Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
Credit: Reuters Photo
In September 2024, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, while addressing a joint session of the US Congress, proposed the formation of an ‘Abrahamic Alliance’. He based this on the Abraham Accords, the historic peace agreement signed in 2020 between Israel, the UAE, Bahrain and, later, Sudan and Morocco. Netanyahu’s proposal aimed to expand on the diplomatic gains achieved by the accords and forge a more extensive coalition that would include other Arab nations. At the time, the idea seemed aspirational, far from grounded in reality, and more a reflection of Israel’s existential fears than a viable American strategy. The US had just begun grappling with domestic and foreign policy challenges, particularly in an election year, and the idea of formally joining an Israeli-Arab coalition appeared to lack broad political and public support.
A month later, however, the dynamics have shifted. With escalating tensions in the region, the United States has deployed its Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) system in Israel, accompanied by US troops to operate it. This development marks a significant escalation in American involvement, particularly as Israel faces increased missile attacks from Hezbollah forces in Lebanon and the looming threat of Iranian retaliation. Fielding the THAAD system signals that the US is bracing for broader hostilities, even as it publicly warns Israel against targeting Iran’s nuclear facilities.
The THAAD deployment comes in the wake of two significant Iranian missile attacks, one in April and another in October, which tested the limits of Israel’s existing defence infrastructure. These incidents have heightened Israel’s sense of vulnerability and prompted both Israeli and US officials to reconsider their next steps carefully. With Israel engaged in ground operations in Lebanon, where its forces have encountered unexpectedly high combat losses, the conflict is evolving into a high-stakes struggle for escalation dominance.
Israel’s pursuit of escalation dominance—gaining and sustaining the upper hand in a rapidly evolving conflict—now extends to both Lebanon and Iran. While Israel’s missile defence systems, particularly the Iron Dome, have proven effective against short-range projectiles, the addition of THAAD provides a critical layer of protection against medium and long-range ballistic missiles, most of which originate from Iran. With these capabilities in place, Israel can now focus on achieving decisive victories on the ground in Lebanon and potentially even launching strikes against key Iranian targets.
However, the US remains cautious. Although it has reiterated its commitment to Israel’s security, it has consistently advised against provocative actions that could spark a broader regional war, particularly an attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Such a strike would likely result in a more direct and large-scale confrontation between Iran and Israel, dragging the US deeper into the conflict. The US is aware that while the missile defence systems can mitigate aerial threats, they are powerless against the broader regional instability that could ensue if Iran retaliates against Israeli or US interests across the Middle East.
Domestically, American support for Israel is increasingly complicated. Since the October 7, 2023, Hamas attacks, which triggered renewed hostilities between Israel and Palestinian groups, there has been a noticeable shift in American public opinion. Younger generations, in particular, are expressing more sympathy for the Palestinian cause, as seen in campus protests and growing calls for the establishment of a Palestinian State. The rise of antisemitic incidents in the US further complicates the Biden administration’s stance, underscoring the delicate balancing act Washington must perform.
This growing divide between the political class and public opinion in the US is straining the traditional US-Israel alliance. While the political leadership remains committed to Israel’s defence, it is increasingly clear that US foreign policy is pivoting toward the Indo-Pacific region, driven by the need to counter China’s growing influence. The strategic recalibration, long in the making, reflects a belief in Washington that achieving lasting peace and stability in the Middle East may be beyond the reach of external powers. The focus on the Pacific theatre underscores a recognition that the US must build alliances in Asia, rather than becoming further entangled in the Middle East. Yet, the Middle East is now increasingly unavoidable in US strategy.
The deepening US involvement with the THAAD deployment certainly tips the balance in Israel’s favour militarily, at least in the short term. However, the broader geopolitical landscape remains fraught with uncertainty. Especially, the unwillingness of any Arab State to even touch Israel by a bargepole is telling, and relegates any Abrahamic understanding to the backburner. Countries like Saudi Arabia, which had shown interest in rapprochement with Israel, have remained conspicuously silent as the situation with Iran and its proxy forces escalates. It remains to be seen if the US is able to lure countries like Saudi Arabia and UAE to sit at the negotiating table for regional connectivity and trade, once the regional escalation spiral stalls.
(The writer is Deputy Director, Strategic Studies Programme, ORF)