Time for structural reforms, modernisation

kicker kciker

The prime minister’s announcement on Independence Day of his decision to appoint a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) as the single-point military adviser to the government was received with great enthusiasm. The creation of the post of CDS has been long overdue.

Like with every other decision on military reforms, the CDS decision became a victim of bureaucratic manoeuvring, vindictiveness, engineered turf battles and political indecisiveness. The process of setting up a tri-Service integrated headquarters was, however, achieved, with a vice chief-equivalent ‘Chief of Integrated Staff to the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee’ (CISC) heading it. Major reforms such as integration of service headquarters, appointment of the CDS, and establishment of a National Defence University have all remained in limbo or have seen cosmetic changes. There is no doubt that the Indian military is in crying need of major structural reforms in tune with the 21st century environment, technologies, strategies, and the primacy of joint operations in the conduct of war. The CDS decision is more than a single person’s appointment, it is the creation of an entire system. Therefore, it needs to be accompanied by other major structural reforms.

Integrated Defence Staff (IDS), the joint headquarters structure to assist the CDS, is already in place. The current CISC will become the Vice CDS (VCDS). It has taken more than a decade for the IDS to establish a mature and optimised acquisition system and processes, develop Long-Term Integrated Perspective Plans, optimise the Defence Intelligence Agency, and address joint operational and training systems.

While significant expertise has evolved, including coordination with multiple MoD agencies, the CISC has had to depend on the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) for major decisions. This was invariably subordinated to the chairman’s priority in his role as the chief of his Service. An integrated approach, driven by the CDS, should ensure speedy and optimal modernisation of individual services towards enhancing our joint warfare capability.

Currently, the chiefs of the respective services are responsible for operational capability, training, and modernisation plans. Acquisitions and modernisation plans were largely driven by individual service-specific interests, and very often these ended up getting delayed or blocked by turf wars and prioritisation battles for share of the defence budget pie. This should change under the CDS, with operational decisions being driven by the CDS system while the chiefs would be responsible for their service capability development, training and maintenance in tune with joint strategies. This should speed up modernisation.

This year’s defence budget is barely above the subsistence level. A decade of stalled modernisation has brought all three services to their lowest levels of force structures and capabilities. The Indian Air Force is down to 32 squadrons and is likely to go down 28 squadrons over the next five years as the older aircraft are finally phased out. It will take more than a decade for the IAF to get back to its authorised force strength of 42 squadrons even if its modernisation is undertaken on a war-footing.

The army is no better placed. As a former vice chief of the army stated, 60% of its weapon systems are vintage. The army’s two major modernisation programs – Tactical Communication Systems (TCS) and Battlefield Management Systems (BMS), intended to be through ‘make’ route, has been shelved after more than a decade of work with two consortiums of Indian majors. This is bound to have a huge adverse impact on its modernisation efforts. One can’t blame the army, though. Repeated delays in routine procurements and lack of accountability on development programs have cost the army dearly.

Notwithstanding some of the recent decisions, such as the joint venture between Kalashnikov and the OFB for small-arms manufacture, light-weight howitzer and the fast-track procurement of assault rifles and weaponry for special forces, the army’s overall capability for a two-front war is of concern. The Future Infantry Combat Vehicle (FICV) project continues to be in a limbo. The army chief’s restructuring efforts towards ‘Integrated Battle Groups’ is a welcome step and would help the cause of jointness.

As for the navy’s modernisation, the progress of the indigenous aircraft carrier continues at a slow pace. Very well laid-out plans, such as the 30-year ship-building and submarine-building programs, were approved years ago, if not decades ago. These have floundered for lack of timely budget allocation. The navy continues to grapple with ageing ships, submarines and weapon systems.

Much of the modernisation that has accrued over the last 15 years has been largely due to procurements from the US, almost exclusively through the FMS route, that is government-to-government contracts. It does not speak well for all our sloganeering on ‘Make in India’, and reflects the lack of a coherent national strategy. This is a domain the CDS will need to address. The government recently indicated that it would allocate $130 billion over the next 5-7 years for modernisation of the three services. The CDS will need to move beyond the current system of work in the IDS as far as modernisation goes. Currently, the Long-Term Integrated Perspective Plan (LTIPP) is seen as a ‘desired capability’ document, which the government is happy to concur with.

There is no assurance of financial commitment, and so the plans remain wishful thinking. Big headlines are made whenever the Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) approves ‘Acceptance of Necessity’ for acquisitions worth thousands of crores. These turn out to be meaningless as the subsequent processes takes years, more than 50% AONs lapse, and less than 25% of approved AONs fructify into desired inductions. On an average, the time taken from AON to contract signing has been about 9-10 years.

The flaw lies in the mismatch between various aspects of indigenous development, ‘Make in India’ manufacturing and huge import dependency versus the combat capability of the forces.

The CDS system, if evolved correctly, should integrate different aspects of integrated operational philosophy, requisite force structures and combat capability with indigenous manufacturing, technology development and a balanced, accountable, and efficient acquisition process. The CDS must also be given enough power to take operational and financial decisions to ensure appropriate force structures. The bottom line, however, is to see the wisdom that an allocation of 1.35% of GDP is abysmally low to meet India’s defence needs in the 21st century.

(The writer is a former Deputy Chief of Integrated Defence Staff. He is currently the founder-chairman of ‘The Peninsula Foundation’, a Chennai-based think-tank)