<p>The recent ruling by a constitution bench of the Supreme Court has expanded the scope of the provision for anticipatory bail in the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) and in the process highlighted the importance of the right to life and liberty of citizens. The court has interpreted and liberalised the provision, Section 438 of the CrPC, on the basis of the citizens’ fundamental rights and the assumption that a person should be held innocent until proved guilty of a crime. It ruled that no restriction should ordinarily be fixed for anticipatory bail and, once granted, it can continue until the end of the trial. Anticipatory bail is the protection granted by a court to a person who apprehends that he may be arrested on a charge of having committed a non-bailable offence. The provision for it was introduced in the CrPC on the recommendation of the Law Commission in 1973. </p>.<p>The commission had said that the provision was needed to give protection to people who may be implicated in false cases by influential persons “for the purpose of disgracing them or for other purposes by getting them detained in jail for some days.’’ It had also thought that anticipatory bail should be granted when the accused is not likely to abscond or to misuse his liberty while on bail. These norms have not always been observed, especially in cases where political personalities are involved, and so the court’s re-statement of the rationale for bail is timely and relevant. The court said that the tendency to implicate political rivals in cases is “showing signs of steady increase.’’ So, the norms that it reiterated should serve as guidelines for lower courts which have to frequently deal with requests for anticipatory bail. The court did well to make it clear that denial of bail amounts to deprivation of personal liberty, and so lower courts should “lean against the imposition of unnecessary restrictions on the scope of Section 438.’’ It also does not favour curtailing the courts’ discretionary power to grant anticipatory bail, as that would be “dangerous.’’ </p>.<p>Basically, the court has reaffirmed the principle that bail is the norm and jail is the exception. This is as true in the case of anticipatory bail because the charge is yet to be formally made. The court has said that conditions can be imposed for granting bail, but only on a case to case basis. The ruling underlined the value of the citizen’s rights by stating that the rights which the citizens cherish deeply are fundamental, but the restrictions are not fundamental. The statement has a resonance and relevance even beyond the matter of bail which was before the court. </p>
<p>The recent ruling by a constitution bench of the Supreme Court has expanded the scope of the provision for anticipatory bail in the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) and in the process highlighted the importance of the right to life and liberty of citizens. The court has interpreted and liberalised the provision, Section 438 of the CrPC, on the basis of the citizens’ fundamental rights and the assumption that a person should be held innocent until proved guilty of a crime. It ruled that no restriction should ordinarily be fixed for anticipatory bail and, once granted, it can continue until the end of the trial. Anticipatory bail is the protection granted by a court to a person who apprehends that he may be arrested on a charge of having committed a non-bailable offence. The provision for it was introduced in the CrPC on the recommendation of the Law Commission in 1973. </p>.<p>The commission had said that the provision was needed to give protection to people who may be implicated in false cases by influential persons “for the purpose of disgracing them or for other purposes by getting them detained in jail for some days.’’ It had also thought that anticipatory bail should be granted when the accused is not likely to abscond or to misuse his liberty while on bail. These norms have not always been observed, especially in cases where political personalities are involved, and so the court’s re-statement of the rationale for bail is timely and relevant. The court said that the tendency to implicate political rivals in cases is “showing signs of steady increase.’’ So, the norms that it reiterated should serve as guidelines for lower courts which have to frequently deal with requests for anticipatory bail. The court did well to make it clear that denial of bail amounts to deprivation of personal liberty, and so lower courts should “lean against the imposition of unnecessary restrictions on the scope of Section 438.’’ It also does not favour curtailing the courts’ discretionary power to grant anticipatory bail, as that would be “dangerous.’’ </p>.<p>Basically, the court has reaffirmed the principle that bail is the norm and jail is the exception. This is as true in the case of anticipatory bail because the charge is yet to be formally made. The court has said that conditions can be imposed for granting bail, but only on a case to case basis. The ruling underlined the value of the citizen’s rights by stating that the rights which the citizens cherish deeply are fundamental, but the restrictions are not fundamental. The statement has a resonance and relevance even beyond the matter of bail which was before the court. </p>