Credit: DH Illustration
In what appeared to be a ‘done deal’ according to exit and pre-polls analyses, Haryana’s electoral outcome has opened a can of worms, raising questions about the Congress leadership and its inability to tactically outsmart the Bharatiya Janata Party. The BJP used a carefully micromanaged, booth-wise strategy that secured its third consecutive term. Not only did it perform well in core urban areas, but it also consolidated a larger voter base gravitating around the Jat districts among non-Jat groups (Other Backward Castes and Dalits) in rural areas.
Winning a third term in a state where the BJP lacks the cultural identification it enjoys in Gujarat or Madhya Pradesh is no small feat. Despite the Congress’ concerns over electronic voting machines, the central issue remains the role of the Congress leadership, which faces a continuing crisis. The leadership, anchored by the Gandhis as the high command—irrespective of who holds the party-president title—seems conflicted in balancing the old and the new cadres when shaping its electoral strategy in state (and national) elections.
In Haryana, for example, the party’s central leadership largely entrusted the old guard, led by the Hoodas, who, despite their efforts, failed to recognise the social realignment in the state’s socio-political landscape. They were unable to mobilise non-Jat voting groups with a better, more compelling developmental narrative and agenda.
The core problem here with the Gandhis runs deeper: they repeatedly rely on loyal but unsuccessful leaders to anchor electoral strategies in key states, despite past losses.
Yes, the Congress’ enormous party cadre may support the Gandhis’ emotively and sentimentally, but their inability to successfully win elections makes them a depreciating asset in political leadership and perhaps a liability in the future with the evolving dynamics of coalition-based politics (realigned by the 2024 Lok Sabha results).
Rahul Gandhi, despite his padayatras and exaggerated confidence gained from the 2024 Lok Sabha performance (while working closely with the I.N.D.I.A bloc), lacks electoral trade craft, which is mastered by rivals in the BJP (Shah-Modi).
Rahul Gandhi has continued to make his appearance, statements, and assertions during election campaigns more ideological, pegged against the BJP (by attacking them), as against electorally sensitising his address or speech to issues, areas where Congress needs to win big—more importantly, his speeches or interventions lack a vision or an alternative development agenda that people need and which go beyond entitlements or guarantees.
The empowerment-focused approach to safeguarding upward mobility is critical in shaping an alternative imagination of an electorate that feeds on new information from social media and YouTube and revises its choice architecture in a consumerist manner.
When it comes to winning elections, the digital narrative is as important as the local narrative, along with a booth-level strategy for influencing core-voter groups (mapping their needs with announced interventions).
In this context, Haryana’s debacle may simply be a reflective basket case of what is likely for the Congress in upcoming elections: Maharashtra (and Jharkhand), if it fails to get its act together.
The Grand Old Party is increasingly becoming a junior partner to bigger regional parties in critical polling states. It’s a temporal strategy that lacks imagination. From the Samajwadi Party in Uttar Pradesh to the Nationalist Congress Party in Maharashtra, the Aam Aadmi Party in Delhi, the Trinamool Congress in West Bengal, and the National Conference in Kashmir, the Indian National Congress has tried to be the little actor, merely staying relevant with the support of regional parties, provided there is mutual trust between these players. Unfortunately, the trust is also lacking on most occasions, as regional partners call the Congress out for its arrogance and high-headedness.
For the BJP, a direct contest against a Congress led by Gandhis is advantageous. The BJP’s strike rate in head-to-head contests, whether at state or national level, with the Congress has been strong, and Haryana reinforces the strength of its electoral machinery under Modi-Shah.
As argued earlier, the electoral scenario (BJP vs Congress) now is very different from how it was between these two parties in the 1980s or 1990s. The Congress remains trapped in the illusion of being the principal national opposition to the BJP, despite evidence to the contrary.
In the 2024 Lok Sabha elections, the I.N.D.I.A bloc’s campaign around constitutional values resonated with many centrist voters, who were wary of the dangerous implications of the BJP’s majoritarian, sectarian narrative. But, in state elections, a national party must move beyond such rhetoric. It can’t rely on ‘national’ narratives to win localised, closely fought elections.
As Pratap Bhanu Mehta argued in a recent column, the Haryana election outcome has further eroded confidence in the Congress’s tactical judgements. Given how the Congress party’s internal rivalries are too close to the surface, its two master narratives—one focused on caste and the other on farmers—are not enough to build a winning electoral strategy. In fact, they could backfire under some circumstances.
The Gandhis need to recognise these flaws. Their emphasis on singular issues, like caste and class, without connecting them to the complex, local dynamics and the rapidly changing aspirations of the electorate (whose needs and preferences are nowhere close to what they were a decade ago) needs careful assessment.
The Congress leadership also needs to ask if merely banking on the distribution of limited state resources, like public sector jobs or reconfiguring reservations, will create the coalitions it needs (especially from regional allies).
For now, the Congress’ vote share is built around an anti-BJP stance, but it lacks the imagination and vision needed to present itself as a viable alternative.
(The writer is professor, dean, and director, Centre for New Economics
Studies, O P Jindal Global University)