October 7 Attacks | How long can India continue its nimble diplomacy?

India’s diplomatic tightrope walk has been complemented and reinforced by the positioning of countries such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Jordan, and Egypt.

As we mark the first anniversary of the October 7 terrorist attacks by Hamas on Israel, one cannot help but wonder how the tables have turned!

On October 7, 2023, Israel seemed vulnerable and weak, with its much-vaunted intelligence agency Mossad’s reputation in shatters. Since then, Israel, with the support of its steadfast ally, the United States, has launched an unrelenting war against Hamas and now Hezbollah, Lebanon, Yemen, and Iran, disregarding international criticism about the number of innocent lives lost in collateral damage. As we continue to witness the aftermath of the October 7 attacks, which is widening its radius of destruction, let’s look at New Delhi’s position since then.

Like every other country, India too was taken by surprise by the attack on civilians by Hamas and the capture of hostages by it. As a victim of terrorism itself and having witnessed in its history hostage-taking by terrorists, India reacted fast to the attacks. Prime Minister Narendra Modi, in his tweet, affirmed India’s solidarity with Israel over the terrorist attacks, followed by a phone call with Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and announced an evacuation mission for Indian citizens in Israel. Later, the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) came out with a nuanced response that India supports the resumption of direct negotiations towards a two-state solution.

In subsequent months, one could witness this same balancing act in how it abstained on a UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution calling for an ‘immediate, durable and sustained humanitarian truce’ between Israel and Hamas in October 2023 as it did not explicitly condemn terrorism. It later voted in favour of a resolution in the UNGA that demanded an immediate humanitarian ceasefire in the Israel-Hamas conflict and the ‘immediate and unconditional release of all hostages’ as civilian casualties mounted in Gaza. In September, it again abstained on a UNGA resolution demanding that ‘Israel end its unlawful presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory within 12 months’.

India’s positioning has been determined by multiple factors, like its experience of terrorism and its strong bilateral ties with Israel, its sympathy for innocent civilians caught in the war, and its long-standing support for a two-state solution. While critics might question New Delhi for breaking its traditional stance on the Israel-Palestine issue, it reflects its nimble, adroit diplomacy.

India’s diplomatic tightrope walk has been complemented and reinforced by the positioning of countries such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), among others. Riyadh has condemned Israeli aggression, backed UNGA resolutions in support of Palestine, hosted a joint Arab-Islamic Summit on the crisis, provided billions of dollars in aid to Palestinians, and has put the US-backed normalisation of ties with Israel on the back-burner.

Yet, the Palestinian issue has lost resonance in the minds of Saudi Arabia’s ruling elites. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salam has reportedly told US Secretary of State Antony Blinken that he does not personally care about the “Palestinian issue”. Saudi Arabia was also one of the countries which passed on intelligence about Iran's plans to attack Israel in April despite the Saudi-Iran deal restoring diplomatic ties between them.

The UAE has maintained its relationship with Israel despite its war in Gaza. Even Jordan and Egypt have adopted a pragmatic stance. None of these countries are willing to accept Palestinian refugees on their territory either. All of this has sent mixed signals to the international community, indirectly favouring Israel, and making it easier for India to balance and uphold its interests and values.

As the attacks and counterattacks by Israel and Iran threaten to conflate into a regional war, New Delhi is watching closely. At stake are stable oil imports from the region, the lives of over 8 million of its diaspora and their annual remittances worth over $55 billion, the future of the IMEC project (on which there has been no movement since its announcement at the G20 Summit in India), and the I2U2 ‘minilateral’ grouping.

The immediate task for India, if there is a wider war, would be to work out the logistics of evacuating its diaspora from the region. The larger question is whether India will be able to continue its diplomatic tightrope, and whether it will be able to play a bigger role in bringing peace to the region, given its strong ties with all the rival stakeholders.

(Uma Purushothaman teaches at Jawaharlal Nehru University. X: @Uma_IRteacher.)

Disclaimer: The views expressed above are the author's own. They do not necessarily reflect the views of DH.