The India-Pakistan War of 1971 is one of the shortest wars in history, but was extremely significant in shaping South Asian geopolitics. India decimated the Pakistani military and helped liberate East Pakistan and form the new nation of Bangladesh. India’s well-defined military strategy, limited goals, and diplomatic efforts, underpinned by a strong respect shown by the political leadership of the time for institutional autonomy and command enabled its soldiers, diplomats, pilots and sailors to achieve the government’s objective.
On the 50th anniversary of the surrender of the Pakistani forces to India on December 16, 1971, there are many lessons from that war to remember that will help India respond to Chinese and Pakistani aggression – primary among them being to ensure that the armed forces are not politicised; and that the government should take the Opposition into confidence while developing India’s aims and strategy. In particular, it is essential to study and understand the groundwork laid by then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi between Pakistan’s Operation Searchlight in March 1971 and the outbreak of war in December.
Under Operation Searchlight, the Pakistani army massacred thousands of citizens in East Pakistan, resulting in some 10 million people fleeing to India. This influx of refugees posed a grave threat to India’s stability and security because of the potential influx of Pakistani spies into the country and the economic cost of supporting so many people.
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India’s strategy had to be to firstly prevent the refugee influx from overwhelming the Indian government’s ability to support its own citizens and maintain law and order, and then take on Pakistan. India resorted to a range of measures -- from appealing to the international community and the United Nations for financial aid to handle the refugees, campaigning against Pakistan’s atrocities in East Pakistan, leveraging Cold War tensions to secure a military alliance with the Soviet Union, and secretly training the Mukti Bahini to make it a force strong enough to counter the Pakistani army and liberate Bangladesh.
Domestically, Indira Gandhi provided army chief Gen. Sam Manekshaw the political cover needed to train the Mukti Bahini, fortify India’s border with East Pakistan and prepare the armed forces for a two-front war -- all while ensuring that Parliament was regularly updated on new developments, whether successes or failures.
By October 1971, it was clear to Indira Gandhi that if a war were to break out, it would have to be limited to liberating East Pakistan and ending the refugee crisis. This would allow India to rapidly enter and exit East Pakistan without facing the issues that an occupying power would normally face.
Additionally, India strengthened her diplomatic relations with allies such as the USSR. Indian foreign policy aims were dictated by its desire to ensure that it had the backing of one of the superpowers if it were to go to war with Pakistan and prevent a Chinese invasion. In August 1971, the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was signed. Article IX of the treaty allowed for the two countries to “take appropriate effective measures to ensure peace and security,” in the event of war. Moreover, the USSR assured India that if China were to attack India, it “would not hesitate to use its strength and force in repelling it”. The US, on the other hand, threatened India with consequences if it were to wage war on Pakistan.
When war finally did break out, India was prepared for it — domestically and externally. Domestically, Indira Gandhi had a popular mandate and had set well-defined war aims: rapidly liberating Bangladesh, fighting in the North and West of India against a Pakistani invasion, achieving limited territorial victories to use as a bargaining chip against West Pakistan, if needed, and destroy Pakistan’s army so that it would not pose a threat to India. This clear directive, in conjunction with the strengthening of the Indo-Soviet alliance, helped shape the nature of military operations that were conducted in both theatres of the war. The different branches of the armed forces coordinated their actions well, which enabled a quick and decisive victory.
This groundwork had the desired effect. On the eastern front, Indian airplanes were launched from INS Vikrant to attack Pakistani army barracks, while navy frigates, which had missiles, helped destroy key East Pakistani ports and military bases, such as Chittagong and Cox’s Bazaar, bringing trade within East Pakistan to a halt and damaging its military infrastructure. Effective coordination between the navy, army and air force allowed successful tactical operations to occur as well. For example, Sylhet was quickly captured because a heliborne operation allowed the rapid deployment of Indian soldiers on the ground. This level of coordination, bereft of politicking, ensured that India’s strategy worked.
Externally, the USSR provided diplomatic cover to India. The US convened multiple meetings of the UN Security Council to discuss the war and drafted resolutions that called for a ceasefire and withdrawal of Indian and Pakistani forces thrice — on December 4, 5 and 13. The USSR vetoed all these resolutions, allowing India to rapidly take control of East Pakistan without foreign interference.
But that was not all. The USSR also backed India militarily. When the Nixon-Kissinger duo dispatched the US navy’s Seventh Fleet to intimidate India, the Soviet Union responded by dispatching battleships and nuclear submarines to counter the US navy. Indira Gandhi’s sagacity in seeking and signing the Indo-Soviet treaty months earlier paid off.
Between March and December 1971, India’s aims and strategy were achieved through coordination across the various arms of government, the armed forces, its diplomatic corps, and with allies.
In the last few years, South Asia has become an increasingly polarised and hostile area. Unlike in 1971, the presence of nuclear weapons and a strong Pakistan-China axis will make a future war far more destructive. Fifty years on, it is imperative that India’s political leadership learns the lessons of 1971 for the sake of the country’s security. The success of any security strategy is the result of clarity of aims and transparency, and coordination within the armed forces, between the government and military, between the government and the Opposition, and India exerting its soft power locally and in multilateral bodies, while strengthening autonomous institutions so that they are effective in times of crisis.
(The writer studies Anthropology and History at Stanford University)