Future historians who study Russian, Ukrainian and Western archives on the history of the Ukraine conflict will probably conclude that misunderstanding, mutual distrust and underestimation of the seriousness of intentions led to it.
For Russia, the issue of security on its western borders has always been very painful. It was from there that Napoleon came to capture and burn down Moscow. And Hitler, who almost did it again. That is why, after the end of WWII, the Soviet leadership took care to create a security belt in Eastern Europe from the allied states. In 1955, they were merged into the Warsaw Pact, after NATO (established in 1949) refused to accept the USSR there.
In 1991, the Cold War ended, the Warsaw Pact was disbanded, and the USSR collapsed. Russia renounced communism and begun to build democracy and a market economy. It counted on the reformatting of NATO, from a bloc that was created against the Soviet threat into the basis of a European security system. But this did not happen. Moreover, NATO began to expand to the east, contrary to the verbal promises made to the last president of the USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev. In 1999, under what Moscow saw as a far-fetched pretext, NATO launched a military operation against Yugoslavia without UN sanction. Days of bombing destroyed many civilian facilities, killed several thousand people, mostly civilians, and caused massive damage to the country's infrastructure. Yugoslavia was forced to capitulate.
These two factors -- the breach of the promises and the aggression against Yugoslavia -- have since shaped Russia's attitude towards NATO. Moscow twice tried to agree on joining the bloc but was refused both times. All this caused an increase in anti-NATO sentiment in Russian society: when the military bloc created against you does not disband after the end of the war but continues to expand in your direction, it naturally arouses suspicions.
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In the first decade of the 21st century, Russia recovered from its crisis and began to gradually regain its position as a great power. This led to a further escalation of tensions with NATO, which only intensified after the 2014 coup in Ukraine. The new Ukrainian authorities took a course towards rapprochement with NATO, while secessionists in the east of the country advocated rapprochement with Russia. Military actions in Donbass in 2014-15 led to the defeat of the Ukrainian army, and Ukraine signed the Minsk agreements, aimed at stabilising the situation. However, over the following years, the implementation of these agreements was sabotaged by Kyiv, which considered them humiliating.
In December 2021, Moscow decided to finally settle the issue with the western border, which had distracted it from vital problems: accelerating the turn to Asia and the Indo-Pacific, and internal development. Russia proposed to the West a plan for a new security system in Europe: both sides were to withdraw troops from the border, to halt ships and aircraft from entering dangerous areas. NATO was not supposed to expand further to the east, which meant that Ukraine would not be able to join it. Thus, a de facto zone of peace would form in Eastern Europe, and Europe and Russia could focus on other goals instead of fighting each other.
Russia's proposals were rejected: the US considered Russia to be too weak and felt it did not need to make concessions to Moscow. In response, Russia and its ally Belarus announced big manoeuvres, and forces were pulled up to the border. This show of force didn't work. Instead of negotiating, the US and its allies launched a media war, announcing Russia's intention to invade Ukraine. This psychological war went on for more than a month. The date was postponed every day, each time referring to intelligence data. At the same time, top Ukrainian officials, convinced of the support of the West and confident that Russia was bluffing, bluntly stated that they would not comply with the Minsk agreements. President Zelenskyy mentioned the possibility of obtaining a nuclear status for Ukraine. Fighting on the front line in the Donbass, which had been frozen for a month, resumed. Finally, on February 24, the prophecy of American intelligence officers came true: Russia launched an operation in Ukraine.
Apparently, the operation was being prepared very quickly, it began with an unsuccessful configuration of forces, without sufficient support, preparation and logistics. Since the Ukrainian army was well-prepared for the invasion, the Russian troops ran into a powerful defence around Kharkiv and Kyiv, they had to hardly break through the well-fortified defence line in the Donbass. Support for pro-Russian elements among the population turned out to be less than expected. The situation was aggravated by the fact that there was no information and humanitarian support for the operation, which could win the hearts and minds of people.
On the other hand, the hopes of the Ukrainian leadership for a total war did not come true either. The civilian population prefers to stay home, cases of sabotage are still rare, and the territorial defence, armed with small arms and petrol bombs, on which many hopes were placed, turned out to be powerless against the regular army, suffering huge losses in vain. It manages to achieve some effect only in the big cities where it supports the actions of the regular troops.
Be that as it may, the Russian troops in the first days of the operation seized the initiative, relying on speed. Russian tanks and IFVs, leaving their broken-down vehicles on the roadside, rapidly moved forward, avoiding battles with the Armed Forces of Ukraine and damage to civilian infrastructure. Aviation seized dominance in the sky, suppressing Ukrainian air defence. However, by the end of the first week, this tactic had exhausted itself. It was no longer possible to leave large, fortified cities in the rear. Russian forces began to regroup, encircling the megacities and preparing for an assault. This inevitably means a large number of civilian casualties, so negotiations are now underway to provide safe corridors for the exit of civilians.
How the war will end is still unknown. Both sides are confident that their tactics will bring victory, and are not ready to make concessions in the negotiations. The Russian side insists on the ‘de-nazification’ of Ukraine (that is, the ban on ultra-right parties and the trial of their activists who committed crimes), its de-militarisation, and guarantees that Ukraine will not join NATO. So far, the Ukrainian authorities are not ready to accept these conditions. Russia, on the other hand, does not want to cross the line beyond which a local operation, in which only a small part of its armed forces is involved and many types of weapons are not used, will develop into a full-scale war. Next week will show if this line stays intact.
(The writer is with the Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences)
Disclaimer: The views expressed above are the authors’ own. They do not necessarily reflect the views of DH.
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