(L-R) Rishi Sunak and Emmanuel Macron, leaders of UK and France
Credit: Reuters Photos
By Amelia Hadfield for The Conversation
Guildford (UK): One hundred and twenty years after the Entente Cordiale, Britain and France are forging a new alliance.
The original 1904 agreement paved the way for a stronger relationship between the two countries, but this time the nations aim to use their partnership to patch up European commitment to Ukraine and exert pressure on the US.
In a recent letter to The Telegraph, British foreign secretary Lord Cameron and his French counterpart, Stephane Sejourne, minister for Europe and foreign affairs, highlighted both the “enduring commitment to our friendship” and their success in together having “helped to forge a better world”.
But the stakes now are high. War continues to rage in Ukraine. The US’s hard power commitment remains fallible, and its $60 billion (47 billion pounds) of financial support was stuck in Congress until just this week.
Europe’s response meanwhile remains fragile, with divisions and disunity threatening both the EU and transatlantic responses.
Can the Anglo-French alliance inspire fresh commitments from other nations? Cameron and Sejourne certainly think so. They suggest that they can “seize together the opportunities offered by our partnership”.
More significantly, as cardinal components of Nato, they have “a responsibility in driving the alliance to deal with the challenges before it”, first by demanding an enhanced commitment from European and US allies, and second by pushing harder for improved European security structures.
British and French support
Since the February 2022 invasion, both countries have arguably been stalwart supporters of providing Ukraine with the full scope of its requirements to defend its sovereign territory.
This has included the provision of lethal weapons, aid, training and finance, supported by diplomatic commitment.
The UK, for example, has been responsible for two substantial projects to provide Ukraine with military assistance since the invasion of Crimea in 2014. Operation Orbital involved intensively training 22,000 troops from the armed forces of Ukraine, bringing both their infantry and medic skills to Nato’s standards.
Operation Interflex significantly improved Ukraine’s anti-armour capabilities before the invasion and has since provided further concentrated aid and training, totalling more than $5 million (3.9 million pounds) across 2022 and 2023.
The UK has also worked alongside nine other international partners, enabling more than 17,000 Ukrainian recruits to complete a five-week training course in the UK, while establishing a wider international effort to train a further 67,000 Ukrainian troops in more than 30 countries.
Together the UK and France have pressured the EU, and Germany in particular, into groundbreaking commitments of military aid. In doing so, Britain has become a strategic pacesetter in its provision of increasingly sophisticated weapons systems to Kyiv, including Challenger 2 main battle tanks, announced in January 2023, motivating Germany to commit Leopard 2 tanks less than a fortnight later.
UK and Dutch support recently triggered the construction of a new international aerial coalition, including the US, to procure F-16 fighter jets for Ukraine in the first instance, and in the longer term, enabling better coordination with Nato allies.
While Britain and France have supported Ukraine with cutting-edge hardware, including UK Storm Shadow cruise missiles and French SCALP-ELG Storm Shadow missiles, the question is whether their own commitment is sufficiently influential to draw others to emulate them. There are decent examples here: the Storm Shadow pledge placed significant pressure on the US to step up its own donations of Army Tactical Missile Systems, and pushed Germany to commit Taurus cruise missiles. However, German chancellor Olaf Scholz has still not committed to this.
But there are also worrying gaps. Delays caused by the US House of Representatives in approving the $60 billion foreign aid package for Ukraine is part of ongoing anxiety that the US may simply elect to draw down its commitments, and ultimately withdraw its support for Europe as a whole under a possible second Trump administration.
Delays from Germany, disagreements among EU countries over anti-Russian sanctions – as well as the ongoing strain of high energy prices, and diminishing military stockpiles – may also take their toll on the EU’s overall appetite for ongoing support for Ukraine.
The consequences of uneven European defence are serious, with even “Ukraine’s most ardent European backers struggling to prevent the Western effort becoming fractured and piecemeal”, according to geopolitical expert and former Foreign Office representative to the Ukraine Samir Puri.
British and French leadership
Britain and France could capitalise on their leadership to coordinate the war effort in terms of defence and diplomacy by keeping allies in the fight, now and in the medium term. This includes everything from providing immediate supplies of weapons to Ukraine itself, to making sure the UK and EU training missions for the Ukrainian armed forces work together.
In the longer term, the overarching security guarantees that UK, French and the EU can provide for Ukraine, along with the US, will dictate the transition from war to ceasefire and beyond. Doing so could shore up the transatlantic aspect of the conflict, as far as US commitment is concerned, but serve to stimulate both the EU and Nato to support more explicit defence initiatives.
While avoiding the temptation for geopolitical point-scoring, the diplomatic dividends for Britain allow it continue to demonstrate its post-Brexit roles and responsibilities.
Leadership opportunities
The next few months offer important opportunities for this Anglo-French alliance to make their case. This includes the European Political Community Summit, to be held on July 18 at Blenheim Palace, Oxfordshire, while the Nato summit in Washington DC on July 9-11 will also be key.
In addition there are ongoing meetings of the Ukraine Defence Contact Group, in which the US and its European allies agree to supply material and moral support to Ukraine.
Post-Brexit, France needs to clarify its own leadership ambitions, both by doing the EU’s institutional heavy lifting, but, more importantly, making it explicit that the EU needs to bet big on a defence agenda. The UK, in turn, is considering its post-Brexit and transatlantic role, with recent increases in defence spending operating as a method of urging European Nato allies to follow suit.
The UK and France partnership on Ukraine has the potential to add pressure to European groups and transatlantic forums to which they both belong, in order to try and secure Europe’s borders and to make sure Ukraine has the military power to continue to push back against Russia’s territorial landgrab.
(Amelia Hadfield is the Head of Department of Politics, University of Surrey)