Indian Home Minister Amit Shah.
Credit: PTI Photo
Despite a formal confirmation to The Washington Post by Canada’s Deputy Foreign Minister David Morrison that Union Home Minister Amit Shah was the “top Indian official” involved in the plot to kill Canadian citizens, there has been no official reaction from India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA).
The MEA’s silence is curious. Such undercover assignments are normally the domain of the external intelligence agency of India, the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW). The operational and line reporting of the R&AW is to the Prime Minister through the National Security Adviser (NSA). The charge, therefore, ought to have been easily deniable, as the R&AW would not normally report to the Union Home Minister.
Unless we believe that the Canadians are bluffing on a grand scale, we must allow that their allegations are based on evidence unearthed by the investigations of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). One can only surmise then, that if the charges are true, India’s external intelligence agency bosses were reporting directly to someone other than their line and operational superiors.
If Shah was indeed acting through the existing structure of the R&AW, then a number of well-trained agents would have been involved in operationalising the alleged conspiracy. Above all, it would require a responsible go-between with Lawrence Bishnoi lodged in Gandhinagar Jail in Gujarat. He could not be a freelancer like Nikhil Gupta held in the botched-up plot to assassinate Khalistani leader Gurpatwant Singh Pannun in the United States.
It is easiest for police officers to go and meet prisoners in jail. Although a right to information application to Gandhinagar Jail could reveal a list of visitors who met Bishnoi preceding the murder of Hardeep Singh Nijjar in Canada, police officers from any government agency probably will not figure in it.
If the Indian government wants to salvage the relationship with Canada, then like Vikash Yadav in the Pannun case, this hypothetical officer, liaising with Bishnoi, may well be the first to be sacrificed. That is the only way to shield the home minister from the alarming allegations made by the Canadians.
More importantly though, one must wonder whether the exposure of Shah’s name in the media was the result of incautious diplomacy on India’s part or a considered decision.
The crucial events preceding the disclosure of allegations against him took place in Singapore on October 12 between the Canadians, including a senior official of the RCMP, and India.
According to Nathalie Drouin, Canada’s Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s national security and intelligence adviser, the Singapore meeting took place after two previous attempts by the RCMP to present evidence to their Indian law enforcement counterparts had failed.
The first, a visit to India, was apparently cancelled by the Government of India on the grounds of ‘administrative technicality’. The second meeting with the RCMP was scheduled in Washington DC (in the US) on October 10, where the Canadian police officers waited, while the Indian officials who had confirmed their participation, did not show up.
It was only after this, that the RCMP approached the government in Ottawa about the “seriousness of the matter”. As a result, three officials — Drouin, Deputy Foreign Minister Morrison, and the Deputy Commissioner of RCMP — travelled to Singapore to meet India’s National Security Adviser Ajit Doval to appraise him of the evidence gathered.
In her testimony to the House of Commons Public Safety Committee on October 29, Drouin claimed that she and her colleagues presented “clear evidence” on October 12 to show that Indian agents were involved in violent criminal activities in Canada.
The Canadian side, she said, was exploring two options. One, to ask India to allow the RCMP to question its diplomatic and consular staff in its High Commission in Canada.
Option two, what she called “the comprehensive option”, was to ask India to stop “illegal activities” in Canada “including directing [Lawrence] Bishnoi to cease and desist”; issue a public statement about adopting a mechanism to investigate the actions “as they have done in the US [Pannun] case”; recall the diplomats involved; and announce a new India-Canada high level dialogue on countering extremism.
If India were to refuse both options, then Canada had decided that it would declare the said diplomats as persona non-grata, and the RCMP would issue a public statement explaining the situation.
The Indian representatives, according to Drouin’s testimony, “denied any links and everything we presented”. However, both sides agreed, at India’s request, that the discussions and disagreements be kept confidential till the discussions resumed after a day’s pause, on Monday, October 14.
However, the Indian side breached confidentiality when news appeared in India on October 13, that Canada had shown no evidence of Indian involvement in criminal activities on its soil.
This, Drouin claimed, convinced Canada that the government of India was “not going to be accountable or take the necessary actions”. It precipitated her government’s decision to declare certain Indian diplomats persona non-grata and “roll out a media engagement strategy” — that included speaking to The Washington Post to extend the reach of the Canadian narrative to counter the Indian one.
Indian officials briefing the media on the Singapore meeting should have known that the pre-emptive engagement with the press and complete denial of Canada having provided any credible evidence could be provocative. It could force the other side to reveal its hand including the release of incriminating evidence in the public domain as a pressure tactic.
Might it not have been better, in hindsight, to keep Shah’s name from appearing in public by continuing negotiations with Canada? A doable deal was being offered provided some of its was operationalised quietly.
Was the media briefing by Indian officials then just careless diplomacy? If, on the other hand, the briefing was a carefully considered one, then what was its objective? If naming Shah would stop the buck at him, then who was being shielded, and at what cost?
At this stage one can only speculate.
Going forward, things can only get worse for India’s international image. According to the Canadian officials, “classified intelligence” has not yet been released publicly. However, there is every chance of some of it becoming public once the Canadian judicial process kicks in. India already faces another potentially embarrassing judicial process in the US in the Pannun case.
(Bharat Bhushan is a Delhi-based journalist.)
Disclaimer: The views expressed above are the author's own. They do not necessarily reflect the views of DH.