<p>After the unprecedented violence against the iconic `Jinnah House’ residence of the IV Corps Commander in Lahore as also other military properties all over the country on May 9, the Director General of the Pakistan Army’s Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) denounced the events of the day as a “black chapter”. He criticized Imran Khan’s `Tiger Force’ volunteers as a “group wearing a political cloak” and accused it of doing “in the lust for power” what Pakistan’s “eternal enemy” could not do in 75 years.</p>.<p>This denouement was on the cards ever since Imran’s ouster as the prime minister in April 2022. His relations with former Pakistan Army Chief, Gen Qamar Javed Bajwa turned sour over the removal of Lt Gen Faiz Hameed from the helm of the ISI. In public meetings, Imran likened the senior army leadership not only to `jaanwars’ but also to historical betrayers Mir Jafar and Mir Sadiq.</p>.<p><strong>Read | <a href="https://www.deccanherald.com/specials/turmoil-in-pakistan-not-good-tidings-for-india-1220319.html" target="_blank">Turmoil in Pakistan not good tidings for India</a></strong></p>.<p>Overcoming insecurities over the perceived unfair distribution of assets during Partition, the Pakistan Army emerged as the country’s most powerful institution, donning the mantle of a saviour protecting the sovereignty of the country. Whenever constitutional processes were disrupted, the common public welcomed its entry into the political domain, as it satiated partly, their disenchantment over ineffective governance and the venality of civilian politicians.</p>.<p>Experimental or `hybrid’ transitions to limited democratic revival came with the proviso of the army’s control over Pakistan’s policy on India and the nuclear trigger. The last such `hybrid’ experiment was in the 2018 elections which brought Imran’s Pakistan Tehrik e Insaf (PTI) to power.</p>.<p>From 2013 onward, army patronage helped Imran create a sizeable public following, especially among urban youth and women. When the army decided to dismantle its Imran Khan project in November 2022, retiring army Chief, Gen Bajwa, lamented continuing criticism by social media trollers and announced a decision not to interfere in politics. This did not really convince sceptics among Pakistan’s disgruntled, media-savvy middle-class and unemployed youth.</p>.<p>While Imran’s agenda is not for asserting civilian supremacy but an unabashed quest for authoritarian power, a surreal hope lingers, to change the reality of the army’s dominance. Pakistan’s newly empowered middle classes hate the Generals’ pelf and privileges, easy access to the landed property at concessional rates. Its corporate forays have not assuaged unemployment. This is partly why support for Imran continues. It is also a cult following where nothing evil sticks to his persona, despite the exposure of double standards on his claims of honesty.</p>.<p>Surprisingly, the superior judiciary, which has been the army’s handmaiden in the past, has given Imran kid gloves treatment this time case by case, indicating a desire to consolidate its own new-found (post-2007) independence, and a conviction that these cases constitute unfair victimization, designed to keep the PTI chief out of elections, which he may win with landslide mandates, whenever they are held.</p>.<p>No `colonels coups’ from below have ever succeeded in the Pakistan Army. When Imran launched his tactic to make the new army chief’s selection controversial, divisions emerged due to the ambitions of the lieutenant generals in line for succession, like Faiz Hameed and Azhar Abbas. However, the new army chief’s selection boomeranged to Imran’s disadvantage, with Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif opting for Gen Asim Munir, whom the cricketer-turned-politician had prematurely shifted out of the ISI in 2019.</p>.<p>While decision-making in the Pakistan Army is notionally collegiate, the Chief of Army Staff remains the face of its unbridled power. This reality will reassert as Gen Munir consolidates his support.</p>.<p>Imran will now have to reckon with the deeper anger these attacks against military installations have generated. The army will quell the protests. Imran may be re-arrested under tougher laws that restrict judicial scrutiny. No martial law will be enforced and the elections will not be held before October 2023.</p>.<p><em>(The writer retired as Special Secretary at the Cabinet Secretariat of the Government of India.)</em></p>
<p>After the unprecedented violence against the iconic `Jinnah House’ residence of the IV Corps Commander in Lahore as also other military properties all over the country on May 9, the Director General of the Pakistan Army’s Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) denounced the events of the day as a “black chapter”. He criticized Imran Khan’s `Tiger Force’ volunteers as a “group wearing a political cloak” and accused it of doing “in the lust for power” what Pakistan’s “eternal enemy” could not do in 75 years.</p>.<p>This denouement was on the cards ever since Imran’s ouster as the prime minister in April 2022. His relations with former Pakistan Army Chief, Gen Qamar Javed Bajwa turned sour over the removal of Lt Gen Faiz Hameed from the helm of the ISI. In public meetings, Imran likened the senior army leadership not only to `jaanwars’ but also to historical betrayers Mir Jafar and Mir Sadiq.</p>.<p><strong>Read | <a href="https://www.deccanherald.com/specials/turmoil-in-pakistan-not-good-tidings-for-india-1220319.html" target="_blank">Turmoil in Pakistan not good tidings for India</a></strong></p>.<p>Overcoming insecurities over the perceived unfair distribution of assets during Partition, the Pakistan Army emerged as the country’s most powerful institution, donning the mantle of a saviour protecting the sovereignty of the country. Whenever constitutional processes were disrupted, the common public welcomed its entry into the political domain, as it satiated partly, their disenchantment over ineffective governance and the venality of civilian politicians.</p>.<p>Experimental or `hybrid’ transitions to limited democratic revival came with the proviso of the army’s control over Pakistan’s policy on India and the nuclear trigger. The last such `hybrid’ experiment was in the 2018 elections which brought Imran’s Pakistan Tehrik e Insaf (PTI) to power.</p>.<p>From 2013 onward, army patronage helped Imran create a sizeable public following, especially among urban youth and women. When the army decided to dismantle its Imran Khan project in November 2022, retiring army Chief, Gen Bajwa, lamented continuing criticism by social media trollers and announced a decision not to interfere in politics. This did not really convince sceptics among Pakistan’s disgruntled, media-savvy middle-class and unemployed youth.</p>.<p>While Imran’s agenda is not for asserting civilian supremacy but an unabashed quest for authoritarian power, a surreal hope lingers, to change the reality of the army’s dominance. Pakistan’s newly empowered middle classes hate the Generals’ pelf and privileges, easy access to the landed property at concessional rates. Its corporate forays have not assuaged unemployment. This is partly why support for Imran continues. It is also a cult following where nothing evil sticks to his persona, despite the exposure of double standards on his claims of honesty.</p>.<p>Surprisingly, the superior judiciary, which has been the army’s handmaiden in the past, has given Imran kid gloves treatment this time case by case, indicating a desire to consolidate its own new-found (post-2007) independence, and a conviction that these cases constitute unfair victimization, designed to keep the PTI chief out of elections, which he may win with landslide mandates, whenever they are held.</p>.<p>No `colonels coups’ from below have ever succeeded in the Pakistan Army. When Imran launched his tactic to make the new army chief’s selection controversial, divisions emerged due to the ambitions of the lieutenant generals in line for succession, like Faiz Hameed and Azhar Abbas. However, the new army chief’s selection boomeranged to Imran’s disadvantage, with Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif opting for Gen Asim Munir, whom the cricketer-turned-politician had prematurely shifted out of the ISI in 2019.</p>.<p>While decision-making in the Pakistan Army is notionally collegiate, the Chief of Army Staff remains the face of its unbridled power. This reality will reassert as Gen Munir consolidates his support.</p>.<p>Imran will now have to reckon with the deeper anger these attacks against military installations have generated. The army will quell the protests. Imran may be re-arrested under tougher laws that restrict judicial scrutiny. No martial law will be enforced and the elections will not be held before October 2023.</p>.<p><em>(The writer retired as Special Secretary at the Cabinet Secretariat of the Government of India.)</em></p>
