People of Myanmar during the ongoing conflict. (Representative image)
The ongoing conflict in Myanmar presents a complex and multifaceted challenge which “risks becoming a forgotten crisis,” warned Ms Julie Bishop, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Myanmar. It has been over a year since Operation 1027, initiated by Myanmar’s Three Brotherhood Alliance (3BHA), which has reshaped the conflict dynamics in the country.
The 3BHA has achieved significant military gains over the past year, capturing over 130 military outposts in northern Shan State, including strategic locations like Laukkai, inflicting heavy losses on the junta and leading to the surrender of thousands of troops. The operational success of Operation 1027 has weakened the military, exacerbated troop morale and recruitment challenges, and exposed its vulnerability.
Additionally, the military has suffered significant territorial losses, particularly in the northern and western regions of the country.
The capture of strategic towns like Pinlebu by the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the Khawpoke camp in Karen by the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), and the AA’s capture of Ann Township in Rakhine State have weakened the military’s position.
Even the military’s attempts to regain control of a key intersection in northern Shan State have been met with fierce resistance, primarily from the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and local People's Defence Forces (PDFs).
Additionally, the Bamar People’s Liberation Army (BPLA) and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) have announced plans to launch operations in central Myanmar, including the Sagaing, Magwe, and Mandalay regions, after fighting alongside allied ethnic armies in Karen and northern Shan states.
China's influence
The situation is complicated by external influences, especially China’s role. Initially supportive due to border security concerns, China has grown wary of escalating violence, suggesting it may reconsider its stance based on stability along its border.
Recently, China suspended all cargo imports at border gates with Myanmar’s Wa autonomous region, affecting key items like fuel, construction materials, and electrical equipment.
This blockade, confirmed by the United Wa State Party (UWSP), began with restrictions at the Muse-Kyalgaung and Mongla-Tarlot gates on 22 October and extended to all Wa region border gates by 24 October.
Furthermore, the attack on the Chinese consulate in Mandalay in October 2024 highlights the deteriorating security situation and the risks associated with China's involvement.
Experts, including Ye Myo Hein from the US Institute of Peace, note that anti-China sentiment has intensified since the 2021 coup, as many believe China backs the junta.
While no group claimed responsibility, analysts suggest the incident reflects public discontent over China’s stance and involvement in regional conflicts.
It must be noted that since Operation 1027, China has increased its interactions with the Myanmar military as well as with ethnic armies.
Analysts suggest that China is playing dual tactics in supporting the military for a resolution of the crisis while simultaneously assisting ethnic armies in waging war against the Myanmar military, suggesting a certain displeasure with the military’s failure to curb online scams and deliver on China’s Belt and Road projects.
On the other hand, China invited General Min Aung Hlaing to Kunming for the first time since the 2021 military takeover. The two sides signed seven Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) on land lease agreements, training school upgrades, agricultural cooperation, and other areas.
Though Min Aung Hlaing informed the Chinese Premier of his intention to restart peace talks with the Three Brotherhood Alliance (AA, TNLA, and MNDAA), he emphasised that talks would only proceed if the alliance groups demonstrated a genuine commitment to peace.
During the talks, he sought increased support from China amid ongoing domestic struggles, and China reaffirmed its support for the junta's political roadmap and the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor.
China's continued support for the junta highlights its strategic interests in Myanmar, which are aimed at securing BRI projects, controlling Myanmar’s natural resources, and most importantly, securing access to the Indian Ocean.
China has also expressed concerns about the security of Chinese citizens and investments in Myanmar, particularly along the border regions.
India’s balancing act
During the 21st ASEAN-India Summit and the 19th East Asia Summit, Prime Minister Narendra Modi emphasised ASEAN’s centrality and the Five-Point Consensus while encouraging continued engagement with Myanmar.
India’s approach to Myanmar is closely tied to its concerns for border security and the Act East Policy, warranting a continuous though cautious engagement with the military.
Recently, on 14 October 2024, Myanmar and India signed five Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) under India’s Quick Impact Projects (QIP) initiative, aimed at fostering socio-economic development in Myanmar.
Apart from this, work on major projects has continued, and India also supplied humanitarian support under Operation Sadbhav in September 2024. However, in recent days, there have also been increased engagements with opposition forces.
India hosted Myanmar's political and military leaders for a seminar hosted by ICWA in New Delhi on themes of constitutionalism and federalism. Additionally few members of NUG and other ethnic armed organisations have been hosted for other meetings. These events align with India’s interest in stabilizing its border and countering China’s influence in the region.
It should be noted that India has faced security concerns in northeast India. Especially since the 2021 military takeover, the northeast region has witnessed increased insurgent activities, arms and drug trafficking, and a surge in refugees.
In the past three years, visits by Indian Foreign Secretaries in December 2021 and November 2022, and the Defence Secretary in July 2023, aimed at securing the northeast region and protecting border security.
India also decided to abolish the Free Movement Regime and fence the entire 1,643 km border with Myanmar, which has led to significant protests in the region. There was initial opposition in Manipur and Mizoram, and more recently, protests in Nagaland against border fencing.
The National Socialist Council of Nagalim (NSCN), the Nagaland Indigenous Peoples Forum (NIPF), and the Zo Reunification Organisation (ZORO) have strongly opposed the central government’s border fencing plans.
While India should reconsider its decision to completely fence the borders, it can regulate border crossings to allow legal movement of goods and people. In regions facing instability, fences could control movement and prevent spillover of violence. Additionally, India can utilise drones and other modern surveillance technology for better border monitoring.
Finally, China poses a significant challenge across the Indo-Myanmar border. China’s recent delivery of six FTC-2000G fighter jets to Myanmar highlights its increasing support for the military junta, despite international condemnation.
For India, the military cooperation between China and Myanmar poses border security risks, particularly as Myanmar’s ethnic armed groups have historic ties with insurgents in India’s northeastern states.
The unguarded border raises concerns over arms trafficking and a potential resurgence of violence, especially in sensitive areas like Nagaland and Manipur.
Additionally, as China fortifies Myanmar’s military, India’s ability to maintain stability and secure its border becomes increasingly complex.
Compounding this, Chinese-led scam operations in Myanmar have proliferated under the junta’s control, generating billions through fraud and targeting countries like India.
The situation places India in a strategic bind: while China consolidates its influence with Myanmar’s ruling regime, India must carefully balance its regional security concerns and developmental goals.
Recently, India has adopted a more balanced approach. While maintaining diplomatic ties with the junta, India has also engaged with various opposition groups and provided humanitarian assistance.
India's primary concerns are border security, counterinsurgency operations, and regional stability. However, India’s ability to influence the situation in Myanmar is limited by its own domestic challenges and the complex geopolitical dynamics of the region.
As Myanmar approaches its 2025 general elections, India might gain leverage if China’s dominance wanes. However, with China’s deepened role in Myanmar, India must remain vigilant to the growing security, economic, and strategic challenges at its northeastern border.
(The writer is a Senior Research Associate at Chintan Research Foundation)