A long way to go for stability in J&K and rest of India

On hearing about the death of Jawaharlal Nehru on May 27, 1964, Sheikh Abdullah, who was J&K’s first Prime Minister (the designations of Prime Minister and Sadar-e-Riyasat were changed to Chief Minister and Governor in 1965) rushed back to India from Pakistan, where the latter had gone on a goodwill mission with the blessings of PM Nehru.

Abdullah was received by one of his friends from J&K, who then lived in Model Town, Delhi, at Palam airport and asked to be taken straight to Teen Murti House. His friend recalled to this writer that while paying tribute to Nehru, Abdullah’s eyes welled up with tears and he remarked that had he known that ‘Panditji’ would die so soon, he would have conclusively settled the Kashmir issue with him rather than go to Pakistan.

The seven-decade political story of J&K and its struggles to find a stable equilibrium in its relationship with New Delhi is laden with ironies. It was under Nehru’s premiership that his friend Sheikh Abdullah was arrested in August 1953, and replaced by a more pliant GM Bakshi. After putting Abdullah on trial for conspiring against India – the Kashmir Conspiracy Case -- Nehru decided to host his old friend in April-May 1964 at his residence. It is open to interpretation why Nehru thought of re-engaging with Abdullah – was it external pressure or Nehru’s own assessment that the status quo, a kind of façade of democracy in J&K, was detrimental to India’s interest.

Now, in a different context, PM Modi’s recent outreach to leaders from J&K, including some who were detained for several months after August 5, 2019, may have surprised many. However, seeing it from the political canvas of the last 70 years, such moves are not rare in the Kashmir story. The main question at this stage is whether this initiative can result in any headway toward bringing peace and addressing the structural aspects of the Kashmir issue which continues to sap India’s diplomatic, military and financial reserves and stall conciliation between India and Pakistan.

First, after battling insurgencies in Punjab and Kashmir Valley, a vital institutional lesson had been learnt that politicians are better in the governing seat than bureaucrats. After almost a decade of violence, the 1992 Punjab Assembly elections, which were held under the shadow of violence, became a key catalyst in containing militancy. Though not as effectively, the 1996 J&K Assembly election also helped in the same way. As long as a political vacuum exists in the governing structure, it is a continuous reminder to the world that the situation is far from normal. Internally, after nearly three years of bureaucratic rule, local confidence and initiative can only be enabled by restoration of democratic rule.

Second, the vicious cycle of majoritarian impulse both at the Centre and in the region has fomented a complicated dynamic. Like other conflicts, J&K has its own specificities and even the August 5, 2019 development cannot be seen devoid of its multi-dimensional context. The decision of the central leadership seems to be purely ideological as it had always been a part of the BJP’s manifesto. At the same time, the political approach of the state’s political elite towards the complex realities within the state made the task of the BJP easier.

In the last seven-decades, there were several saner voices from J&K who continuously warned the state’s political elite to address ethnic, religious and regional tensions. The warnings went unheeded, and this is no less a reason that even after two years, no political party in India has the gumption to support the demand for reversal of the revocation of Article 370. In that context, the failure to accord residency rights to refugees who came to J&K from Pakistani Punjab in 1947, and who were mostly Dalits, provided a potent argument for the revocation of Article 370. Even the rights of J&K women who were married outside the state were initially opposed by its political elite. The fear of change in religious demographics drove the local parties to oppose these commonsensical steps.

Three, one of the reasons being cited for Modi’s recent initiative is a bid to enlist the support of J&K parties for the delimitation exercise. This may have led to undue expectations among some stakeholders within J&K that it would address regional, ethnic and geographical grievances. In the last Assembly, the Kashmir Valley had 46 seats and Jammu 37. No major change is expected in terms of the proportion of the J&K Assembly seats between the two regions. According to the 2011 census, Kashmir’s population is nearly 1.6 million more than that of Jammu, although Jammu is nearly double the size of the Valley by area. Because of the structural realities— Kashmir is relatively more homogenous than Jammu geographically, and by religion and ethnicity— it is unlikely that any delimitation exercise could address the complex ethnic and geographical gulf that exists within J&K. There is enough scholarly work on how to address these ethnic and regional tensions. What is required to actually do it is political bandwidth and intellectual honesty.

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Four, the impact of Modi’s outreach on the ongoing backchannel discussions between India and Pakistan will be limited. Actually, Pakistani fears of potential demographic change in J&K due to the revocation of Article 370 are exaggerated and not in congruity with facts. Only one lakh residents, who didn’t have state subjects’ rights earlier, have got domicile rights so far. In some respects, the current requirements to get J&K domicile rights are more stringent than to get permanent residency or citizenship rights in richer countries like the US or the UK. An adult requires 15 years of stay in J&K to get domicile status, and till then s/he cannot buy land. The Pakistani obsession with J&K is predicated on far more complex factors. Some of them have become quite independent of the Pakistani State’s approach on these issues.

Given all this, Modi’s recent meeting with J&K political leaders may help initiate the electoral process with greater inclusivity, but this alone will not be enough to create a stable and harmonious equilibrium between J&K and the rest of India, something that has already eluded four generations post-1947.

(The writer is the author of ‘Across the LoC’, published by Columbia University Press)

Disclaimer: The views expressed above are the author’s own. They do not necessarily reflect the views of DH.