Why Indonesia is the fulcrum of the Indo-Pacific

Prabowo Subianto's temper, Islamist connections, and inheritance of Jokowi’s massive parliamentary coalition when added to the authoritarian laws passed by Jokowi will make a slide into authoritarianism a distinct possibility

Last month, Indonesia saw a change of guard from the presidency of Joko Widodo (Jokowi) to that of former army general Prabowo Subianto, and this week news reports suggest that India may extend an invitation to him as the chief guest of our Republic Day Parade, making this a good time to take stock of the country.

Indonesia, which is both secular and democratic — though it has seen democratic back sliding over the recent past — is courted intensely by both China and the United States, and yet remains non-aligned. There are several reasons why this fulcrum of the Indo-Pacific is considered a critical swing state.

Firstly, Indonesia sits astride all the major straits between the Indian and Pacific oceans — Malacca, Sunda, Lambok, Ombai Wetar, and Timor. Not only are these critical for carrying 60% of global sea borne trade but only two of these — Ombai Wetar and Timor — are deep enough for nuclear submarines to pass undetected.

With twice India's per capita income, a quarter of its population of 280 million under the age of 15, the fastest growing online economy in South East Asia, and huge reserves of the very minerals required for the green technology revolution globally underway, Indonesia’s importance is immense and only likely to increase.

This has prompted billions of dollars in FDI from the Chinese in projects ranging from mineral processing to high-speed railways, but despite being a major recipient of Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) investments, Indonesia’s population remains deeply suspicious of China. Nonetheless, because of their integration with the Chinese economy, none of the ASEAN nations wants to abandon their relationship with China in favour of the US, since that would mean a massive cut in their GDPs.

Jokowi the builder

To boost growth back to the 7% levels Indonesia saw under the corrupt military regime of Suharto, which came to an ignominious end with the financial crises of 1997, Jokowi focused massively on 200 infrastructure projects (ports, highways, airports, dams and power plants) though his grandest project, the new capital city of Nusantara, could yet prove to be a white elephant.

Despite this as well as efforts to boost manufacturing and significant deregulation late in his tenure, Indonesia remained protectionist and averaged growth of ~5% during his decade in office. Due to a reduction in poverty, hunger and provision of universal health coverage, Jokowi left office with an approval rating of 75%.

Populist autocrat

Unfortunately, despite being the first non-elite, non-military president whose main draw as mayor of Solo and then governor of Jakarta was his common man image, Jokowi backslid not just on corruption, where he hobbled the anti-corruption commission, but also on liberal democracy and the constitution that had been put in place 25 years ago.

He not only created laws to attack NGO’s and the free press but also brought the police and army back into civilian roles. He tried to create a dynasty of his own by trying to change electoral laws to get his underage younger son elected, a move that was aborted by widespread public protests.

He also unsuccessfully tried to remove the two-term cap on the presidency but succeeded in having his underage elder son, Gibran, sworn in as vice president by two underhand moves. The first was to lower the age eligibility for the vice presidency by getting his brother-in-law who was the chief justice of the constitutional court to rule in his favour.

The second was to fix a deal with his successor and past electoral rival, Prabowo, to take his son and other supporters into his Cabinet in exchange for Jokowi’s substantial electoral support.

Uncertain future under Prabowo

Whatever may have been Jokowi’s drawbacks, unlike other populists he never demonised minorities; in fact, he banned those Islamists who opposed him, and was a good administrator who controlled inflation, provided welfare and expanded incomes (though at the cost of environmental and labour protections).

The same can’t be said about Prabowo who is a son-in-law of Suharto and a notorious former general associated with human rights violations in East Timor, Papua, and Jakarta itself, where pro-democracy students and human rights defenders disappeared and were tortured by him in 1998.

This led to his dismissal from service and a ban on US visas for two decades. Equally disturbing are his poor views of democracy and former avatars as a nationalist and Islamist, even though he now projects himself as a gentle grandfather.

His temper, track record, and inheritance of Jokowi’s massive parliamentary coalition when added to the authoritarian laws passed by Jokowi will make a slide into authoritarianism a distinct possibility. The only check will be the constitutional court and the political elites that he has struck a delicate bargain with. These, especially Megawati Sukarnoputri, had blocked Jokowi’s third term.

Prabowo’s economic future also is uncertain given that he has promised a $30 billion a year mid-day meal scheme to soften his image and additional billions to Nusantara to keep Jokowi on his side. Billions more will have to be given to satisfy the elite coalition backing him. All of this will make juggling the fiscal deficit a trapeze act. Prabowo has promised 8% growth but with a still protectionist economy and a bloated Cabinet this would be a near impossible task.

Nonetheless, barring any major mistakes, Indonesia is likely to grow at a decent clip and so will its importance in Asian and world affairs. Engaging with, leveraging and celebrating a democratic and secular Indonesia is more in keeping with our values and our interests than with any other emerging power.

(Mohsin Raza Khan is Professor, Jindal School of International Affairs, OP Jindal Global University.)

Disclaimer: The views expressed above are the author's own. They do not necessarily reflect the views of DH.