Myanmar: Under the jackboot again

The military is back in charge in Myanmar. Should New Delhi be concerned?

Civil disobedience is brewing in the otherwise quiet alleys of Mandalay, Myanmar’s second-largest city, located in the country’s north, where dissidents are “banging pots and pans.” Medical healthcare workers from smaller towns in Taunggyi and Dagon are conveying their dissent against the nation’s military, called the Tatmadaw, through a Red Ribbon protest. Earlier this week, the Tatmadaw carried out a coup, returning the country to military rule again.

The coup came as a surprise to the world which had viewed Myanmar’s fledgeling democracy as deepening under the leadership of Aung San Suu Kyi. But the reality is that the military never left, and the swift arrests of Suu Kyi and President Win Myint reflect the total control the Tatmadaw enjoys.

Before delving into the internal churning that led to the coup, some facts need to be highlighted. The grounds for the coup stem from the Tatmadaw’s claim that the November 2020 election, won by the National League for Democracy (NLD), was fraudulent. The NLD, headed by Aung San Suu Kyi, won the election obtaining 346 seats in the Hluttaw (Parliament) while the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) won just 30 seats.

Smaller, minority ethnic parties won a total of 47 seats. In fact, even prior to the declaration of the results, the military, along with the USDP, began their campaign to delegitimise the elections, citing irregularities in voter lists and “widespread violation of laws and procedures.” What’s pertinent to note is that the Tatmadaw and the USDP have provided little to no evidence to back their claims. The Union Election Commission (UEC) and other international watchdogs have maintained that the elections were credible and transparent. The Myanmar military’s campaign against the country’s elections ran parallel to Donald Trump’s campaign to delegitimise the US election results. In the US, the institutions of democracy stood up to the challenge; in Myanmar, the military easily overwhelmed them.

Given these facts, three questions arise. First, why did the coup take place? Second, is the timing of the coup important? Third, and importantly, how is the world responding to Myanmar? In answering the first question, we must remember that it was the Tatmadaw that initiated Myanmar’s path to democracy back in 2008. As the architect of the Constitution, the military wrote the rules of the game—how Myanmar would become a “disciplined democracy” on the military’s terms. These terms included constitutional guarantees through which the Tatmadaw retained control over internal security, seats in Parliament and appointments to key posts.

Back in 2015, when the NLD won a landslide victory, it campaigned to amend the controversial Constitution but was later accused of dragging its feet on the matter. On the delay in revising the charter, Kyaw Zwa Moe, editor of The Irrawaddy, claims that U Than Shwe, a top leader from the former military regime “asked” Aung San Suu Kyi, during a meeting in December 2015, to “wait a couple of years” before amending the Constitution. Although that claim hasn’t been substantiated, it is well known that the NLD has faced specific challenges in carrying out constitutional reforms. One such challenge arose in 2017 when the party’s legal adviser and prominent advocate for reform, U Ko Ni, was assassinated. The entire discourse on constitutional amendments indicates how the rules of the game are key to the institutionalised role the military plays in Myanmar’s political landscape.

So far, the NLD has not been able to amend the Constitution, meaning that the Tatmadaw continues to retain its pre-eminence. That begs the first question again—why did the coup occur? The answer lies in the Tatmadaw wanting to the change the very rules it made, and this is where the unpacking of motives is crucial, yet tricky.

Prominent figures in the military held that the Constitution was formulated keeping in mind the interests of the citizens, and for easier public understanding, a single-member plurality voting system was adopted. This system has resulted in two landslide victories for the NLD, leaving the military’s USDP far behind. Furthermore, such a system has been detrimental to minority ethnic parties, who have lost heavily to the NLD. This is where the delegitimisation of the election by the Tatmadaw, and the step it took in initiating the coup, indicate its intention to probably change the electoral system to that of proportional representation. Some Myanmar watchers have suggested that such a move would lend the coup a certain legitimacy within the country. Some reports have suggested, however, that the coup took place to benefit the Tatmadaw Chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing’s personal interests. He is set to retire in six months, and perhaps would not have got an extension; the coup allows him to stay on, extend his power and further enrich his close aides.

Although personal interests could definitely be a key factor, the declaration of emergency for one year, in line with Article 417 of the Constitution, highlights the Tatmadaw’s need to change the rules of the game. This ensures and guarantees its power in controlling State affairs, irrespective of which political party wins future elections.

That brings us to the second question—on the timing of the coup. In recent times, with the widespread international coverage of the Rohingya crisis, not only did Suu Kyi’s image as a democracy crusader lose sheen, she was even dubbed a defender of the military. In such a scenario, the timing of the coup would seem to benefit the Tatmadaw. This fall from grace of the national leader demands a closer analysis in the context of the timing of the coup because it highlights two important aspects. One, that Suu Kyi worked with the military throughout the genocide accusations levied against the Tatmadaw and its Chief; two, how the Western media has misunderstood Suu Kyi’s role in view of this.

Suu Kyi has consistently viewed the military as an important actor in State affairs. For instance, when she first took her seat as leader of the opposition in Parliament in 2012 alongside military officers, she stated, “I have tremendous goodwill toward the military. So, it doesn’t in any way bother me to sit with them.” However, in 2020, in the backdrop of the Rohingya issue, Suu Kyi’s policy of working with the military-led to sanctions being imposed on the country and her reputation in the Western media nosedived. The imposition of sanctions by the West further alienated the military from the negotiating table where peace talks were ongoing with Myanmar’s ethnic armed groups. A combination of these factors seems to have pushed the military to the coup at this time.

How is the world reacting to Myanmar post-coup? The US has released an official statement condemning the military’s actions. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) released a joint statement three days after the putsch condemning the Tatmadaw’s actions and expressing “deep concern” for Myanmar’s democracy. Despite the statement showing a somewhat united front among the members, China did block initial statements condemning the military and warned that international sanctions would make the situation in Myanmar worse. Beijing shares a close relationship with the Tatmadaw and has for decades utilised its veto power in the UNSC to prevent the imposition of sanctions on Naypyidaw. In turn, China has benefitted from gaining several strategic development projects and access to Myanmar’s rich natural resources.

Serendipitously, India is currently a non-permanent member in the UNSC. New Delhi played the role of a “bridge” in formulating the UNSC’s joint statement. Over the past decade, India has walked the tightrope in dealing with its north-eastern neighbour by showing encouragement to the democratic process whilst maintaining ties with the Tatmadaw. Given the radical changes taking place within Myanmar, India would benefit from engaging with the new generation leaders emerging through this turmoil. Additionally, New Delhi should ensure that it remains an active part of the reconciliation process toward democracy so as to offer itself to Myanmar as a strategic alternative to China.

(The writer teaches at the School of Law, Presidency University, Bengaluru)