Transforming Andaman & Nicobar Islands

In August, Prime Minister Narendra Modi inaugurated the 2,312-km submarine optical fibre cable project between Chennai and Port Blair, which put the far flung and usually tranquil Andaman & Nicobar Islands (ANI) under media glare. This project will bring ANI closer to mainland India digitally and promote e-governance, tourism, fisheries, the blue economy, and maritime logistics.

Speaking on the occasion, Modi said that a maritime hub would be set up in the islands. The government is working on a Rs 10,000 crore trans-shipment port at South Bay in the Great Nicobar Island (GNI), the southern-most island of the group, which lies approximately halfway between Colombo and Singapore along the east-west maritime route. When completed, it could emerge as a viable alternative to Colombo where some 70% of Indian containers are trans-shipped, that too by Chinese companies, which besides causing loss of revenue is also a security risk. Hopefully, bunkering and ship repair facilities would also be set up on GNI, which could undercut the importance of the China-leased Hambantota port in Sri Lanka in the long run.

New Delhi is well aware that India’s economy and security are both linked to the seas. The strategic salience of these islands have increased tremendously since the Chinese surge into the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) began over a decade ago through the so-called ‘String of Pearls’ strategy, anti-piracy patrols, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the increasing Chinese submarine deployments in IOR in recent years. The development of ANI would act as the lynchpin for India’s east-ward push in terms of ‘Act East’ policy, the ‘Indo-Pacific’ policy and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or Quad with the US, Japan and Australia.

The ANI stretch for about 1,000 km in the north-south direction, with the northern-most island of the group, Landfall Island, being some 643 km from the port of Kyaukphu in Myanmar, which is the hub for the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC). The islands dominate the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) along the ‘Ten and Six Degree Channels’ which funnel into the choke point of Malacca Straits, through which at least 70,000 ships transit annually. About 80% of China’s crude oil imports passes through these straits, which is a serious vulnerability and has been termed as China’s ‘Malacca dilemma’. The Indira Point on GNI, the southern-most tip of the islands, is only 90 nautical miles from Aceh in Sumatra. A few years ago, Indonesia agreed to give India access to Sabang in Aceh for development of maritime infrastructure. Thus, India will eventually dominate both sides of the Malacca Straits.

With the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman Sea emerging as an important strategic space, it is clear that India’s only tri-Service Command, the Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC), established in 2001 and headquartered at Port Blair, would need to acquire greater military heft. India has failed to fortify these islands, which are its maritime frontiers, similar to the blunder of waking up rather belatedly to develop infrastructure along its northern land border with China.

The Islands are akin to a fixed aircraft carrier, with four airports spread along the north-south axis. The Indian Navy has recently commissioned an air station, INS Kohassa at Diglipur in the north. The airport at Port Blair, which also has a civilian enclave, is operated by the navy while the airport at Car Nicobar is controlled by the IAF. The navy had earlier commissioned an airbase, INS Baaz, on GNI to keep an eye on the Malacca Straits, aided by the Boeing P8I maritime surveillance aircraft. All these airports need extension and up-gradation to enable permanent basing of military aircraft there and to permit operation of civilian aircraft.

The creation of a third fleet for the navy based in these islands would be required for operations in the South China Sea (SCS), just as China is reportedly planning to create its fourth fleet based in the Hainan Islands for Indian Ocean operations. Similarly, creation of facilities for submarine operations and maintenance are necessary. A permanent amphibious capability of at least one army formation of around 10,000 troops, besides deployment of at least one battalion of combined Special Forces, would also be necessary.

Post-Galwan incident, there has been a spurt in military activities around the ANI. Warships of the navy’s Visakhapatnam-based Eastern Fleet are now deployed at critical positions in the Bay of Bengal and Andaman Sea to keep an eye on Chinese ships that may enter Indian waters. Only in December 2019, a Chinese research ship was sighted carrying out a hydrographic and oceanographic survey in the Andaman waters and was chased away by the Indian Navy. The IAF’s Jaguar aircraft, armed with Harpoon anti-ship missiles, have also been stationed at Car Nicobar recently. Moreover, Indian Navy ships conducted joint exercises with the Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Forces (JMSDF) in June 2020 and passage exercises or PASSEX with the USS Nimitz carrier battle group in mid-July. This was followed recently by INDRA 2020, a joint exercise with ships of the Russian Navy on 4-5 September in the Bay of Bengal. The message to China was clear.

If the Andaman & Nicobar Islands finally get their much overdue strategic and economic transformation, they could act as India’s ‘Great Wall at Sea’ against an aggressive Chinese surge into the Indian Ocean Region and enable India, in turn, to launch itself into the South China Sea.

(The writer is a former Principal Director, Naval Intelligence, and has served as a Director in the Cabinet Secretariat)