Toiba Illiyas alias Fauji along with two others. Sketches of two of the militants were released by the police announcing a reward of Rs 20 lakh on them.

The militants used highly sophisticated weapons like the M4 carbines in the ambush, which perhaps are the ones left by US forces while retreating from Afghanistan. Use of steel bullets by the militants is another cause for worry as these bullets are capable of penetrating vehicle sheets and even bullet proof jackets when fired from a close range.

That there has been an intelligence failure about the movement of the militants is amply evident. The mistake of IAF personnel in moving in the evening gave the militants ample time to strike and vanish into the forests in the darkness after which it becomes difficult and highly risky to pursue the retreating militants.

Operating in the forests after dusk is fraught with the danger of suffering own casualties and security forces have to perforce wait till dawn the next day to conduct operations. By then, the militants would have covered a long distance and retreated into their bases across the border.

Most of these ambushes are classified as “deliberate” ambushes as they are well planned, rehearsed and executed to inflict maximum casualties on the security forces.

They observe the movement of the forces for a few days and even gather information before they plan. IAF personnel would be their soft targets as they do not carry out independent operations against militants. The vulnerability of such soft targets imposes upon them the need to exercise precautions of a high degree so as not to fall into the trap of militants.

The road was not sanitised by road opening patrols leaving the area free for the militants to strike at will at a suitable spot of their choosing for the ambush, after which they could easily make good their escape without the security forces chasing them in hot pursuit.

With 10 to 15 militants having infiltrated into the Pir Panjal region and spotted in Poonch and Rajouri belt, IAF should have avoided movement in the evening. As is the practice, after all such incidents, a court of Inquiry is ordered which will come out with its recommendations to forestall such incidents in future.

Since intelligence inputs assume paramount importance in the war against terror, the intelligence grid calls for upgradation and enhanced pro-active tapping of sources. In Jammu and Kashmir, there are several intelligence agencies that are on the prowl in most places. But lacunae exist, and they need to be plugged. It is here that the Village Defence Guards (VDGs) can
be assets not only in gathering intelligence but also to take on the militants when the need arises.

Consequent to militant attacks on villagers of Dhangri in Rajouri on January1last year in which five of them died followed by an IED blast the following day in which two children were killed and 14 others injured, the Village Defence Committee (VDC) was revived with a new name as Village Defence Guards. Back in 1995, VDCs were formed in 10 districts of Jammu to defend the villagers from terrorist attacks.

Several ex-servicemen and civilians joined the VDCs and the villagers enjoyed a sense of security. With a strength of 26,567 personnel, these VDCs also served as sources of information about the movement of militants to the nearby security forces.

he experiment proved its efficacy. Attacks by militants declined. But some of them indulged in crimes which turned into irritants for the villagers. As many as 160 criminal cases were registered. With militant activities at the lowest ebb, the government disbanded the VDCs, much to the relief of villagers.

With VDCs in place since last year, their potential needs to be exploited. They are not only equipped with weapons but have also been trained by the Central Reserve Police Force. They can prove to be assets when they accompany the security forces. Their familiarity with the terrain and ability to identify strangers in their areas could be conducive in carrying out operations.

In the event of a person getting killed in operations, as had happened in Basantgarh on April 28 when VDG Mohammed Sharief was martyred, their families need to be paid solatium as any other security forces personnel. Strengthening of VDGs could go a long way in containing militancy in the region.

Though there could be instances of some VDGs going berserk and misusing the weapons entrusted to them, periodic monitoring of their activities would be able to curb the menace.

(The writer is a retired Inspector General of Police, CRPF)