Chief of Defence Staff: A year on

Defining Role

India’s first Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) Gen Bipin Rawat has completed a little over one year in office. With China recently unveiling its 14th Five-Year Plan, aiming to bring its military on par with that of the United States by 2027, it would of interest to observe if the appointment of the CDS has helped the Indian military spruce up its strategy and organisation in any manner.

When the CDS assumed charge on January 1, 2020, it was reported that he would be the Principal Military Adviser to the government (read Prime Minister) and he would head the newly created Department of Military Affairs (DMA). Additionally, he would assume charge of the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS), serve as the permanent Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (CoSC), head the Tri-Service Commands, be a member of the Defence Acquisition Council and the Nuclear Command Authority.

Quite a tall order, but the post doesn’t seem to have been adequately equipped with the statutory mandate to perform effectively. The military had yearned for and imagined that a CDS would play a vital role in bringing about the true integration of Services HQ with the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and expedite defence modernisation. However, after one year, it is indeed of great concern that the office of the CDS (read DMA) appears to be focussed on administrative issues such as the increase in retirement age, reduction in pension, closure of CSD canteens at peace stations, etc., that have absolutely no strategic significance. One of the first initiatives announced by Gen Rawat was to create an Air Defence Command, and it is yet to materialise; and the creation of Theatre Commands seems to be an even longer haul.

It is beyond comprehension as to what prompted the government to create a Department of Military Affairs within the MoD when the Integrated Defence Staff was already functioning since 2001, only awaiting the appointment of a CDS. As Service Chiefs continue to exercise command over their respective Service, the CDS as the head of the IDS would be rightly placed to promote joint training initiatives, validate joint operational plans and act as a catalyst in defence modernisation.

For all this to be achieved, however, the role and functioning of the CDS should be spelt out; particularly the role of the CDS as the ‘Principal Military Adviser’ to the Prime Minister, vis-à-vis the Defence Secretary, who continues to be the ‘Principal Adviser’ to the Defence Minister. Such vital aspects are never left to chance, basing them on an individual’s equations with the political leadership of the day. They need to be appropriately institutionalised, mandated and published.

Currently, the Defence Secretary functions as the head of the Department of Defence and is additionally responsible for coordinating the activities of the five departments in the ministry, including the newly created DMA. The Defence Secretary draws his functional powers from the Cabinet Secretariat–Manual of Office Procedures (CS-MoP) which clearly states that the Secretary of the Department “is the principal adviser of the Minister on all matters of policy and administration within his Ministry/Department, and his responsibility is complete and undivided.” If the Defence Secretary is coordinating the affairs of all the five departments including the DMA as the Principal Adviser, what is the status of the 4-star CDS?

The Indian military is not an expeditionary force. However, if there is a convincing need to create Theatre Commands in pursuit of joint operations and interoperability, replacing the existing 17 Service-specific Commands by fewer Theatre Commands would be the most challenging task for the CDS. If the experiences of the US, UK and other major militaries are anything to go by, such major military reforms could be pushed through only with steadfast backing from the government, taking all three services into confidence and aligning the entire military leadership with the desired outcomes of this humungous exercise, which may eventually need constitutional validity through an Act of Parliament.

For the appointment of the CDS to be purposeful, the following measures are imperative:

Abolish the DMA and facilitate the CDS to take complete control of the IDS, keeping its functioning outside the purview of the Defence Secretary.

Revise the CS-MOP, Allocation of Business Rules, Transaction of Business Rules and the Warrant of Precedence, clearly bringing out the role and responsibilities of the CDS as the Principal Military Adviser to the PM, clearly different to the roles and responsibilities of the Defence Secretary which may also now need to be re-drafted.

Make the CDS a permanent member of the Cabinet Committee on Security, facilitating single-point military advice to the National Security Council.

The Cabinet should spell out a Defence Policy Guidance (DPG), with a 15-year horizon, in the light of prevailing and forecast geopolitical scenario and assist the CDS in preparing a clear roadmap for military modernisation.

To remove the stigma of “Attached Offices”, and to integrate the Services HQ with MoD, a beginning needs to be made by augmenting the IDS with senior officials from the MoD.

In the absence of a clear mandate and constitutional validity for the functioning of the CDS, the entire effort of instituting one seems to be of little consequence, much less competent to drive any significant reforms. The current arrangement needs a complete overhaul if that is to be achieved.

(The writer is the author of “India’s Higher Defence–its Organisation and Management”)