Despite the lull and drawdown in media coverage, international engagement in Afghanistan is at a critical juncture. A looming humanitarian crisis, driven primarily by constraints in food and resource, economic turmoil and harsh winter, should underscore the immediacy of combined international action in this regard.
The most prominent impediment to taking international steps in Afghanistan is the Taliban, their inability to form an inclusive government and, above all, provide assurance to the international community that there will be a genuine follow through on critical tenets of governance and security. In fact, the Taliban’s return to the helm has only compounded challenges ranging from militancy and violence to human rights violations, for nations near and far. Consequently, international engagement with Afghanistan is bedevilled by the dilemma of choosing between inactivity on the one hand and engaging the Taliban, despite their anachronistic policies, on the other.
India finds itself at the heart of this quandary, divided between restoring Afghanistan as a strategic priority in its policy and the practical hurdles on the ground. Currently, India is assessing three broad ways of potential engagement with Afghanistan: providing humanitarian assistance, exploring a joint counterterrorism effort with other partners, and talking to the Taliban.
The end goal of all these is to restore people-to-people links and prevent backsliding of the gains Delhi’s developmental aid has made in Afghanistan in the past two decades. India has undertaken more than 400 key infrastructure projects in all 34 Afghan provinces and has signed strategic agreements to enhance trade and bilateral relations.
Beyond the historical and civilisational links that India and Afghanistan share, in the immediate circumstance, India recognises the importance of its investments in Afghanistan’s peace and development. Today, there is an open assertion made by India regarding Afghanistan, calling for the urgent, non-discriminatory distribution of humanitarian assistance across all sectors of the Afghan society.
As a responsible power and the largest in South Asia, India has deep stakes in not just the reconstruction of Afghanistan but also in safeguarding the interests of minorities, women and vulnerable sections of Afghan society. India has voiced its obligation to provide humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan at numerous multilateral fora.
In delivering assistance, India has opted to coordinate with other stakeholders, instead of with the Taliban. Apprehensive of the Taliban exploiting the current humanitarian crisis and following a partisan distribution process, India is more inclined towards distributing assistance through international agencies like the UN and the FAO as their involvement comes with an implicit larger consensus.
For India, one of the vital components of the ‘enabling environment’ is the establishment of a stable humanitarian aid corridor through Pakistan. Although Pakistan finally relented in permitting a free two-way transit between India and Afghanistan, its reluctant, conditions-based authorisation and deteriorating relations with Delhi rule out complete reliance on any such corridor.
India’s policies toward Afghanistan have been underpinned by the terrorism threat that emanates from Pakistan. The recent rise in terrorist attacks in Kashmir could well be a pointer of things to come. As such, India is cautious about a terror corridor that might be facilitated from eastern Afghanistan leading up to Kashmir, should a land-based link be established. Such concerns ride on the proximity of the Taliban with Islamabad and some of the Taliban’s statements on Kashmir.
India has consistently reaffirmed its support for UNSC Resolution 2593 and staunchly maintains that Afghan soil should not be used for anti-India terrorist activities. Counterterrorism is likely to play an increasingly pertinent role in shaping India’s policies vis-à-vis Afghanistan, even as India seeks an alignment in its broader Indo-Pacific obligations and its immediate South Asian goals. India has demonstrated a growing interest in developing more robust counter-terror approaches across various multilateral fora, including the UNSC and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.
More recently, the Quad’s focus on counterterrorism apropos Afghanistan could provide a rare opportunity to combine capacities with Australia, Japan and the US. The Quad members share a consensus on the significance of cooperation, the necessity of regulating funding channels and of closely monitoring means of recruitment via online media. The hosting of the very first counterterrorism table-top exercise (CT-TXT) by the National Investigation Agency has presented an opportunity to Delhi to lead the Quad’s counterterrorism narrative.
This could include the country using its bilateral intelligence-sharing networks with the US as a strong plank to improve and consolidate the intelligence-sharing capacities of the group. Additionally, India could also propose the development of a Quad-led counter-terror ecosystem: a regional structure bringing together the South Asian neighbourhood to deliberate over the best practices to regulate terror groups and combat violent extremism in the region. With India’s permanent representative to the UN recently named the new Chair of the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee, India could amplify such concerns at the global level.
In its wait and watch policy, India’s stance on the official recognition of Afghanistan under the Taliban and engaging Kabul finds resonance with most international and regional countries. Delhi is reluctant to draw sharp conclusions on the nature of the Taliban rule. However, there is a realisation that India should stay relevant and preserve its influence in the region. This has manifested in the events that led up to the Delhi Regional Security Dialogue on Afghanistan, assembling NSAs of regionally important countries.
While Delhi sought to convene critical stakeholders and pave a new political roadmap for a unified regional response to the Taliban, it experienced multiple hurdles in convincing the South Asian neighbourhood to align with its leadership. For instance, Pakistan and China chose to attend the Troika-plus deliberations, instead of joining India.
These competing approaches to Afghanistan will be a reality going forward. A realistic assessment of its goals, both long-term and short-term, together with readjustments, is the need of the hour in framing a strategically sustainable Afghanistan policy. Delhi rethinking the issue of opening its embassy in Kabul could be a good start.
(Mishra is Fellow, Observer Research Foundation; Dhabhai is Research Intern, Kalinga Institute of Indo-Pacific Studies)
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