Empirical data based on a nationwide post-poll survey conducted by the Lokniti programme of the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS), which depicts deepened social divide on basis of religious identity, is acutely worrying because it underscores the heightened polarisation in the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) electoral constituency. This is at odds with Prime Minister Narendra Modi's pledge, after the astounding victory, of working to create an India which is both empowered and inclusive.
While it has been contended for a long time, since 2014 to be precise, that the ruling party was pursuing policies with the objective of maximising its support within the majority Hindu community, the survey provides the first substantive nationwide data of the BJP meeting with considerable success.
Undoubtedly, the party's victory in the Lok Sabha elections are primarily a result of increased enthusiasm that large sections of Hindus, cutting across caste divisions, exhibited for Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his blend of militarist nationalism and 'neo-Hindutva' electoral plank.
Moving ahead of old issues, like Ram temple, abrogation of Article 370 and introduction of Uniform Civil Code, that became the Sangh Parivar's political signature, the BJP has now carried its ideology into daily life and experiences by extending the Hindutva logic into arguments on almost all facets of social realities.
Up from 31.3 per cent in 2014, this time the BJP's vote share has risen to an all-time high of 37.4 per cent and this has come on the back of a significant spurt in the support from Hindus. From a support of 36 per cent of Hindu voters, this time the BJP's share of this majoritarian pie is 44 per cent and if one includes the votes of its allies, this breaches the 50 per cent mark and settles at 52 per cent.
If this is not sufficient indicator of the party's sectarian electoral base, the data demonstrates that a very small proportion of the religious minorities rooted for the BJP. While BJP leaders in private have often confessed that they had little expectations of a Muslims vote, the party's support among Sikhs also remains poor at 11 per cent and even this has declined from 16 per cent in 2014.
Although the BJP-Shiromani Akali Dal alliance won four of the 13 seats in Punjab and swept all seven seats in Delhi, there is more than a fair sprinkling of Sikhs voters in the capital – the support for National Democratic Alliance (NDA) within the community has declined. In 2014, along with the Akali Dal, the NDA vote share among Sikhs was 49 per cent and now it is down to 31 per cent. Christians too remain unenthusiastic towards the BJP and the deep polarisation on religious lines is a pointer to the fragile nature of social harmony in the country and the extremely limited nature of trust among the minorities for the BJP.
State wise, Hindu support for the BJP has jumped in leaps and bounds except in Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh, where the backing for the party had reached near-saturation levels in 2014.In these states the BJP support among Hindus increased marginally – three and one per cent respectively. However, in Assam where the party secured support of 58 per cent Hindus in 2014, this share has increased phenomenally to 70 per cent.
With a corresponding consolidation of Muslim vote for the main opposition party in every state, several states have become potential tinder boxes and the slightest provocation from the hitherto uncontrollable sections of the Sangh Parivar carries the potential of widespread social violence. In states like West Bengal, Odisha and Telangana, where the BJP sees opportunities for widening its popular base, this possibility is particularly acute.
Most worryingly, in West Bengal support for BJP among Hindus has gone up from 21per cent in 2014 by almost three times to 57 per cent. What carries the probability of this increasing further is the consolidation of Muslims around the Trinamool Congress.
In 2014, the survey states that TMC had the backing of 40 per cent of the Muslims while 31 per cent and 24 per cent of them rooted for the Left and Congress respectively. Besides enabling the BJP to trigger 'reverse polarisation' among Hindus, their decision to enlist for the BJP establishes that a Hindu constituency existed in the state and was not visible because nobody politically harnessed this constituency. This raises the spectre of situations that could result in Assembly elections being advanced from the middle of 2021, when next due.
Likewise, in Odisha and Telangana, support for BJP among Hindus has gone up from 22 to 40 per cent in the eastern state and 10 to 22 per cent in the southern state. Even in Kerala and Tamil Nadu, where the BJP did not win any seat, its support has gone up by 6 and 10 per cent respectively.
The growing support for the BJP among Hindus is not the result of a single overarching Hindutva campaign in these elections. Contrarily, little progress has been made with the three contentious issues which have been the BJP's political leitmotif since the mid 1980s when the party began its ascendance. The Ayodhya issue remains in limbo because of mediation and on the other two issues, the BJP has not pushed ahead and instead focussed on related matters – Article 35A and triple talaq.
BJP's success and widening appeal among Hindus is greatly the result of the idea of Hindu nationalism permeating into new areas and universalising the notion that Muslims have been consistently 'appeased' by the Congress and other non-BJP parties. As an ideology, Hindutva has permeated into new spaces: Organisational, territorial, conceptual and even rhetorical. This carries the portent of limiting democratic debate within the Hindu nationalistic framework – partially we have seen this happening with opposition parties opting for 'soft-Hindutva'.
There are also indications that neo-Hindutva is finding articulation through campaigns and actions that operate outside the framework of the Sangh Parivar. It would be difficult to find actual linkages between the RSS or its directly affiliated organisations and several violent incidents since 2014. It no longer requires 'approval' from the leadership, but the prejudice and hatred towards Muslims is so deep that, as the recent video demonstrated, people not only publicly flog Muslims but also record and publicise the act as proof of valour or 'contribution' to the Hindu 'cause'.
From the late 1980s it has been argued within liberal circles and among non-BJP political parties that the Saffron surge had peaked and would inevitably reach a point beyond which decline was certain because Indians were believed to be ‘inherently secular’. But the secularist has now been inverted in public imagination as the new 'political untouchable'.
In 2014, many believed that the support for the BJP was at its apex. It was thus assumed that old-school electoral mathematics would trump Hindutva forces. But it would be incorrect to assume that the present victory of the BJP marks the zenith of neo-Hindutva and the Sangh Parivar.
(Nilanjan Mukhopadhyay is a Delhi-based writer and author. His latest book is RSS: Icons Of The Indian Right. He has also written Narendra Modi: The Man, The Times (2013))