The unfortunate demise of first CDS Gen Bipin Rawat in the recent tragic helicopter accident is a major blow to the restructuring and reform process of the Indian military. He was a pusher and a man in a hurry. It needs a man like Gen Rawat who can take bold decisions, right or wrong, to initiate radical changes.
But now that the CDS system is somewhat in place, the new CDS, whenever appointed, must take careful stock of the road travelled so far, whether the structure needs further tweaking and the challenges ahead. I say the CDS is somewhat in place, with deliberate emphasis. That the appointment of CDS, long overdue, was necessary is unambiguous. However, the structure to assist the CDS in discharging his duties has taken time to evolve. It relates to the two hats that he wears, the first as the Permanent Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee and the second as the Secretary of the Department of Military Affairs (DMA).
The first one, that of the Permanent Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee, is the most important role of the CDS. The government has tasked the CDS with achieving jointness and integration, optimisation of the organisational structures, joint planning and acquisition process, joint logistics, and help save through rationalisation of the defence budget. Over the last two years, much of the discussions and press releases have revolved around theatre commands, prioritisation of capital procurement, and aspects related to manpower, pensions etc. The late General brought his forceful personality into this functioning if one goes by public pronouncements. The controversial statement on the Air Force being a supporting arm that the Navy is better off with submarines than the aircraft carrier or the DMA proposal on graded pensions, all created significant controversies and indicated a strong personality imprint.
The Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC), therefore, becomes the biggest task and challenge for the new CDS in terms of getting the structure and the working culture right. The CDS as the permanent chairman of the COSC is very important for his role as the single-point military advisor to the defence minister and the prime minister. But that power rests on the collegiate functioning of the COSC. Effectively, it is the COSC’s advice to the government. A permanent chairman brings better coordination and the weight of well-directed discussions. All research and support work is provided by the Integrated Defence Staff. Hence, the structure of the COSC needs attention. Although the head of the IDS, CISC (chairman of the integrated defence staff to the chairman chiefs of staff committee) is seen as the Deputy CDS, the structure needs to be formalised. The Deputy CDS should also be a four-star member of the COSC and function as the chairman in the absence of the CDS. Quite naturally, he will be the second senior-most ranking officer next to the CDS, and above the other chiefs. This strengthens the COSC structure. A fully structured COSC, with a permanent chairman and a deputy chairman, lends a better mechanism for evolved decisions. The advice and decisions that come from this process will be strong and make the CDS’ role far more effective.
Theatre commands
The issue of joint or theatre commands is a major challenge for the new CDS. He needs to be careful that he is not seen as forcing a change at the behest of the government more from a structural and financial perspective. This is a major operational restructuring. It should be driven by operational considerations. There is a subtle difference between jointness and theatre commands. Joint operations or integrated operational structures are necessitated by the changing nature of war and technology. India has been hampered by a land-centric mindset for long. Our problems with Pakistan and China, counterinsurgency, low-intensity conflict, terrorism, and the Army’s involvement in all these along with its huge size have contributed majorly to this land-centric mindset. This explains the controversial statement on the IAF by the late CDS.
War has changed. The effectiveness of national security strategy and military strategy lies in robust deterrence of the adversary through demonstration of warfighting capability. Airpower is vital in this and should lead the way. India’s operational philosophy should rest on the critical capabilities of airpower and naval power, with the army providing the punch and deterrence from the ground. The CDS needs to bring this change in mindset. It will also redefine the acquisition priorities in favour of an urgent focus on airpower in terms of precision, swift response, robust outreach, and deterrence.
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If the above is well understood, the jointness or integrated operations approach will be better managed. As for theatre commands, the CDS must convince the government of articulating the national security strategy that should define our national interests and accordingly the necessary power projection. Integrated commands are not an exercise in financial saving alone. It is primarily one of operational necessity and that alone should govern this restructuring. Financial savings will naturally follow.
The second part is about the DMA. The CDS theoretically does not have an operational mandate. However, every work and restructuring that he initiates will have a major bearing on operations. The CDS should define the overall operational philosophy, which will mandate joint operational planning. All this will have a bearing on how DMA deals with manpower policies, logistics and acquisition. Integration of civilian bureaucracy into the DMA is the right start.
However, this needs to be done in the IDS and Service headquarters as well. This will be CDS’ biggest challenge. The acquisition process has already been optimised significantly by the IDS. The CDS will bring more weight to these changes from his role as permanent chairman of COSC.
Finally, the elephant in the room is about theatre commands and commanders. What India is doing is exactly what the US system grappled with for 25 years. Our Service chiefs are also operational commanders. Notwithstanding the CDS role, theatre commanders will continue to be influenced by their service loyalties, which may circumscribe the effectiveness of the concept of integrated commands/theatre commands.
The disappointing experiences of managing such turf battles is what finally led to the famous Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. What is more interesting is that the call for such intervention was made by the then Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, who was also the former chief of the US Air Force. Will India’s CDS wait for another 25 years to learn its lessons?
(The writer is former Deputy Chief of Integrated Defence Staff. He is now the president of The Peninsula Foundation, Chennai)