<p>Two major attacks that Maoists have carried out in Chhattisgarh’s Bastar region in a span of 10 days underscore their continuing capacity to inflict heavy losses on the security forces. On March 23, a bus carrying security personnel was blown up by an improvised explosive device (IED) in Narayanpur district. Five District Reserve Guard personnel were killed in that strike. Then came the Maoist ambush of security personnel in Sukma district on April 3, which has left 22 jawans dead, 32 injured and one missing. The toll may rise. More than 400 Maoists are said to have carried out the ambush on the security personnel. A gunfight ensued but the jawans were clearly outnumbered and outgunned, resulting in the high casualties. While details of what transpired are still emerging, it appears that a major security operation was underway in the area to nab Hidma, commander of the Maoists’ Battalion No 1, who was reportedly in the area. Around 1,000 security personnel as well as auxiliary forces were pushed into the jungles for the operation. However, from what has resulted, the forces seem to have walked into a trap laid by the Maoists.</p>.<p>Although the number of Maoist attacks have fallen in recent years and the area over which they wield influence has declined considerably, in the Bastar region, it is the rebels who continue to call the shots. Here the Maoists hold the advantage, adept at playing the security forces by feeding them ‘intelligence’ and then drawing them into a trap. In contrast, the security forces continue to operate like a big bumbling army. Rather than sending thousands of troops into the jungles, they should be sending small units of nimble-footed troops to act on solid, actionable intelligence. Apparently, senior police and paramilitary officials were being brought in by helicopter over the last 2-3 weeks to plan the operation to nab Hidma. Surely, this heightened activity would have alerted the Maoists, who would have then planned and laid the ambush. The gunfight is said to have lasted over five hours. Why were the ambushed jawans not provided reinforcements, especially since there were hundreds of troops in the area? Was there a communications failure? </p>.<p>It is evident that the quality of intelligence input available to the security forces in Bastar is at best patchy. This is because the State is yet to win the confidence of the locals. Especially in Bastar, the benefits of development promised by successive governments has failed to reach the Adivasis. They have little reason to support the State and to provide the forces with inputs on the Maoists.</p>
<p>Two major attacks that Maoists have carried out in Chhattisgarh’s Bastar region in a span of 10 days underscore their continuing capacity to inflict heavy losses on the security forces. On March 23, a bus carrying security personnel was blown up by an improvised explosive device (IED) in Narayanpur district. Five District Reserve Guard personnel were killed in that strike. Then came the Maoist ambush of security personnel in Sukma district on April 3, which has left 22 jawans dead, 32 injured and one missing. The toll may rise. More than 400 Maoists are said to have carried out the ambush on the security personnel. A gunfight ensued but the jawans were clearly outnumbered and outgunned, resulting in the high casualties. While details of what transpired are still emerging, it appears that a major security operation was underway in the area to nab Hidma, commander of the Maoists’ Battalion No 1, who was reportedly in the area. Around 1,000 security personnel as well as auxiliary forces were pushed into the jungles for the operation. However, from what has resulted, the forces seem to have walked into a trap laid by the Maoists.</p>.<p>Although the number of Maoist attacks have fallen in recent years and the area over which they wield influence has declined considerably, in the Bastar region, it is the rebels who continue to call the shots. Here the Maoists hold the advantage, adept at playing the security forces by feeding them ‘intelligence’ and then drawing them into a trap. In contrast, the security forces continue to operate like a big bumbling army. Rather than sending thousands of troops into the jungles, they should be sending small units of nimble-footed troops to act on solid, actionable intelligence. Apparently, senior police and paramilitary officials were being brought in by helicopter over the last 2-3 weeks to plan the operation to nab Hidma. Surely, this heightened activity would have alerted the Maoists, who would have then planned and laid the ambush. The gunfight is said to have lasted over five hours. Why were the ambushed jawans not provided reinforcements, especially since there were hundreds of troops in the area? Was there a communications failure? </p>.<p>It is evident that the quality of intelligence input available to the security forces in Bastar is at best patchy. This is because the State is yet to win the confidence of the locals. Especially in Bastar, the benefits of development promised by successive governments has failed to reach the Adivasis. They have little reason to support the State and to provide the forces with inputs on the Maoists.</p>