Pakistan: An uphill road ahead for Nawaz Sharif

Barring a last-minute hurdle, Pakistan will go to its much-delayed election on February 8. It comes in the backdrop of a precarious economy, the political crisis unleashed by Imran Khan’s ouster from power and the rising wave of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) terror.

The Pakistan army is looking for a civilian face, who could stabilise the economy and not upset the civil-military equation.

Veteran politician Nawaz Sharif is back in Pakistan from exile in London, reportedly under a deal with the army, evidenced by the sudden collapse of various judicial cases against him and the pro-army smaller parties gravitating towards his PML(N). He is the most experienced of the political lot, has good connections in Saudi Arabia, one of Pakistan’s sources of funding; and above all, the only one with the potential to counter Imran Khan’s popularity, particularly in the Punjabi heartland. All this makes him attractive to the army leadership. But can he deal effectively with Pakistan’s multiple crises and is his prime ministership a done deal?

The $3 billion, nine-month IMF facility that ends in March 2024, has given a temporary breather to the economy. However, with very heavy external debt repayments due in the coming years, it is far from being out of the woods. Pakistan’s perennial economic woes result from its adversarial posture towards a much bigger and better endowed India that casts an unbearable economic burden; and its tendency all along its existence to live far beyond its means, thereby causing dependence on internal and external borrowing and foreign aid.

Nawaz Sharif has the right instinct on the need to improve relations with India. Besides an eye on the economic imperatives, he also sees a stable relationship with India as a means to erode the salience of the army in Pakistan. He is perhaps the only Pakistani politician, who has shown the courage to speak of a better relationship with India in the run-up to elections – in 2013 and yet again recently, when he faces a tough election. In his last tenure, he pursued the peace process both with the UPA and the successor NDA governments, but his agenda was stymied by the army. His prime ministership could benefit the relationship, but his capacity to deliver will remain contingent upon the will of the army. So far, army chief Asim Munir has by and large followed the policy of tactical restraint vis a vis India, adopted by his predecessor towards the end of his tenure because of Pakistan’s internal compulsions. However, periodic terror attacks in J&K this year have caused some uncertainty and Munir’s thinking on India remains unclear. Greater clarity may emerge once he is done with the task of managing the electoral process.

In his earlier tenures, Nawaz Sharif has not shown the ability to tackle the other structural problem – living far beyond Pakistan’s means. His stints have been known for mega projects – CPEC being the latest example – which might have given a temporary spurt to the economy, but also added to the debt burden. He has not bitten the bullet of putting a greater tax burden on the Pakistani elite, led by the army and its vast business empire. Whether he would do so now, in the event of securing another tenure, remains an open question.

Nawaz has had a tense relationship with all his army chiefs and has, for many years now, been a strong votary of civilian supremacy. He called for the accountability of the former army chief, Qamar Javed Bajwa and the former DG ISI, Faiz Hameed, a few days before his return from exile. Persuaded by senior party colleagues, he did not voice the demand for some time but has come back to it recently, perhaps to counter his newly acquired image of the army’s ‘ladla’ (favourite). Therefore, while the army needs him at this juncture, he may not be their first choice for the prime ministership.

Politically, Nawaz Sharif faces an uphill task in countering the public anger against his party because of the harsh economic steps taken by the Shehbaz Sharif government to restore the IMF programme. There are other open questions. Can he enthuse the growing number of young voters, who reject old-style politics and have been enamoured of Imran Khan? He is yet to clear all judicial hurdles, including the lifetime disqualification from holding public office, handed down to him by the Supreme Court in 2018. The matter has recently come up again before the Supreme Court and he may get relief from the current judicial dispensation.

Imran Khan remains incarcerated. His party has announced his intention to contest from three seats and has also set a new trend by putting out his AI-generated speech. However, with the army chief ill-disposed towards him, the odds against his contesting remain heavy. Several other senior leaders of PTI have either deserted it under army pressure or are also in jail. Rejecting its recent intra-party election, the Election Commission of Pakistan has deprived PTI of its election symbol – a cricket bat; and this on a day when the Supreme Court directed the Commission to address the party’s grievances on a level playing field. It is becoming extremely difficult for PTI to put up a credible fight. Many of Imran’s supporters may, therefore, choose to stay home on the election day.

The army would prefer to have a fractured mandate in the new National Assembly to be able to craft a majority of its choice with the help of the smaller parties accountable to it. In addition to the three such parties, used by it in the last assembly, two more have been floated by pro-army PTI deserters.

All indications point towards a managed election, as in 2018. It will fail to resolve the political crisis and most likely result in a weak government, dependent on the army and incapable of resolving Pakistan’s intractable problems.

A positive turnaround for a secure future for Pakistan would require a radical shift in its internal and external orientation, involving principally living within its means, greater mobilisation of resources, shunning encouragement to religious extremism, redressal of the civil-military imbalance and above all, changing the fundamentals of its relationship with India. Going by Pakistan’s proclivities so far, this is a very tall order.

(The writer is a former High Commissioner to Pakistan and author of the book ‘India’s Pakistan Conundrum Managing a Complex Relationship)