Why South Asia is divided over Russia-Ukraine

IN PERSPECTIVE

On March 2, the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution demanding that Russia “immediately, completely and unconditionally withdraw all of its military forces from the territory of Ukraine…” Although the resolution condemned Russia’s actions, it is non-binding on Moscow. South Asian countries, rather than taking a unified stance, were split on the issue. Nepal, Bhutan, the Maldives and Afghanistan voted in favour of the resolution while India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh abstained. Economic and geopolitical considerations influenced voting.

The four countries that voted in support of Ukraine are the smallest and most vulnerable states in the region, and thus most concerned about losing sovereignty and foreign policy autonomy due to great power competition. They have made a symbolic statement by voting in line with their foreign policy, which prioritises protecting territorial sovereignty. In the past, Nepal has more often than not followed India on crucial votes at the UN, with Myanmar being the latest example, when the UN sought a resolution against the junta’s atrocities on the Rohingya in June 2021. India and Nepal abstained. The Russia-Ukraine vote at UNGA is one of the first instances of Nepal striking out on its own.

According to the latest World Bank data, among the eight countries in South Asia, India, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka have substantial trade with Russia. Ranked lowest on this count are the Maldives and Bhutan.

Since 2015, Nepal has run a trade deficit with Russia, it imports more goods from Russia than it exports. Major exports include black tea and carpets whilst imports consist of agriculture products, including dried peas, and military equipment such as aircraft. As of July 15, 2020, Nepal had got around $5.6 million in Foreign Direct Investment from Russia. In recent years, Nepal has begun to align itself more with the US. The US is among the largest investors in Nepal, with $109 million in FDI invested in 418 companies, generating 18,848 jobs. Unsurprisingly, Nepal’s biggest trading partner is India, making up at least 60% of its goods traded. As such, even if Russia were to curb its trade with Nepal, it would hardly make a dent in its economy.

The same cannot be said for Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, which are significant importers of commodities, including wheat, from Russia. Tea is the main export item from Sri Lanka to Russia. According to export figures, in 2020, the export value of tea to Russia was over $142 million. Sri Lankan Foreign Secretary Jayanath Colombage said the economic impact on Sri Lanka would be “severe” from the conflict. He added: “We will have to pay more for our fuel and gas, our tea market will get affected”.

Of all the South Asian countries, India is most keen to maintain an amicable relationship with Russia. Russia/the Soviet Union has previously given political support on the Kashmir issue by abstaining or vetoing UNSC resolutions. For India, Russia’s political support at the UNSC is essential, until at least India itself is accorded a seat on the council.

In terms of trade, the two countries are fairly big partners. Russia’s exports to India stood at $6.9 billion while India exported $3.33 billion worth of goods to Russia in 2021. Indian officials are concerned that vital supplies of fertilizer from Russia could be disrupted as sanctions intensify, threatening India's vast farm sector. In addition, Russia is helping India with nuclear energy expansion: the two nations signed a far-reaching agreement on nuclear cooperation in 2017. The Kudankulam nuclear power plant is a key partnership. India, in turn, offers a potentially huge market that Moscow cannot afford to undermine.

India is also a heavy importer of Russian-made weapons. The latest example is India’s acquisition of the S-400 Triumf air-defence systems, despite US opposition and threats of sanctions. India will likely continue to import a significant number of weapons systems from Russia.

Interwoven geopolitical and economic reasons act as an undercurrent to South Asian countries’ differing stance on a great power’s morally dubious actions. The vote was a tactful and deliberate decision, made by smaller and larger counterparts in South Asia, which gives an insight into the foreign policy decision-making of each country. Each South Asian country had its own reason/s to remain neutral or vehemently condemn Russia’s actions. Naturally, the smaller countries with little by way of economic or military ties to Russia, followed their moral conscience. For those that abstained, the reasons have been mainly fuelled by realpolitik, acknowledging that they could not afford to fall out of Russia’s favour.

(The writer is a researcher at a private security consultancy in Singapore)