Brazil's President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva.
Credit: Reuters Photo
By Juan Pablo Spinetto
Brazil President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva turned 79 last weekend — a good reason for him to celebrate, but also to start thinking hard about his succession plans.
By the next presidential election in October 2026, in which Lula has signaled his possible participation, the former union leader who will have governed Brazil three times would be about to turn 81. If he were to win, Lula would be 85 when his new four-year mandate ends on the last day of 2030, making him the all-time Methuselah of Brazilian presidents.
Lula looks healthy and clearly in command these days, despite a recent domestic accident that meant several stitches on his head (plus the convenient cancellation of an uncomfortable trip to Russia). Those who have traveled with the president during some of his recent world tours speak with admiration of his stamina and drive. With his popularity hovering around 50 per cent and good news emerging on the economic front, it’s understandable he might want to seek another term. But he might want to put in a call to another elder statesman. As the 81-year-old President Joe Biden discovered, the age factor can be a tricky issue to navigate in modern politics.
On a recent trip to Brasilia, I picked up traces of anxiety in Lula’s camp over the uncertain political scenario emerging as the president embarks on the second part of his mandate.
Consider the three areas where the age factor is most likely to play a role.
First comes the selection of Lula’s running mate. If Lula indeed runs in what would be his seventh presidential race, the pick of his vice president would be consequential because of the non-zero probability that this person would have a bigger role in government. Current Vice President Geraldo Alckmin, 71, comes from a more centrist party (the result of the ample coalition built in 2022 to defeat the incumbent Jair Bolsonaro), but I have trouble imagining Lula’s Workers’ Party, the PT, not trying to get that position for one of its own — just in case. At the same time, Lula 3.0 has been reluctant to make drastic personnel changes, so he may well repeat the ticket. This decision promises to roil the political waters a year from now.
Second, the day-to-day management of government. Lula’s current administration is much more risk-averse compared with the 2003-2010 years. What made Lula successful in his first two terms — his endless capacity to negotiate with Brazil’s powerful congress and parties, typically over large dinners and social encounters, gloriously defined in Portuguese as ‘articulação’ — has now deflated. This Lula has less patience for such pork barrel politics, while at the same time being less resolute in his decisions. The result is a government without reformist drive, comfortable with the status quo if it weren’t for the severe fiscal constraints it faces.
Finally, the needs of the Brazilian electorate. There is a growing disconnect between what Brazilians demand in political terms and what Lula and his party are offering. Lula insists on playing the greatest hits that made him a global star, from heavy government intervention to the fight against poverty, but the public demands some new, more right-leaning songs. That discrepancy was clear after Brazil’s municipal elections last month, where the PT came in ninth by number of municipalities won, leading to recriminations between the radical and the moderate wings of the party (a harbinger of the internal succession battles to come).
I am not making predictions here, just drawing up scenarios: Two years in Brazilian politics is an eternity. Lula may well decide not to run. But in June, the president gave a strong hint he’s likely to: “If it is necessary to be a candidate to prevent the troglodytes who governed from governing again, you can be sure that my 80 years will turn into 40 and I will be able to be a candidate,” he said.
A lot would depend on the shape of the government’s coalition and whom the opposition fields for this contest. If the right splinters, Lula will have an easier time, particularly against a radical rival such as the bizarre Pablo Marçal, the abrasive, vulgarity-prone influencer who disrupted the São Paulo city race despite not making it to the runoff. If the opposition unites behind a more moderate voice, say business favorite São Paulo Governor Tarcisio de Freitas, then Lula faces an uphill battle, particularly due to the country’s fiscal problems. In any case, as we saw in the US, the opposition is likely to use the age card to discredit Lula. One clever way to dodge this question would be to widen his coalition as he did in 2022.
Accepting that it may be time to retire must be one of the hardest things for those who reach the top of their careers, whether in politics, business or even sports. The temptation to keep going when you don’t have anything or anyone to stop you can be irresistible. Lula may also be reluctant to signal a successor due to the impact that would have on his own authority, particularly after his big mistake in 2010, when he anointed Dilma Rousseff as his successor, only to see her be impeached after she presided over the country’s worst economic contraction. But delaying that move will not deliver him from it. With all its differences, the case of Biden in the US shows again that letting time pass by only amplifies the consequences.
Regardless of whether he runs in 2026, Lula should start signaling his preferred succession path. History is littered with examples of charismatic leaders whose tenure ended in trauma and infighting because of their failure to plan for their departure.