Russia's President Vladimir Putin and North Korea's leader Kim Jong Un.
Credit: Reuters Photo
The mainstream imagination of North Korean troops fighting in Ukraine – about 12,500 of them across four military bases in the Russian Far East, reports say – is of underfed men loaded onto railway wagons with missile launchers resting on their shoulders. However, this Eurocentric perception of the Russia-North Korea partnership diverts attention from questioning the reality of this development, and from asking the fundamental question: why is North Korea sending troops to Moscow and why is Russia risking it all on the global stage by furthering its bilateral cooperation with Pyongyang.
Moscow’s relations with the collective West have fragmented, improving Russia’s relations with the non-western powers that include nations considered pariah states by the West, such as North Korea, Venezuela, Afghanistan, Myanmar, and coup-ridden countries in the African continent. Russia’s re-alignment comes in light of regional geopolitical shifts; Washington’s pull-out from the joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and resuming its sanctions campaign against Iran in 2019 resulted in Tehran losing faith in the West and improved its relations with Moscow and Beijing. Similarly, several countries, such as Cuba, Syria, Pakistan, and Mongolia, have improved their relations with Russia. This includes North Korea. Since the invasion of Ukraine, high-ranking officials and ministers have exchanged bilateral visits. Kim Jong Un visited Vladivostok in 2023, and President Putin visited Pyongyang in June this year.
During Putin’s visit, both signed a comprehensive strategic partnership treaty, replacing the treaties signed in 1961 and 2000, reflecting the new geopolitical realities. The treaty firmed up a military-technical partnership, military assistance in the event of threat, promotion of investment and economic development, labour mobility, and cooperation in science and technology. Since the conflict in Ukraine began, Pyongyang became an important supplier of munitions for Moscow. However, there is more to the bilateral partnership than quid pro quo.
Finding new markets
The loss of markets in the West because of sanctions has led to an increased demand to find markets for Russia’s exports. Moscow needs countries to sell its finished goods and keep its domestic industries efficient. Finished Russian goods do not have a market in China which is a manufacturing powerhouse. Thus, North Korea becomes important – here, Russia can, over time, influence the economy, barter its goods and technology for defence exports and labour to power its wartime economy. The economic rationale for maintaining the relations with North Korea in Moscow dwarfs in comparison with partners in the BRICS grouping. Moscow downplays its relations with North Korea because Russia still wants the support of non-Western countries that have good relations with the West.
North Korea is an important variable in the relations between Russia and the West. The news of the use of North Korean forces on the battlefield first surfaced after Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk in Russia after Kyiv began asking permission to use long-range weapons to strike deep inside Russia, which, in other words, would imply the direct participation of NATO countries because the use of these weapons would require troops and intelligence from the United States and the United Kingdom to assist Ukrainian forces.
In retaliation, even though Russia denies these claims, Korean troops are used in Russia beyond the factors of mere utility. Troops from Pyongyang allegedly being deployed in Kursk is a form of signalling from Moscow to create new rules of engagement in the conflict, where Russia is drawing its red lines. These developments have been gradual and not immediate, as Putin seldom engages in knee-jerk reactions. Therefore, the use of North Korean troops is a fearmongering tactic to dissuade Ukraine from launching strikes within Russian territory or trying to cross into Russian territory.
Kim Jong Un’s soldiers in Kursk may seem like a rapid escalation of the war, but it is in line with the treaty signed in July this year and ratified in October in Russia’s Duma and Federation Council, which called for mutual consultations and assistance in the event of armed aggression against either party. Kyiv’s incursion into Kursk set the grounds for troops from Pyongyang to be deployed and potentially deterred the scope of a Western-backed Ukrainian long-range attack inside Russia. However, if there is large-scale mobilisation of North Korean troops inside de jure Ukrainian territory (including Russian-occupied territory), that would be considered a rapid escalation. However, this is unlikely to occur as global geopolitics has tilted with the US presidential election victory of Donald Trump who has a vision of the endgame in the Ukrainian conflict.
(The writer is a Research Assistant at the Observer Research Foundation)