Iran-Saudi Arabia Deal: China is here for self-interest, propaganda

China’s motivations are not altruistic, and its narrative is disingenuous

Iran and Saudi Arabia have just announced the restoration of diplomatic ties — suspended since 2016 — with China playing the mediator. The development is being widely interpreted as a sign of China’s increasing role in West Asia and ability to match the United States in influence. Beijing’s diplomatic prowess is evident. Xi Jinping, China’s President, first travelled to Riyadh for a state visit in December, and hosted Ebrahim Raisi, Iran’s President, in February before pulling off the latest agreement.

Also worth highlighting is Beijing’s ability to sense an opportunity amidst the complicated geopolitics of the region. The US administration’s 2018 withdrawal from the multilateral Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) deal on the Iranian nuclear programme signed in 2015 was a major blow to the regional security environment. What is more, the current US administration has continued to drag its feet on restoring the agreement. In this context, there is no doubt about ‘China’s support for developing good neighborly relations’ between Iran and Saudi Arabia. This is something that Washington did not actively seek or openly support because of its internal dynamics and ideological rigidities.

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Nevertheless, it needs to be underlined that China’s contribution does not come in a vacuum.

Several factors had to come together for Iran and Saudi Arabia to develop a ‘shared desire’ to resolve their disagreements and as the trilateral statement itself acknowledges, the agreement to resume ties came as a result of two years of talks held in Iraq and Oman between 2021 and 2022. Riyadh also kept Washington in the loop even as it declared its interest in restoring the relationship with Tehran. The Saudi Foreign Minister was in Moscow recently, and in Paris soon after, indicating that Riyadh saw value in keeping other powers informed as a way of guaranteeing the deal’s durability. Beijing, for its part, while expressly stating, “Saudi Arabia and Iran also expressed their appreciation and gratitude to China” was careful not to mention the positive role of other countries in its own Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) spokesperson’s remarks to the press.

Indeed, China’s own motivations are not entirely altruistic.

The MOFA statement about the deal refers several times to the UN Charter, resolution of disagreements “through dialogue and diplomacy”, and respecting the sovereignty of states. While neutral-sounding, the references here possess ‘Chinese characteristics’ — they are aimed at undercutting US dominance. For countries in the region “to take the future into their own hands”, the Chinese spokesperson states explicitly that they will need to “get rid of external interference”. This interference can only be from the US because apparently “China pursues no selfish interest whatsoever in the Middle East”.

China’s support “for the people in the Middle East in independently exploring their development paths” is also disingenuous. For one, the statement covers up the authoritarian nature of most regimes and the lack of any genuine political role “for the people” in much of the region. For another, it promotes China’s ruling communist party’s (CPC) ideas of an illiberal alternative such as its own to what it perceives to be Western liberal, democratic political systems.

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While there is no guarantee that deal will last, the region’s very volatility and record of upended agreements could help Beijing walk away from any impression of failure or to blame it on the US as has now become standard practice for Chinese foreign policy for everything that goes wrong anywhere in the world.

Beyond these narrative or propaganda gains, what are the other benefits from the Iran-Saudi Arabia deal for China?

The Saudis and Americans are in the midst of discussions over potential US support for a civilian nuclear programme in the kingdom, and naming it a major non-North Atlantic Treaty Organization ally — a special status accorded to among others Israel, Qatar, and Jordan in the region — and one which would give it greater access to US weaponry. While China might yet win some limited arms deals from Riyadh and the arms trade with Tehran could grow, progress on issues of greater interest to Beijing such as openness to Chinese digital infrastructure, the use of the Chinese renminbi as trading currency of choice, and the promotion of its financial services in the region will still run into increasing US opposition. Only Iran under Western sanctions will continue to be dependent on the Chinese. But even here, the deal with Riyadh might be seen as Tehran’s own attempts to diversify, and balance external players.

However, China could well gain military, technological, and commercial deals, elsewhere in West Asia, and wider afield by leveraging its perceived rise in standing following the trilateral deal. China has made no secret of its ambitions in the security domain across the globe — and besides its traditional arms sales and military training exchanges, it could push for greater policing and intelligence co-operation as well as military and surveillance basing facilities with other countries in the region.

These Chinese moves might not amount to much in the short term, but their symbolism and potential should not be lost on anyone.

(Jabin T Jacob is Associate Professor, Department of International Relations and Governance Studies, Shiv Nadar Institution of Eminence and Honorary Fellow, Institute of Chinese Studies, Delhi-NCR. Twitter: @jabinjacobt)

Disclaimer: The views expressed above are the author's own. They do not necessarily reflect the views of DH