China’s cops are coming to a city near you

By Karishma Vaswani

China’s international policing activities are increasing in size and scope, particularly in the Global South. This risks giving the world’s second-largest economy more influence in nations where it’s already forging ahead through diplomacy and economic relationships. It’s a worrying trend, especially as Washington — with President-elect Donald Trump running things from next year — and Beijing jostle for leadership in the developing world.

These security operations are helping the Communist Party protect its interests abroad, a new report from the International Institute for Strategic Studies shows, while promoting Beijing’s image as a responsible security player. China is doing this, the report adds, through the export of technology, and the integration of technicians into the security agencies of foreign countries, providing Beijing with vital intelligence opportunities.

This is not an entirely new development, but merits further scrutiny. In September, China announced that it’s training thousands more foreign law enforcement officers as part of President Xi Jinping’s Global Security Initiative, which was launched in 2022. His vision is to create an alternative security structure to run parallel to the American-led word order.

It’s already causing some controversy. Think tanks point to Beijing’s use of its global police force as a nontraditional means of projecting strategic power in the Indo-Pacific and Central Asia. Others say training programs for African police officers have introduced Communist Party-style authoritarian tactics. At times, operations are even less transparent. In July, Canada reported details of what it says are covert Chinese police units within its borders. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police has said it’s investigating the allegations, although a spokesperson for China’s embassy in Ottawa denied the reports.

When China is asked about these overseas police outposts, it either denies that stations exist, or says that they’re service centers providing administrative services for overseas citizens — which isn’t entirely untrue. Still, the IISS study found the Chinese government, while ensuring the safety of its nationals abroad, is providing training or even joint patrols to host countries.

Often, the reasons are benign — and the other nation is asking for the help. Chinese police officers have signed cooperation agreements with numerous countries across Asia, Latin America, the Pacific and Sub-Saharan Africa. Beijing offers to embed its officers in the national police forces of partner countries, and training programs, as well as joint patrols. It’s also exporting its digital and traditional security equipment, becoming a global supplier of choice, particularly in developing economies.

Pakistan, where Beijing has expanded its Belt and Road Initiative, is one such example. The South Asian nation already gets its surveillance tech and police equipment from Beijing, and has signed a law-enforcement agreement. Last month, the two sides reaffirmed their commitment to work together on securing Chinese projects and citizens who have been the target of militant attacks recently.

But these arrangements have drawn censure, while some have been cancelled or changed. The Italian government, for instance, pulled out of a policing tie-up a year before it withdrew from the Belt and Road Initiative, suggesting that Beijing’s help was no longer needed once the economic relationship had served its purpose.

China’s police presence in the Pacific started with a memorandum of understanding with Fiji in 2011. The pact came under review over concerns of Beijing’s excessive involvement and worries that it could undermine democratic systems in the Pacific, but was upheld earlier this year.

In other cases, human-rights groups found that Chinese studying abroad were also being surveilled from these stations, adding to concerns that Beijing’s harsh domestic security apparatus is finding fresh life overseas. The increased presence globally gives China a larger role on the international scene, an ability to monitor its citizens, gather intelligence, and get an insight into the security structures of nations it’s trying to build closer ties with.

Washington and its allies should work together to assess the geopolitical risk the growing number of these forces pose, especially in regions of diplomatic or security rivalry. An obvious solution would be for host countries with close ties to the US, or other proxies for Washington — like Australia and Japan — to simply stop asking for Chinese help. But alternative options, such as Australia’s Pacific Policing Initiative, need to be part of the plan. Providing funds for developing countries in the Global South to invest in their own domestic policing capacity — often underfunded or in need of modernization — would help wean them off Beijing’s assistance.

China isn’t trying to be a geopolitical security guarantor in the way the US has done around the world. But at this level, it doesn’t have to. It’s a transactional relationship — a way to enhance its diplomatic position, without getting into the messy business of having to protect nations from aggressors. Forging relationships with the internal security personnel of host countries is one way to gain insight and influence in a vital arm of any nation’s domestic power structure. Beijing externalizing its vision of national security to make the world more conducive for its ambitions, opens another front of rivalry with the US. It's one Washington can't afford to ignore.