The Russia-Ukraine conflict, now in its sixth week, has impacted the geopolitical order — or the global disorder, as some would say — as never before in the last many decades. Analysts the world over are divided in their prognosis of the causes and effects of this devastating war that has brought death, destruction and disruption in the lives of thousands of innocent Ukrainians. Millions of them have fled their nation to escape the massive onslaught from the invading Russian army, which is equipped with overwhelmingly superior firepower. The Ukrainian army, not as well-equipped but strengthened by many of its citizen-volunteers has taken on the Russians displaying rare grit and matchless valour to defend their motherland. Many border towns in Ukraine, such as Mariupol, Chernihiv, Sumy and Kharkiv, and the Luhansk and Donbass regions have been razed to the ground. But that the Russians have not exactly had a cakewalk into Ukraine and that they have suffered so many casualties to their manpower, superior weaponry and equipment has surprised not only them but military analysts the world over.
Governments, professional militaries and strategic analysts do analyse the lessons and shortcomings emerging out of such conflicts to effect course corrections and prepare for the future. Wars, which in today’s world can cause unimaginable havoc and humongous casualties on both sides, are launched with a clear-cut strategic objective in mind. What was in Russian President Vladimir Putin’s mind when he did so does baffle many analysts. Did he go to war to prevent Ukraine from formally joining NATO, thus discouraging NATO deployments and other influences close to Russian borders? Or, was his larger, unstated ambition to resurrect the erstwhile Soviet Union, which collapsed in December 1991, and which he described as the “greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century”? Was Ukraine about to develop a nuclear capability in the near future that would have threatened Russian security? Did the Russians, after capturing Crimea in 2014, now desire to annex Ukraine’s Mariupol to obtain unhindered access into the Sea of Azov? Was his motive to effect regime change in Ukraine and install a pro-Russian government in Kyiv?
The jury is out on the question, with differing opinions on Putin’s end objective — some have also proffered the opinion that Putin has perhaps fallen into the US trap of getting himself into this needless military confrontation!
Thus, the first lesson for any nation and its leaders is to have a clear-cut and achievable politico-military aim before it launches itself into any armed conflict — the costs of which can be staggering to all sides, with severe economic repercussions for a nation’s well-being in the future. The economic sanctions imposed by the West now will surely impact Russia and its people over a long period.
The second lesson that clearly emerges is that a nation must be fully prepared to ensure its security on its own. Notwithstanding any alliances or any other friendly grouping, no nation will put its ‘boots on the ground’ to assist its allies. It may give financial or military assistance to a friendly or allied nation, but nothing more than that. The Ukrainian plight is a good example of a nation’s imperative to be prepared to singly fight for its security. Thus, for India, as its strengthens the Quad or any South-East Asian grouping, it will be appropriate to remember that in humanitarian operations or in distress situations, these alliances may come in handy, but they will most likely not in a war.
In the event of a conflict, nations supplying arms and equipment may resort to imposing sanctions and thus a nation can be in jeopardy as regards its war-fighting capabilities if the supply or import of critical ammunition/spares is denied for whatever reason. Thus, self-reliance in essential military requirements must be ensured in peacetime by both the public and private defence industry of the nation. Ordinarily, it takes inordinately long to reach satisfactory levels of self-reliance in indigenisation of equipment. To overcome this, the Indian government must push for self-reliance programmes on a war footing.
The Indian military is heavily dependent on Russia for the supply and sustenance of over 65% of its weapons and weapon platforms like aircraft, ships, tanks, artillery, air defence weaponry, missiles, etc. Thus, it will only be prudent for India to diversify its sources for these in the immediate term while vigorously striving for indigenous development and production of these.
Importantly, the performance of critical Russian equipment, which the Indian military possesses in its arsenals – such as the T-90 tanks, BMP 2/3 mechanised infantry combat vehicles, Su-30 and MiG-29 fighters, the S-400 air defence systems being bought now, the GRAD and SMERCH rocket batteries, various types of drones and helicopters should be carefully evaluated, keeping in view their performance in the current conflict.
Restoration of the military supply chains with both Russia and Ukraine will have to be adequately streamlined. In addition, the lessons emerging from this conflict at the strategic, and operational art and tactics levels must be studied as relevant to the Indian context and our own geographical terrain. Prima facie, the Russians appear to have faltered in their deployments and actions at all these levels.
This conflict has once again highlighted the significance of ‘hybrid warfare’. Information warfare appears, unexpectedly, to have been the weakness of the Russians in this conflict and Putin personally has been successfully painted as a “war criminal”, the Hitler of the present day, etc., to global audiences. Nevertheless, he could also have avoided causing far too much collateral damage on innocent Ukranians. As the current sole superpower in the world, the Americans too have to take their share of the blame for not being able to prevent this conflict. India, of course, in keeping with its national interests, has been walking a diplomatic tight rope between Russia and the West.
Even six weeks into Putin’s invasion, it remains difficult to predict how this conflict will end. But the hard lessons that emerge from this conflict must be sought and analysed, and suitable measures taken for India’s benefit and overall security.
(The writer was the first chief of the
Defence Intelligence Agency and Deputy Chief of the Integrated Defence Staff)