Adjacent to the exit gate of the Indian side of the RS Pura-Sialkot International Border between India and Pakistan, the Border Security Force has embossed in bold letters the opening line of Muhammad Iqbal’s Tarana-e-Hind -- “Sare jahan se achha”. Interestingly, and ironically, alongside the Pakistani entrance, less than 50 metres away from India, the second line of Iqbal’s Tarana-e-Milli -- Muslim hain hum/Watan hain saara jahan hamara is hand-written by Pakistan Rangers. It is a striking illustration of the differences between the two countries and yet of the bond between them at some level.
The 75 years of engagement between what are now nuclear powers brings to fore some basic lessons. The civil-military relationship in the two countries is quite different, and this factor has been an impediment in past efforts to normalise ties. In recent times, Pakistan’s former Prime Minister Nawaz Shariff’s attempt to broker peace with India was sabotaged by the Pakistani military leadership in 1999. Then, Musharraf’s own attempted détente with former PMs Atal Behari Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh failed. The final nail in the coffin of peace efforts, as it were, was the November 2008 terrorist attack on Mumbai. In India, no political party can ignore the popular sentiment while engaging with Pakistan, and the context decides whether it is in favour or against such moves at any particular moment.
This begs the question whether inaction – giving up efforts at peace-making -- is the prudent approach because of the structural reality, or there is room for manoeuvre, which is off-the-beaten track and is less costly politically. While there is little official engagement and a stalemate prevails, there are trends that one cannot ignore. First, the two countries have young populations, with India’s median age at 28.4 and Pakistan’s 22.8. Second, in the last decade, when bilateral relations have remained at their lowest ebb, there has been an explosion in the digital oral histories centred on Partition stories, particularly emanating from the younger members of the Indian and Pakistani diaspora communities. Apart from an interest in their ancestral roots and the tragedy of Partition, there is a reason that members of the diaspora were successful in undertaking studies on India-Pakistan relations. The main factor is that anyone with a US or UK nationality can easily travel to either country. In contrast, given the huge mistrust between the two countries, domestic Indian or Pakistani scholars have to rely upon secondary sources, or at best on online connections they may make in either country, to get the required information about the other side. Without rigorous fieldwork at the societal level, their scholarship, despite their best efforts, have severe limitations and, arguably, lacks legitimacy.
Third, despite the constraints, the internet has enabled some creative projects that bridge the divide. Various social media initiatives have reunited hundreds of families and friends on both sides of Punjab who were divided in 1947. These efforts humanise the tragedy of the bitter divide and can be a mitigating factor against the forces of extremism that seek to exploit it.
Fourth, linked with the above, one often underestimates the continued impact of Partition on domestic politics. In the case of Pakistan, it is more so, because of its smaller size and the fact that Punjab overshadows other provinces in Pakistan, primarily due to its size, resources and representation in elite institutions.
But Pakistani Punjab can itself be seen as constituted by three broad sub-cultural units: the Majha Punjabi-speaking eastern and central Punjab; the Pothwari-speaking northern Punjab that includes Rawalpindi and Islamabad; and the Saraiki-speaking southern Punjab.
On the linguistic plane, the central and eastern parts of Pakistani Punjab are similar to Majha Punjabi-speaking border areas on the Indian side, namely Amritsar, Gurdaspur, RS Pura area in the Jammu plains, or the majority of Punjabi-speaking migrants and their descendants living in various parts of India. The caste and economic profiles are similar in border areas on either side. In his recent book, The Punjab Borderland: Mobility, Materiality and Militancy, 1947-1987, Partition scholar Ilyas Chatha brings to light the lesser-studied facets of the borderlands on the Pakistani Punjab frontier before fencing with a focus on contraband trade.
In the Pakistani Punjab hinterland of the eastern and central tracts, many residents belong to families that had migrated from India during Partition. They are mostly settled in Lahore, Sialkot, Lyallpur (Faisalabad), Montgomery (Sahiwal) and Gujranwala. In his seminal book Pakistan: A Modern History, British historian Ian Talbot wrote, citing Pakistani academic Mohammad Waseem, that “the five million migrants [from the Indian side of the border] have both provided a major support for Islamist parties, and shaped the Punjab province’s strong anti-India and pro-Kashmiri leanings.”
The northern parts of Pakistani Punjab speak Pothwari, which earlier linguists used to call ‘highland Punjabi’, which is akin to the language spoken in some parts of undivided Jammu and Kashmir. The third part of Punjab is Seraki-speaking area, where Sindhi and Punjabi combine to form this unique linguistic ecosystem.
Many parts of northern India, including Punjab, the Jammu plains, and Delhi and, to a smaller extent, Mumbai, were impacted by Partition in-flow and outflow in 1947, though the relative available area of dispersal for migrants’ settlements was huge on the Indian side. However, there were significant urban areas that were transformed overnight. The sheer scale of new migrants radically impacted the popular culture and even the political traits around the new settlements. A few years ago, depending on where the Partition-impacted family lived in populous Delhi, it was easy to pinpoint the place in present-day Pakistani Punjab from where the family originated.
Allowing comparative analyses by scholars and researchers in an inter-disciplinary framework may promote better understanding of each other’s societal and political landscape, and better inform the policymaking domain. Inter-university exchange of scholars is an option to explore in this regard. There is no harm in being attuned to some of the recent trends that could be further encouraged by some quiet, sagacious policy interventions by both sides. When the time comes for macro changes, including restoration of diplomatic ties, a more aware and networked set of stakeholders can possibly act as a force multiplier in supporting efforts toward normalisation. At the same time, with a greater understanding of societal nuances, policymaking would be sensitised with a greater originality and pragmatism, without raising too many expectations too soon.
(The writer is the author of two books, including ‘Across the LoC’, Columbia University Press)