We are now nearing one year of the ongoing standoff between the Indian Army and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in Ladakh and it is perhaps time to take a critical look, both at past events and future prospects. Such an examination could throw up some suggestions for the resolution of one of the most serious military disputes between India and China after the Wangdung incident of 1986.
The first reports of a military buildup in Tibet came in January 2020 when Global Times reported PLA’s New Year exercises in Tibet. This was perhaps passed off as routine because similar exercises had been carried out by the PLA in January/February of 2018 and 2019. In May 2020, Chinese soldiers carried out large-scale intrusions across the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the Galwan Valley, Gogra, Hot Springs, and North Bank of the Pangong Tso lake. There were also reports of PLA troops blocking Indian patrols from accessing large parts of the LAC in the Depsang plains in northern Ladakh.
The intrusions came as a complete surprise as there was no immediate provocation that could have triggered the Chinese action. Battling the COVID-19 pandemic, and hoping that the matter could be peacefully resolved, the Indian government initially sought to downplay the issue. However, the bloody clash at Galwan in June that left 20 Indian and numerous Chinese soldiers dead revealed that the current Chinese incursions were completely different from their past actions.
Spurred into action, the Indian military carried out a massive induction of forces into Ladakh. The Indian government also took numerous economic steps, banning Chinese apps and putting restrictions on Chinese investments and procurement of products in the telecom and power sectors. After five Corps Commander level meetings failed to break the impasse, in a swift manoeuvre, the India Army occupied dominating heights along the Kailash Range in the South bank of Pangong Tso in August. According to the Northern Army Commander, Lt. Gen. Y.K. Joshi, this was the closest that the two sides came to an armed conflict.
Further discussions between the two sides led to an agreement in February 2021 for a mutual disengagement and pull back of troops from the North and South Banks of Pangong Tso. While the PLA would withdraw from Finger 4 to Finger 8 in the North Bank, the India Army would vacate the Kailash heights occupied in August. There was some criticism of this agreement on the grounds that by giving up its advantage on the Kailash Range, the only real pressure that India had leveraged over the PLA would be released. In hindsight, this argument does appear to have merit.
Recent talks on the two sides on the restoration of the status quo in the areas of Gogra, Hot Springs, and Depsang have yielded no results. In the latest Corps Commander meeting held earlier this month, the Chinese representative reportedly said that India “should be happy with what has been achieved”. It is clear that the PLA is adopting the same intransigent attitude that was seen at the start of the crisis last year.
Looking ahead, India needs to have a clearly defined strategy. The aim should be to get the PLA to withdraw from areas that they have occupied since last year. If this means a temporary moratorium on patrolling by both sides in specified sectors (similar to the arrangement at Pangong Tso), this should be acceptable. Hoping for status quo ante is neither practical nor feasible after all that has transpired in the last one year. The clock cannot be turned back.
Getting the PLA to pull back across the LAC will require a firm posture on the ground in Ladakh and a nuanced communication approach that conveys a clear message that China’s actions along the LAC are unacceptable. This requires consistent messaging across all organs of the government, but only the Ministry of External Affairs appears to have got it right.
The Indian Foreign Minister, S Jaishankar, has constantly maintained that bilateral ties have been “very significantly damaged.” Speaking at the Lowy Institute in December last year, he said, “We are very clear that maintaining peace and tranquility along the LAC is the basis for the rest of the relationship to progress. You can’t have the kind of situation you have on the border and say let’s carry on with life in all other sectors of activity. It’s just unrealistic”.
Messaging from other government “sources” has been mixed and the clearest illustration of this is the narrative about Depsang Plains. Strategically, Depsang is an extremely important area, and it is vital that the PLA does not gain any territorial advantage in this sector. Unfortunately, the blocking of Indian patrols in the area is being painted as a legacy issue dating back to 2013 and hence not linked to the current standoff. Apart from the fact that all disputed areas along the LAC are legacy issues, such statements will only serve to weaken India’s position. If the situation at Depsang, as per Indian admission, has remained unchanged for the last eight years, the PLA could simply refuse to discuss this area.
While the Indian Army continues with a deterrent deployment along the LAC, it is time for diplomacy to take centrestage. It is apparent that neither side is considering the military option to resolve the ongoing crisis. Continuous statements by military officials on the threat from China, though factual, can only harden positions and should be avoided. President Roosevelt’s advice to “speak softly and carry a big stick” is perhaps the way forward.
(The author retired from the Indian Army as the GOC-in-C of its Northern Command. His area of operational responsibility included the Ladakh Sector)