It was in April 2020 when the headquarters of the Indian Army’s 14 corps at Karu near Leh started receiving reports from forward posts about Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s build-up along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) – the de facto boundary between the two nations in the western sector. The PLA moved to hinder traditional patrolling pattern of Indian Army troops in the Galwan Valley in late April and early May. A skirmish on the northern bank of Pangong Tso on May 5 left some soldiers of the two nations injured. China’s army made several attempts to transgress into the territory of India over the next fortnight. The Indian Army responded to the Chinese PLA’s move with counter deployment – resulting in stand-off in multiple locations all along the LAC. It reached a flashpoint with the clash in Galwan Valley on June 15, when the Indian Army lost 20 of its soldiers. The PLA later revealed that it had also lost four soldiers in the violent face-off.
A year has now passed since it all started, but the stand-off is still on.
When the two sides withdrew front-line troops from the face-off points on northern and southern banks of Pangong Tso last February, it did raise hope for an early end of the stand-off. But the two rounds of talks between the senior military commanders on February 20 and April 9 as well as a video-conference between the senior diplomats on March 12 failed to make any headway towards similar disengagement in other face-off points along the LAC. The Chinese PLA is particularly reluctant to withdraw its front-line troops from Gogra and Hot Springs to restore the April 2020 status quo ante. It is rather trying to put pressure on the Indian Army to accept its new positions, which are not only well into the territory of India, but also beyond 1959 claim-line of China.
China is also not ready to restore the status quo ante in Demchok and Depsang Plains, where it has been trying to push the LAC westward into India over the past several years.
Liu Lin, the chief of the PLA’s South Xinjiang Military Region, took a hardline stand during his last meeting with the GoC of the Indian Army’s 14 corps, Lt Gen P G K Menon. The meeting on April 9 ended without any joint statement, unlike the previous few rounds of talks between the senior military commanders of the two sides.
That the PLA of late deployed advanced long-range precision-strike rockets closer to the LAC clearly indicated that China would maintain the pressure on India.
Beijing has been asking New Delhi to withdraw additional troops the Indian Army deployed in ‘depth’ areas along the LAC in April-May 2020 in response to the Chinese PLA’s build-up. India, however, made it clear to China that only complete disengagement of troops from all the face-off points along the LAC would “pave the way for two sides to consider de-escalation of forces and ensure full restoration of peace and tranquillity and enable progress in bilateral relations”.
When New Delhi struck the deal with Beijing for mutual disengagement of front-line troops from both banks of Pangong Tso a few weeks ago, questions were raised if the Indian Army was giving up its leverage against the Chinese PLA. The Indian Army had occupied the dominating heights in the Kailash Range on the southern bank of the lake in an overnight operation on August 29-30 last – a move, which had succeeded in forcing the Chinese Army to give up its absolutist position and return to the table of negotiation to end the impasse.
An element of the deal New Delhi and Beijing clinched for withdrawal of troops from the face-off points on the banks of Pangong Tso is the “temporary moratorium” on “military activities” by the soldiers of the two nations on the North Bank, “including patrolling to the traditional areas”.
The spurs of the mountain range on the northern bank of the Pangong Tso jut towards the lake like the fingers of the palm, with the Finger 1 at the western end and the Finger 8 at the eastern end. The Indian Army earlier regularly sent soldiers from its permanent base at the Dhan Singh Thapa Post near Finger 3 for patrolling all the way up to Finger 8. But it had to suspend patrolling after its troops had a scuffle with the Chinese PLA soldiers near Finger 4 in the first week of May 2020. The PLA later built bunkers and observation posts and deployed additional troops in the area – thus denying access to the Indian Army to its earlier patrolling limit at Finger 8, which also marked the LAC as perceived by New Delhi. China, however, claims that the LAC, after cutting through the lake, goes through the Finger 4.
Beijing’s demand for a moratorium on patrolling on the northern bank of Pangong Tso remained a sticking point in its negotiation with New Delhi for several months. India’s military strategists were sceptical about China’s proposal as they feared that the communist country would later use the moratorium on patrolling to buttress its claim on the entire stretch from Finger 4 to Finger 8. But Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Government finally accepted it, obviously with the hope that the disengagement of troops would start from the banks of Pangong Tso and soon the diplomats and the military commanders of India and China would also be able to work out a mutually acceptable formula for similar withdrawal of the front-line troops from other face-off points along the LAC.
The moratorium on patrolling now resulted in a buffer zone between Finger 3 and Finger 8 on the northern bank of Pangong Tso, just like the one created in Galwan Valley, where the Indian Army and the Chinese PLA had disengaged a few days after the violent face-off on June 20 last year.
Brahma Chellaney, an eminent strategic affairs analyst, called the deal New Delhi and Beijing had agreed upon for disengagement of troops on the banks of Pangong Tso as a “win-win” for China as the Buffer Zone created as a result of moratorium on patrolling between Fingers 3 and 8 included not only disputed areas, but also a swath of undisputed territory of India. With Beijing now again playing hard-ball with New Delhi on disengagement in Gogra, Hot Springs, Depsang Plains and Demchok, the questions on the Pangong Tso disengagement deal now appear to be valid.
China has of late renewed its attempt to play down the stand-off along its LAC with India. Sun Weidong, the communist country’s envoy to New Delhi, recently said that the boundary dispute was “not the whole story of China-India relations and should be put at a proper place in the overall bilateral relations”. He apparently suggested that notwithstanding the continuing stand-off along the LAC, China and India should bring the ties back on track.
Sun’s counterpart and New Delhi’s envoy to Beijing, Vikram Misri, responded. “We have also seen a tendency in some quarters to sweep this situation under the carpet and characterize it as just a minor issue and a matter of perspective. This too is inadvisable as it can only take us further away from a sustained solution to present difficulties and deeper into an unfulfilling stalemate.”
India and China had several agreements over the years to maintain peace and tranquillity along the disputed boundary between the two nations, pending a final settlement of the row. But Xi Jinping’s “Middle Kingdom” flouted all such agreements last year, as it brazenly sought to alter the status quo along the LAC. China’s move particularly violated its 1993 pact with India, which required both sides to keep military forces in the areas along the LAC to a minimum level.
The stand-off taught New Delhi a key lesson – quarantining the boundary dispute in pursuit of better India-China ties is not going to work.