In the decade preceding the 1962 China-India war, the Intelligence Bureau (IB)’s operations in India’s north-east were obscured by a ‘fog of espionage’ -- similar to the fog of war that militaries experience in combat operations. Then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru had declared Kalimpong, a buzzing town in the Himalayan foothills, a “nest of spies”. Yet, 60 years later, lacking an objective historiography, narratives are dominated by both the intrigue of a spy story and the horrors of State excesses.
Evidently, Kalimpong had become the epicentre of several foreign intelligence operations, whereas the Chinese spy operations expanded from Kalimpong to the wider north-eastern region. Prince Peter, a European anthropologist, was expelled from Kalimpong on suspicions of being a spy, while Hisao Kimura, a Japanese spy, had frequented the town under the guise of a Mongolian monk. Later, Marco Pallis, a British scholar who reached Kalimpong as an explorer, was influential enough to arrange a meeting between Gyalo Thondup, the Dalai Lama’s brother, and the director of the British intelligence agency, MI6. Such was the espionage landscape in Kalimpong.
China’s operations were partly facilitated by the history of India-China trade ties. Cross-border trade that commenced in the 1930s had resulted in large-scale economic migration from China to India. Considering the increasing espionage activities of the Chiang Kai Shek-led Kuomintang regime, the predecessor to Mao Tse Tung’s Communist China, after the Simla Accord, the British colonial IB drafted a report in 1944 exploring the threat posed by the Chinese population. This threat perception further strengthened following the People’s Republic of China’s annexation of Tibet in 1950. Assessing that the Darjeeling-Kalimpong-Gangtok area would be a source of international espionage and subversive activities, the IB opened an office in Kalimpong.
The other supporting feature for Chinese spy operations were the inherent Mongoloid prejudices existing in the region. This racial dimension was a severe impediment for Indian operations, at times with life-threatening consequences. An Assam Rifles patrol was reportedly lured by the tribes with food and shelter, only to be killed to the last man. Elsewhere, Indian security personnel were subject to poisoning and witchcraft. In these circumstances, India’s only advantage was its physical control of the territory, whilst China had no overt presence. However, the obstacles to Chinese operations were offset by the concessions India made during the Panchsheel Agreement.
In exchange for renewing permission for existing Indian trade agencies in Chinese provinces, India permitted establishment of new Chinese trade agencies (CTA) in New Delhi, Calcutta, and Kalimpong. The IB, which loathed such developments, could do little but bide its time. Immediately after the opening of the CTA in 1955, the IB took cognisance of its pro-Communist activities and propaganda. The Chinese consulate in Calcutta, along with supporters of the Indian Communist Party, were also seen as engaging in Chinese clandestine activities. However, it was only when bilateral relations began to visibly deteriorate during 1958-59 that New Delhi approved stricter security measures.
Mass surveillance of people of Chinese origin led to arrests and deportations. In January 1960, the IB’s Calcutta station directed its field offices to prepare and maintain an up-to-date note on “all Chinese nationals who have come to adverse notice”. The field officers were further encouraged to submit their recommendations alongside their notes to support deportation. The result was a compilation of files on hundreds of individuals who were later served ‘Leave India’ notices. Many were alleged to have been directly linked to the CTA’s spy ring. Despite these measures, it is difficult to estimate the exact outcome of the IB’s counter-intelligence operations since the Chinese intelligence web had expanded significantly beyond the CTA and the Chinese diaspora in Kalimpong and Darjeeling.
From at least 1958, evidence suggests that the Chinese had begun infiltrating trained spies into India. Organisations christened the ‘Commercial Academy’ and ‘Border Affairs Office’ were schools that trained thousands of Chinese spies disguised as traders. With elementary training in trading techniques, the recruits were imparted language courses in Nepali, Hindi and Bengali. Three infiltration training schools then absorbed the recruits to prepare them for infiltration into India. Thus, it is possible that the IB’s counter-intelligence, despite its stringency, might have been rendered ineffective by the sheer expanse of Chinese spying operations.
Alongside the Chinese operations, Kalimpong was famed for another kind of secret operation – the US Central Intelligence Agency’s covert training of the Tibetan rebels in para-military operations. Gyalo Thondup has recorded in his memoir that the Tibetans had hidden their activities with the Americans from the Indian government, especially owing to a promise made to B N Mullik, the then Director, IB. However, Mullik, an understudied personality in the world of spooks, was much more intriguing than history gives him credit for. From convincing Nehru to maintain contacts with the Tibetans to study their movement, to secretly negotiating with the CIA in Hawaii to continue support for the Tibetan resistance, Mullik was working on several dimensions of the spy game simultaneously. The intention was straightforward – to strengthen India’s security posture against China.
Despite these measures, the 1962 war was a total surprise. Counter-espionage operations certainly could not avert the humiliation India suffered. But life in Kalimpong was made difficult, especially for people of Chinese origin. A 1959 newspaper editorial reflecting the economic impact of India’s operations had commented that “even the spy business is down”.
Today, with geopolitical changes, the spy business is back once again. Intelligence officials now view the disproportionate growth of Buddhist monasteries around Kalimpong and Darjeeling as potential sources of Chinese intelligence and propaganda operations. Like the 1959-62 period, 2019-22 witnessed 81 Chinese nationals being served ‘Leave India’ notices. In such an environment, the public and policymakers will be better served by an objective historiography of Sino-Indian spy games.
(The writer is the author of ‘India’s Intelligence Culture and Strategic
Surprises: Spying for South Block’)