Ukraine’s assault inside Russia is Putin’s worst nightmare

By James Stavridis

It has been close to a century since the last invasion of Russia by another sovereign power. That was Hitler’s Germany in June 1941, and it did not turn out well for the Nazis. The military failure echoed Napoleon’s invasion in the early 19th century, which made it to Moscow but was forced to retreat with catastrophic losses.

Now, for the first time in the 21st century, an invading military power, Ukraine, is in possession of hundreds of square miles of Russian territory, capturing Russian military prisoners and forcing a state of emergency and evacuations in the Belgorod and Kursk regions.

It is a stunning turnaround. The Ukrainian military, which seemed for months to be on its back foot as it lost territory to the far larger Russian army, has made more territorial gains over the past couple of weeks than its opponents. What does this mean for the trajectory of the war? How will events play out over the remainder of the summer and into the fall against the backdrop of the US presidential election?

The first and most important point to be made is a military one. For the first time, Ukraine has carried out what more than two years of Western advice and support was designed to help it accomplish: a true combined arms offensive operation.

This means demonstrating, in combat, the coordination of the complex ballet of modern ground warfare. That includes not only infantry movements but also accompanying armor (tanks and armored personnel carriers); artillery (both mobile and emplaced large caliber guns); air (including close air support and deeper attack ops); cyber and information warfare; satellite intelligence and nascent AI guidance; and control of unmanned vehicles, both in the air and on the ground.

Using the panoply of Western-supplied weapons systems, from advanced drones to brand-new F-16 fighters to main battle tanks to long-range ATACMS missiles, the Ukrainians have proved that they can surpass their larger, less nimble opponents. They have also shown the ability to provide logistics supplies, communications and medical capability, something that has been a repeated stumbling block for the Russians.

Also notable has been Ukraine’s ability to prepare and execute the operation despite the presence of of Russian satellites and intelligence operatives. It is much harder to achieve the element of surprise in a modern battlefield under the unblinking eye of modern surveillance systems, from drones to advanced cyber capabilities. Kudos to the Ukrainian planners.

All this plays well for the Ukrainians with three crucial audiences.

First, and vitally for President Volodymyr Zelenskiy, it is a much-needed shot in the arm to the civilian population of Ukraine. Polling over the past months has shown a softening of support for the war and growing dissatisfaction with the government’s conduct of combat, from increased draft requirements to combat failures in the eastern Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The offensive operation into Russia will boost confidence in Ukraine, where nearly 25 per cent of the population has either fled the country or been internally displaced.

The second key audience is in Russia. While President Vladimir Putin has maintained iron-fisted control over the national media (and thus largely controls the diet of commentary his people receive), this is a shocking turn of events. The entire strategic concept of Soviet and then Russian geopolitics since the end of the Second World War was to prevent another invasion of the Russian motherland.

When I was Supreme Allied Commander of NATO, I made several visits to Russia, and I remember how obsessed their armed forces were with the “near abroad” regions around Russia proper. What they viewed as the buffer lands of former Soviet republics including Ukraine and Moldova; Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kurdistan, et al); Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia in the Caucuses; and the Baltics were all now independent of Russia. The Warsaw Pact nations of Eastern Europe, once Soviet satellites, had joined NATO.

Having lost control of the near abroad and foolishly having invaded Ukraine, Putin’s worst nightmare is now unfolding. The Ukrainians are bringing home the consequences of Putin’s attack in a very direct way.

The third and in some ways most consequential audience is the rest of the world, notably the West. For political leaders in the US, European Union and in Asian democracies from Tokyo to Seoul to Canberra, the Ukrainian assault inside Russia validates the strategy of training, equipping and advising the Ukrainian military. The incursion also might make leaders in Beijing, Tehran and Pyongyang question how vigorous their support for Moscow should be.

The military term for the Ukrainian operation is a “salient.” This is in effect a territorial bulge that projects into enemy lines and is surrounded on multiple sides by an opponent. It is a dangerous position to take, particularly against a larger and very angry foe. It seems unlikely that the Ukrainians will want to leave a significant combat force embedded in the metaphorical gut of Russia for a prolonged period of time.

But their bold move has changed perceptions of Ukraine’s military competence. It has also yielded a supply of Russian prisoners of war who could become bargaining chips for Ukrainian soldiers held by Moscow. And if the Ukrainians can hold on to at least some of their gains through the fall, it might be an important part of a negotiating process that seems likely next year.

Does this all mean that Ukraine will press on, heading toward Moscow like the ill-fated rebellion of Yevgeny Prigozhin and his Wagner Group of mercenaries? That’s highly unlikely, given the massive size of Russia compared with Ukraine, although there certainly are examples of smaller nations defeating far larger ones, from the American colonies taking on Great Britain to Vietnam overcoming the US.

More likely, Ukraine won’t overreach. Instead, it at most will construct some defensive lines to hold roughly what it has already conquered. Even that will be difficult against a determined Russian military response, which is sure to come. But the picture of Russian jets bombing Russian villages to drive out Ukrainian soldiers is surely a compelling one for Kyiv.

War is ultimately about measuring risk and return. By sending 10,000 troops and supporting arms into Russia, the Ukrainians are accepting a great deal of risk. But the returns thus far — in terms of prisoners, territory and morale — are already significant. It may be a move that ultimately is more about the negotiating table than the battlefield, and in that sense it is a smart play indeed.

Stavridis is also vice chairman of global affairs at the Carlyle Group. He is on the boards of Fortinet and Ankura Consulting Group, and has advised Shield Capital, a firm that invests in the cybersecurity sector.