<p>Can democracy be a guiding principle of a country’s foreign policy? If a country is forced to choose between political values and national interests, what should take precedence? Or to put it somewhat differently, should the nature and type of political system in a given country matter for formulating foreign policy towards that country?</p>.<p>All these questions come to the fore as the world, and more importantly, India, saw Myanmar’s military assuming control of the country. The military has reversed the gains of a democratic process of a decade, detained democratic political leaders including the Aung San Suu Kyi and has promised to hold fresh elections within a year.</p>.<p>This latest development points towards the complexity of the relationship between democracy and the military as well as the balancing act that India has to undertake while dealing with non-democratic regimes in its neighbourhood including in Myanmar.</p>.<p>A cursory glance at the political history of South Asia reveals that only India and Sri Lanka have managed to remain democratic since attaining independence. In all the other states, some form or the other of authoritarian government has been in power for long periods of time.</p>.<p>Pakistan and Myanmar were dominated, even when civilian governments were in power, by the military. Nepal was ruled by a monarchy till 2006 and Bhutan, despite the onset of democracy, is still a constitutional monarchy. Bangladesh was ruled by the military between 1975 and 1991 and then again, the military was willing to return to power during 2006-2008. </p>.<p>Afghanistan, through the civil wars and insurgencies, has never had a truly democratic government and with a resurgent Taliban, there are serious questions over the survival of a democratic political system. The Maldives, for long, had been ruled by authoritarian rulers.</p>.<p>To top it all, a politically-closed and increasingly repressive China is next door to South Asia. It is quite keen to export its governance and ideological model to the world. Thus, democracy is not a prevailing political system in and around the region where India’s critical strategic interests lie. </p>.<p>In fact, the last decade-and-a-half has witnessed some tangible gains in the democratisation of South Asia. Hence, India has been forced to do a balancing act between support for democratic forces and the need to engage with non-democratic regimes for ensuring national interest. Support for democratic forces is considered as a morally superior position. However, foreign policy and national security policies are essentially amoral in nature and are designed to pursue national interests.</p>.<p>It has been observed the world over, whenever there is a dilemma to choose between values and interests, interests triumph. Even the United States (US) which prides itself as a beacon of democracy has propped up non-democratic regimes in many parts of the world to support its interests.</p>.<p>In the past, India’s sympathies and support for Aung San Suu Kyi has cost it much political ground in Myanmar. China was the largest beneficiary of India’s reluctance to engage with the military during the 1990s. Myanmar's military junta and China enjoyed a much closer relationship during those years. Interestingly, when India took steps in the 2000s to build ties with the military junta of Myanmar, the US and some other Western governments were critical of India’s position. However, later, recognising the geopolitical importance of Myanmar, the US also opened up to Myanmar. </p>.<p>Therefore, there are lessons from the past that India would do well to remember. Realists would argue that the nature of the regime and its treatment of its citizens are not and should not be a concern for India as long as the regime in power is friendly towards India’s interests. Morally, this is not a tenable position. However, geostrategic realities and economic leverages would temper the liberal enthusiasm for democracy in such a situation.</p>.<p>In Myanmar, China enjoyed as much influence with the democratic government as it used to during the heydays of the military junta owing to these factors. India's Look East/Act East policy hinges on Myanmar and the country is crucial in the evolving geopolitics of the Bay of Bengal. Myanmar’s geostrategic location and role as a bridge between South and Southeast Asia don’t allow India much of a choice between the nature of the regime and India’s fundamental strategic interests. Therefore, democracy or the lack of it can not be a sole factor deciding India's Myanmar policy. </p>.<p>India’s former foreign secretary Shyam Saran said in 2005: “While democracy remains India’s abiding conviction, the importance of our neighbourhood requires that we remain engaged with whichever government is exercising authority in any country in our neighbourhood.” The same logic would most likely be applied while formulating the foreign policy position towards Myanmar. </p>.<p>(<em>Sankalp Gurjar is a Research Fellow with the Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi. Views are personal</em>) </p>.<p><em>Disclaimer: The views expressed above are the author’s own. They do not necessarily reflect the views of DH.</em></p>
<p>Can democracy be a guiding principle of a country’s foreign policy? If a country is forced to choose between political values and national interests, what should take precedence? Or to put it somewhat differently, should the nature and type of political system in a given country matter for formulating foreign policy towards that country?</p>.<p>All these questions come to the fore as the world, and more importantly, India, saw Myanmar’s military assuming control of the country. The military has reversed the gains of a democratic process of a decade, detained democratic political leaders including the Aung San Suu Kyi and has promised to hold fresh elections within a year.</p>.<p>This latest development points towards the complexity of the relationship between democracy and the military as well as the balancing act that India has to undertake while dealing with non-democratic regimes in its neighbourhood including in Myanmar.</p>.<p>A cursory glance at the political history of South Asia reveals that only India and Sri Lanka have managed to remain democratic since attaining independence. In all the other states, some form or the other of authoritarian government has been in power for long periods of time.</p>.<p>Pakistan and Myanmar were dominated, even when civilian governments were in power, by the military. Nepal was ruled by a monarchy till 2006 and Bhutan, despite the onset of democracy, is still a constitutional monarchy. Bangladesh was ruled by the military between 1975 and 1991 and then again, the military was willing to return to power during 2006-2008. </p>.<p>Afghanistan, through the civil wars and insurgencies, has never had a truly democratic government and with a resurgent Taliban, there are serious questions over the survival of a democratic political system. The Maldives, for long, had been ruled by authoritarian rulers.</p>.<p>To top it all, a politically-closed and increasingly repressive China is next door to South Asia. It is quite keen to export its governance and ideological model to the world. Thus, democracy is not a prevailing political system in and around the region where India’s critical strategic interests lie. </p>.<p>In fact, the last decade-and-a-half has witnessed some tangible gains in the democratisation of South Asia. Hence, India has been forced to do a balancing act between support for democratic forces and the need to engage with non-democratic regimes for ensuring national interest. Support for democratic forces is considered as a morally superior position. However, foreign policy and national security policies are essentially amoral in nature and are designed to pursue national interests.</p>.<p>It has been observed the world over, whenever there is a dilemma to choose between values and interests, interests triumph. Even the United States (US) which prides itself as a beacon of democracy has propped up non-democratic regimes in many parts of the world to support its interests.</p>.<p>In the past, India’s sympathies and support for Aung San Suu Kyi has cost it much political ground in Myanmar. China was the largest beneficiary of India’s reluctance to engage with the military during the 1990s. Myanmar's military junta and China enjoyed a much closer relationship during those years. Interestingly, when India took steps in the 2000s to build ties with the military junta of Myanmar, the US and some other Western governments were critical of India’s position. However, later, recognising the geopolitical importance of Myanmar, the US also opened up to Myanmar. </p>.<p>Therefore, there are lessons from the past that India would do well to remember. Realists would argue that the nature of the regime and its treatment of its citizens are not and should not be a concern for India as long as the regime in power is friendly towards India’s interests. Morally, this is not a tenable position. However, geostrategic realities and economic leverages would temper the liberal enthusiasm for democracy in such a situation.</p>.<p>In Myanmar, China enjoyed as much influence with the democratic government as it used to during the heydays of the military junta owing to these factors. India's Look East/Act East policy hinges on Myanmar and the country is crucial in the evolving geopolitics of the Bay of Bengal. Myanmar’s geostrategic location and role as a bridge between South and Southeast Asia don’t allow India much of a choice between the nature of the regime and India’s fundamental strategic interests. Therefore, democracy or the lack of it can not be a sole factor deciding India's Myanmar policy. </p>.<p>India’s former foreign secretary Shyam Saran said in 2005: “While democracy remains India’s abiding conviction, the importance of our neighbourhood requires that we remain engaged with whichever government is exercising authority in any country in our neighbourhood.” The same logic would most likely be applied while formulating the foreign policy position towards Myanmar. </p>.<p>(<em>Sankalp Gurjar is a Research Fellow with the Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi. Views are personal</em>) </p>.<p><em>Disclaimer: The views expressed above are the author’s own. They do not necessarily reflect the views of DH.</em></p>