India’s arms export is growing, so must its scrutiny
A grainy picture of an ostensibly ‘Made in India’ bomb part in Gaza created a social media maelstrom in June, amid growing concern about India’s arms exports exacerbating the suffering of Palestinian civilians. The Gaza war has been closely followed in India vis-à-vis the politics of India’s traditional foreign policy stand on the Palestinian struggle, and its changing geopolitical relations in the region. It also highlighted the less-than-transparent global arms trade and its disproportionate harm to civilians in contemporary conflicts.
This is not the first time India’s nascent, yet growing, arms export industry has been linked with harm to civilians. In 2023, the United Nations’ special rapporteur on human rights in Myanmar noted that India’s arms exports to the country amounted to at least $51 million, that some of these may have been lethally used against civilians, resulting in ‘probable war crimes’, and likely in breach of India’s obligations under the Wassenaar Agreement — a self-regulating, non-binding framework among 42 arms-exporting countries.
As a result of the UN rapporteur’s reports, Singapore, another arms exporter to Myanmar, decreased its exports reportedly by 83 per cent. There is no discernible policy change by India.
In 2022, India exported Akash surface-to-air missiles to Armenia, while the country was in conflict with Azerbaijan. Armenia continues to receive arms from India. In July, the Lemkin Institute for Genocide Prevention raised alarm at the ‘weapons and tactical exchanges’ occurring by the United States, Israel, India, and Europe, to the South Caucasus, contributing to building authoritarian police forces there. There is no discernible policy change by India.
In the last few decades, India has emerged as one of the top importers of arms globally. It has also established an arms export industry — further propelled by the atmanirbharta (self-reliant) vision of the Narendra Modi government. With civilian harm occurring in Gaza, Myanmar, and the Caucasus — scrutiny of these arms transfers could have legal, moral, and reputational risks for India.
Today, such scrutiny has increasingly become the norm for traditional arms exporters, including, via judicial means. India as a relative newcomer to the bloc should front-end its management of civilian harm in arms exports, by adopting a ‘protection of civilians lens’. This is a natural progression for a democratic country with human rights enshrined in its constitution and keen to demonstrate its responsible global power status within a rules-based international system.
Defining protection of civilians
It is a term with slightly differing parameters among UN member states, multilateral, and non-governmental organisations, conveying a recognition of harm to civilians in conflict, and the need to protect them from this harm. The organisation PAX, or Protection of civilians, defines civilian harm as “all negative effects on civilian personal or community well-being caused by use of force in hostilities. Effects can occur directly (death, physical or mental trauma, property damage) or indirectly through the destruction of critical infrastructure, disruption of access to basic needs and services, or the loss of livelihood”.
A protection of civilian lens involves appraisal of civilian harm, by applying international humanitarian law and human rights law, notions of morality, military honour, and humanity. Then applying measures to protect from such harm, including supporting peace negotiations, responding to sexual violence, combating disinformation, scrutinising weapons sales, or curtailing the use of certain types of weapons that cause disproportionate harm.
Application of this lens can avert or stop harm from occurring. The lens focuses on civilians’ needs — rather than the politics of the conflict. So, for example, a protection of civilian lens in the Gaza war will focus on ways to minimise harm endured by civilians on all sides (Israel and Gaza).
The impact of the supply of unregulated arms on civilians is myriad, apart from fuelling and sustaining conflict, it causes large-scale deaths and injuries; damages vital civilian survival infrastructure such as hospitals, and power systems; causes displacement; and contaminates land and water. By adopting this lens for its arms exports, India would score a reputational and moral win.
Stipulate end-use monitoring
Within the polity, this lens can be applied by ensuring adherence to key international instruments signed by India: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Geneva Conventions 1949, the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons 1984, the Missile Technology Control Regime, and the Wassenaar Arrangement 1996.
India could consider signing the Global Arms Trade Treaty 2014, the principal legally binding instrument regulating arms trade. It shares similar regulatory aims to the Wassenaar Arrangement, while also incorporating stronger measures to prevent civilian harm. India is an outlier among democratic arms exporters in not being a signatory. The 112 signatories include the United States, France, and Israel, all arms exporters to India. While Russia is not a signatory, China is a signatory.
There are also numerous instruments regulating the use of certain weapons due to their disproportionate harm to civilians. A new non-binding addition is the 2022 Political Declaration on Strengthening the Protection of Civilians from the Humanitarian Consequences arising from the use of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas with 87 state signatories. It seeks to regulate arms which in 2023 alone, contributed to 63 per cent of civilian deaths in conflict. Leading democratic countries from the global south such as Brazil and Indonesia, as well as France and the US, are signatories. Signing this would be an easy reputational win for India.
India could also strengthen its regulatory regime to ensure the protection of civilians lens is applied to arms sales (defence, and dual-use items). It could stipulate end-use monitoring for civilian harm in export licensing requirements. It could pass legislation to restrict export to parties committing civilian harm, similar to the United States’ Leahy Law, or the European Union Common Position on Arms Exports 2008. It could mandate adherence to the United Nations Guiding Principles on human rights and business by arms manufacturing companies.
Pressure and scrutiny
In Parliament, understanding and consistent application of this lens to arms export is needed. It could be applied to discussions in parliamentary committees such as defence, external affairs and commerce similar to the United Kingdom’s parliament; or Parliament could vote to register a position like the Canadian one did on the Gaza war; or incorporate demarches to the government by Opposition politicians.
Private sector arms manufacturers should take note of increasing global scrutiny on their role in civilian harm and should self-regulate. So, as part of their corporate social responsibility, they could adopt the UN guiding principles and ensure human rights due diligence. Apart from facing reputational and legal risks themselves, their engagement could pose a reputational risk for the Indian State. A recognition of this was demonstrated by the Japanese company Itucho, which ended its defence contracts in light of the Gaza war earlier this year.
Civil society, including think tanks, could play a role in ensuring the application of this lens by the government. They would need to deepen their understanding of this lens and apply it consistently to all situations where arms exports are occurring. My scan of Indian think tanks reveals a paucity of work on this topic, unlike their Western counterparts such as Council on Foreign Relations and Chatham House. The same goes for the Indian media.
Arms sales represent business profits intertwined with security and foreign policy aims, and protecting civilians from harm is rarely the primary consideration for any arms-exporting democracy. However, it is never entirely missing from the conversation either. At global power high tables like the UN Security Council, which India aspires to, it is never absent.
(Sarah Khan is a former UN Civil Servant who consults on Law and Policy in conflict/violence settings vis-a-vis protecting communities and displacement. X: @Khan2005Sarah.)
Disclaimer: The views expressed above are the author's own. They do not necessarily reflect the views of DH.