BRICS-11 and India’s foreign policy trajectory

With the announcement that six new members are to join BRICS from the beginning of 2024, the grouping enters a new era. The attention devoted to the Johannesburg Summit by the international community reflects expectations that the group, which will soon double its bench strength to a team of 11, can be expected to make a bigger impact in global affairs. New Delhi will have to be particularly active to ensure that that impact accords with our priorities and interests.

China has been for over a year the main protagonist for expansion, with India and Brazil adopting a more cautious approach. The background to this is China’s changing policy towards BRICS since it was first proposed by Russia two decades ago. India, like Russia, saw merit in BRIC (South Africa was included in 2010 making it BRICS) to promote multipolarity; and like Brazil it sought economic synergies, while simultaneously leveraging BRIC for reform of global institutions including the United Nations in line with contemporary realities.

China which prioritised its ties with United States at that time, wanted emphasis on economic co-operation and related issues. However, since around 2015, China has sought to steer BRICS in line with Beijing’s foreign policy agenda, like promoting the Belt and Road Initiative (including the China Pakistan Economic Corridor, which is an affront to Indian sovereignty); and, more recently, trying to garner the group’s support in its disputes with the US.

In May 2022, China invited foreign ministers of nine countries to a virtual BRICS foreign ministers outreach meeting; this was unusual since outreach is usually for leaders at summit meetings. India and Brazil have both worried that China was pushing expansion to clinch leadership of BRICS and sought to work on principles and procedures. With Russia increasingly supportive of China ever since it got bogged down in the Ukraine war, it did not provide a balance. South Africa, the first beneficiary of expansion, seemed disinclined to question China’s methodology.

With over 40 countries expressing interest in joining and 22 having applied for it, a decision could not be postponed indefinitely. The 2022 BRICS Summit agreed that expansion would go forward but based on consensus on guiding principles, standards, and criteria.

Not much information has emerged on the criteria and standards applied in selecting the six new members. Why Indonesia and Nigeria, the biggest countries in their regions (in population and GDP terms), were not included has not been reported. Why not Bangladesh, which is already a shareholder in the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB)? International news agencies had reported that India initially suggested that countries under international sanctions not be admitted just now; however, Iran was included while Venezuela was not.

India has good relations with Iran, and with all the new entrants (as also with most still on the waiting list). It has close ties with the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and both the UAE and Saudi Arabia are important trade partners, and suppliers of our oil imports. We have valued relations with Egypt and Ethiopia. New Delhi can, hence, plan to work with these new members to keep BRICS focused on multilateralism, reform of global governance, and economic co-operation; i.e as voices of the Global South.

Contrary to speculation before the summit, there was no announcement of a plan for a BRICS currency, just greater use of national currencies. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s prediction that “de-dollarization” is irreversible, may take some more time.

In the current global atmosphere, many, including Saudi Arabia, seek alternatives to the US dollar (USD) because Washington has misused the ‘exorbitant privilege’ of the USD’s role in international transactions, and as the global reserve currency. Saudi Arabia values China and India as key customers for oil, and as suppliers of infrastructure, and goods and services. Some oil sales in Chinese yuan will continue, however with the Saudi riyal still pegged to the USD, ‘de-dollarization’ will be a work in progress.

Each new entrant will, of course, seek to maximise its own gains from membership. Iran has declared its joining as a strategic success for its foreign policy. It noted Iran’s unique geopolitical position and potential contribution of transport corridors for India to Russia, and for China to the west. Like Saudi Arabia and the UAE, Iran has assured that it will be a reliable supplier of oil. But all three sell — and will continue to sell — to the whole world on commercial terms; and the Indian social media chatter about a BRICS energy bloc sounds like spin to justify our joining the decision on expansion.

Argentina may provide some diversion, as it has presidential elections in October with two candidates having expressed disinterest in joining BRICS. The Argentine President was not listed among participants at the outreach in Johannesburg. On August 23, Argentina welcomed IMF’s approval of a $7.5 billion financing facility; even as Brazil’s President at BRICS called IMF loans “suffocating”!

The six new members will undoubtedly bring new resources and synergies to the organisation. They could also slightly reduce China’s preponderance in economic weight. Currently, BRICS’ share of global GDP is 25 per cent of which China alone accounts for 18 per cent; and in world trade, China accounts for 12 per cent of BRICS’ total of 17 per cent!

As the Johannesburg summit experience shows, India and Brazil will have to find partners among the new members to keep the group focused on an agenda of interest to all; and arrived at by consensus. The time is right for a focus on the needs of the Global South — for development, food and energy security, and a rightful place in institutions of global governance. The Global South does not need a confrontation with the G-7 or any other group. When the BRICS-11 gets a new name to reflect the new team, it can also reflect that it is into many, long, league games — and not a knock-out tournament.

(Ranjan Mathai is former Foreign Secretary of India and High Commissioner to the United Kingdom.)

Disclaimer: The views expressed above are the author's own. They do not necessarily reflect the views of DH.