Modi in government, RSS on the ground

Narendra Modi had yet to be sworn in for a second term when RSS sarsanghchalak Mohan Rao Bhagwat reminded him, “Ram ka kaam karna hai”. Four years and eight months later, Bhagwat was at the Ram Mandir in Ayodhya, attending the pran pratishtha ceremony of Ram Lalla. Yet another box on the RSS agenda had been ticked.

From the ideological perspective, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh’s handpicked PM has delivered — consistently and spectacularly. Article 370 is off the books and the ban on triple talaq augurs a Uniform Civil Code (with Uttarakhand serving as a trial balloon). Even so, there is endless speculation about the nature of the RSS-BJP jugalbandi. 

The RSS is either seen as over-influential, or as having lost influence. Modi is dubbed a creature of the RSS, or vice versa. Differences are spun into signs of a breach, and agreement is perceived as a sacrifice of the RSS’ core values in service of Modi’s aggrandisement.

But the jugalbandi is far more nuanced than these formulations suggest. It is a give-and-take, based on mutual understanding and common goals. Historically, the BJP has always gained from a synergistic relationship with the RSS, and lost out whenever there has been a rift.

Although M S Golwalkar was reluctant to sanction a political role for the RSS, the Akhil Bharatiya Jan Sangh (BJS) nonetheless became an organic and ideological extension of the mothership in 1951. After 1954, power vested in the hands of a pracharak, Deendayal Upadhyaya, who went on to give the BJS an ideological framework in the form of ‘integral humanism’ and to lead the party to significant electoral successes in 1967.

After Upadhyaya’s death in 1968, the RSS served more as a guide than a puppet master. Fissures appeared between hardliners, led by BJS co-founder Balraj Madhok and moderates like Atal Bihari Vajpayee, over the question of the BJS’ participation in coalitions with the communists. 

Some historians believe that Vajpayee’s ‘leftist’ views prevailed because they aligned with the class interests of the RSS cadre. Besides, alliances offered protective cover to the RSS, always in the crosshairs of the Congress.

Vajpayee and L K Advani embarked on a strategy of activism and outreach, with the support of the pragmatic RSS General Secretary Balasaheb Deoras and heavyweights like Nanaji Deshmukh and K R Malkani.

As sarsanghchalak, Deoras altered the RSS orientation. He not only mandated a range of social welfare programmes, making ‘sewa’ a core activity, but sanctioned direct political engagement through the anti-Emergency campaign.

The BJS and socialists worked alongside and eventually merged to form the Janata Party. Once it came to power, however, the exigencies of working within an ideologically diverse set-up took a toll on the RSS-BJS relationship.

A chill set in when Vajpayee, under pressure from the socialists to sever links with the RSS, famously wrote in 1979: “The RSS claiming to be a social and cultural organisation should have taken greater pains to demonstrate that they did not seek a political role.”

After Indira Gandhi came storming back in 1980, the BJS faction formed the BJP, along with several socialists. Keen to project the BJP as inclusive, Vajpayee and Advani adopted positive secularism and Gandhian socialism as its ideology.

Deoras was against ideological dilution. Like Nanaji Deshmukh, many in the sangathan turned away from politics, limiting the BJP’s access to the RSS talent pool. 

Upping the ante

In 1984, after the BJP’s decimation, a period of close coordination followed. The BJP’s connection with the RSS cadre was restored, integral humanism was adopted as its ideological framework, and talented pracharaks, among them Narendra Modi and K N Govindacharya, were deputed to the BJP. Advani, seen as more aligned to RSS values, emerged from Vajpayee’s shadow to enunciate the party’s hard right stance.

From 1986, when the locks at the Babri Masjid were removed, the Sangh Parivar stepped up the campaign to  ‘liberate’ Ram Janmabhoomi, with the Bajrang Dal — the embodiment of muscular Hinduism — as the vanguard of the movement. The BJP’s ‘right’ turn translated into 85 seats in 1989. It extended outside support to the Janata Dal government, but clearly stated the party’s commitment to core RSS issues: the Uniform Civil Code, the repeal of Article 370, a Human Rights Commission and Ram Janmabhoomi. 

The BJP upped the ante with Advani’s Ram Rath Yatra, and benefited electorally from the resulting mass mobilisation. When the Babri Masjid fell in 1992, the Sangh Parivar’s response was equivocal, but unapologetic. The BJP went on to leverage the Ram temple into gains across all socio-economic segments, particularly — as a result of Govindacharya’s ‘social engineering’ — the numerically important OBCs. 

The decision, in 1995, to project the BJP’s most moderate face, Vajpayee, was to vitiate the RSS-BJP relationship. Inevitably, Vajpayee’s inner liberal asserted itself and fissures developed between the BJP and the Sangh affiliates, notably the VHP and the Swadeshi Jagran Manch. The trust deficit between the RSS and Vajpayee came to a head after K S Sudarshan became sarsanghchalak in 2000. Relations plummeted to their lowest point, with repeated confrontations between the NDA government and RSS affiliates.

The advent of Mohan Rao Bhagwat as sarsanghchalak in 2009, shortly before the BJP’s drubbing in the general elections, heralded a phase of unprecedented RSS-BJP cooperation.

In 2010, the RSS and BJP closed ranks, especially after the Congress targeted the RSS in the 2006 Malegaon blasts case. It was in the sangathan’s interest to ensure the UPA did not return to power.

Turning to Gujarat

Cometh the hour, cometh the man. This time, the RSS wanted a hardline leader who would not soft-peddle its agenda in deference to allies. Bhagwat’s gaze, like that of the cadre, turned to Gujarat. Here was an OBC chief minister with three consecutive electoral victories and an unmatched record of governance, wildly popular with the cadre and the darling of economists, yet ideologically committed.

Never before had the RSS thrown itself into an election campaign with such verve. The frontals, the affiliates and even the RSS-inspired organisations were put to work. 

If the personality cult around NaMo gave the RSS pause, it was a fair trade-off. From day one, Modi owned his relationship with the RSS; unlike Vajpayee, he attended its functions, hosted its leaders and encouraged an RSS-government interface. While there are rumours that the situation has changed in NDA 2.0, the coordination between the BJP and RSS brass does not appear to have suffered. If BJP leaders close to the RSS have been sidelined, RSS men have been appointed as CMs of Rajasthan, Chhattisgarh and Madhya Pradesh.

The RSS continues to align its activities to the needs of the BJP, for example, mobilising disadvantaged sections through various campaigns. Conversely, the expansion of the RSS network has been aided by the ‘conducive’ political environment.

How seriously the RSS – and Modi himself – take his larger-than-life image is a matter of conjecture. There are differences, as there have always been. But the relationship is one of mutual accommodation.

If Modi backed down on the Land Acquisition and Farm Laws, Bhagwat understood the need for the RSS to project a more moderate face and did so through a series of public lectures. There is coaction – the RSS working on the ground, and Modi in government. 

Yes, the RSS does exercise influence in government and yes, the BJP is far less dependent on the mothership than it has ever been. To quote a party functionary, “If the BJP was 100% dependent on the RSS in 2014, it is only 30% dependent today”. That does not detract from the fact that the RSS was, is and will remain the ideological parent of the BJP.

(Bhavdeep Kang is a journalist and an author.)